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ABSTRACT 
Water Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
by 
Augustina Yaa Oye Odame, PhD 
Utah State University, 2015 
Major Professor: Dr. Charles Sims 
Department: Applied Economics 
This dissertation comprises three separate studies under the unifying theme of 
“Water Decision-Making under Uncertainty.” The first study evaluates the decision to 
invest in water-saving infrastructure in the face of technical, as well as water supply 
uncertainty. It finds that the price at which one would not produce might be a more 
important consideration in water-saving investment decisions than previously 
thought. It also asserts, by the effect of incorporating after-adoption efficiency 
uncertainty, that a careful identification and consideration of all significant sources of 
uncertainty and their relative impacts on investment outcomes should be undertaken 
in determining where to target policy, as well as future research efforts. 
 
The second study, an extension of the first to allow for incremental 
undertaking of infrastructure investment, finds that the option of gradual increments 
to an investment as opposed to the all-or-nothing investment story, has significant 
impact and potential with regards to investments meant to effect behavioral change 
for improved system outcomes such as more efficient irrigation systems towards 
regional water conservation goals. 
 
The third and final chapter comprises a spatially explicit hydroeconomic 
model of water-use behavior in the Cache Valley of Utah and analyzed the impact of 
individual decisions, actions and interactions on available water supplies in terms of 
both quantity, as well as the efficiency contribution of an omniscient water master to 
overall water-use efficiency of actors in the canal. 
  
 
                          (233 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
Water Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
by 
Augustina Yaa Oye Odame, PhD 
Utah State University, 2015 
Major Professor: Dr. Charles Sims 
Department: Applied Economics 
This dissertation is made up of three separate studies under the unifying theme 
of “Water Decision-Making under Uncertainty.” The first study analyzed a farmer’s 
decision to invest in a more efficient irrigation system given uncertainty about future 
water supplies and his post-investment efficiency. It found the price at which farmers 
would no longer produce to be a bigger consideration in irrigation investment than 
previously thought. It also found support for a careful identification and consideration 
of all significant sources of uncertainty in order to create better policy incentives for 
irrigation technology investments. 
 
The second study extended the first to allow the farmer to gradually update his 
irrigation system rather than undertake a single, complete overhaul. It found that 
giving the farmer this option, has significant impact and potential with regards to 
investments meant to effect behavioral change for improved system outcomes such as 
more efficient irrigation systems towards regional water conservation goals. 
 
The third and final chapter established a spatially explicit hydroeconomic 
model of water-use behavior in the Cache Valley of Utah to evaluate the impact of 
individual decisions, actions and interactions on available water supplies, and whether 
and how a water master’s privileged information about the behavior of users in his 
system may be used to improve system outcomes for users in the canal, downstream 
water requirements and storm-water management. 
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“It is not the quantity of water applied to a crop, it is the quantity of intelligence applied 
which determines the result - there is more due to intelligence than water in every case” 
ALFRED DEAKIN, 1890. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The continuously intensifying scarcity of water resources is a crucial problem in 
almost all contemporary societies (Tsegaye and Vairavamoorthy, 2009). In fact, the 
scarcity, distribution and quality of water resources are highlighted in the literature as 
factors with the greatest propensities to invoke powerful political pressures and potential 
conflict (Wolf et al., 2003).  
This problem becomes even more pertinent in the face of aridity, and with uncertainty 
about the ability of future water supplies to meet future demand in the face of changing 
demographic and hydroclimatic conditions. Utah’s per capita water usage ranks first in 
the country despite being the second driest state in the country (Frankel, 2010). Given the 
region’s high water-use population, limited water supply due to its arid nature, and 
current as well as projected changes in its hydroclimatic conditions, managing water for 
current and future populations is a pertinent issue in the region. 
While agriculture remains the largest user of water, substantial population gains have 
seen increased adaptation of agricultural land, water infrastructure and management 
systems for urban use in the region (Barnett, 2008). Concurrently, increasing variability 
of snowfall and rainfall attributed to climate change has amplified concern and 
uncertainty about future water supplies in the region. While contending with the changing 
human and physical (infrastructure) systems; water management in the region has to cope 
with changing hydroclimatic patterns and its attendant increased uncertainty about future 
water supplies. 
Water management in the region is thus a complex, multi-dimensional system 
challenge which requires decisions on infrastructure projects highly dependent on more 
2 
 
dynamic human and actions (past and future), environmental parameters and processes, 
as well as long-term climate change (Taptiklis, 2011). Infrastructural investment 
decisions of this nature have historically been based on cost-benefit analysis where an 
investment is undertaken only if its net present value is positive. However, in the 
presence of human uncertainty about returns to investment and natural uncertainty about 
future precipitation, the efficiency of these investments depend on more than a cost-
benefit rule (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Their efficiency depends on individual water-use 
behaviors which may factor in additional opportunity costs as well as notions of 
economic efficiency.  
This dissertation thus analyzes long-term water-use decisions such as investments in 
irrigation infrastructure, employing a real options approach to incorporate the value of 
waiting for more information when making investment decisions in the face of 
uncertainty.  Vano et al. (2014) more recently confirmed the need to understand the 
uncertainties inherent in climate predictions, and to better communicate these 
uncertainties to the larger water management community. This study speaks to this need 
and brings out of the tangle of uncertainty debates, useful information that may be readily 
used by water decision makers. 
It also studies, via a bi-level agent-based modeling approach, how day-to-day (short-
term) interactions between individual farmers, residents, water managers and policy 
makers affect investments towards higher water-use efficiency and conservation, and the 
ability of the region’s water supply to respond to the future water shocks and constraints. 
By simulating these behaviors under different scenarios, the study will bring to light the 
conditions that precipitate different agent responses to the changing hydroclimatic 
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conditions in the region and what causes them to switch from one behavioral rule to 
another. 
This combination of methods will provide a larger range of short-term human 
responses to changing environmental conditions, illustrate how these impact over-arching 
water management goals, and provide a more realistic account of the evolving human 
water infrastructure in the region. Distinguishing between these two types of decision-
making is critical for understanding how water-use behaviors adapt to changes in social 
and natural contexts and respond to various sources of uncertainty.  
This is important because while other approaches may show agent behavior as being 
inefficient, they may be creating rules based on the best available information. The 
interesting question then arises of how much uncertainty (from either natural or human 
variability) is needed to make switching from an economically efficient strategy to a rule 
of thumb preferable to agents. By incorporating agent response to changing hydroclimatic 
conditions, the model will provide a framework to help answer this question by exploring 
how natural- and human-induced variability in things like stream flows and field runoff 
may trigger less efficient uses of water. It will help determine whether increased 
uncertainty may make water-users revert to a rule of thumb, to exhibit seemingly 
‘inefficient’ behavior. 
These three unified studies provide insight into how humans impact and are impacted 
by water, and identify several links on the bridge between the qualitative social science 
data on human behavior and quantitative natural science data on water.  
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CHAPTER ONE: WATER-SAVING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: A CASE STUDY OF IRRIGATED LANDSCAPES IN THE 
WESTERN UNITED STATES 
1
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
While research on water-use efficiency typically focuses on improving day-to-day 
water-use decisions, longer-term investments in new technology have the greatest 
potential for sustaining water conservation. Employing a real options approach, this study 
evaluates the decision to invest in water-saving infrastructure in the face of technical, as 
well as water supply uncertainty. An agent must determine whether and when to invest in 
water-saving technology in order to maximize his water-use efficiency and subsequent 
water-savings gains. The study extends previous research on the effect of stochastic water 
prices and emerging water markets on the adoption of modern irrigation technology by 
Carey and Zilberman (2002)
2
 in three ways. First, it illustrates a way of incorporating 
water-price uncertainty based on readily available stream flow data. Second, it 
investigates the influence of a market exit condition on the decision to invest in new 
technology.  Third, it allows for an explicit consideration of uncertainty in technical 
efficiency. A numerical solution procedure is used to allow for both sources of 
uncertainty. A key finding of this study is that the price at which one would not produce 
might be a more important consideration in water-saving investment decisions that 
                                                            
1 Paper Co-author: Dr. Charles Sims 
2
 This study acknowledges and builds off the investment model put forward by Carey and Zilberman 
(2002) and refers amply to their model for comparison and juxtaposition. 
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previously thought. Relaxing the assumption of a negligible probability of the price of 
water exceeding the upper bound required to continue production, we find that agents are 
even less likely to invest when they are provided the option to exit the market in addition 
to the uncertainties they face. The significant impact of this relaxation suggests that 
analyses done with the implicit assumption of no market exit may engender spurious 
conclusions and policy suggestions, as well as suboptimal investment decisions. The 
study also confirms that uncertainty generally stalls investment in both farm and meso-
scale investments, and that the incorporation of a second source of uncertainty 
compounds this investment inertia in the face of uncertainty. While unsurprising in itself, 
this result has interesting research and policy implications. It hints at the potential value 
identification of additional sources of uncertainty and their relative imports on investment 
decisions may have by way of informing which sources of uncertainty would yield the 
best bang for policy buck. Thus, a careful identification and consideration of all 
significant sources of uncertainty and their relative impacts on investment outcomes 
should be undertaken in determining which particular sources of uncertainty research 
efforts and policy dollars should prioritize in order to better inform investment decisions 
to attain desired outcomes.  
Key Words: Water-Saving Infrastructure Investment, Real Options, Uncertainty 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Potentially non-efficient use of reservoirs and water distribution systems in the 
western U.S. is a growing concern (Frankel, 2010). While water has always been a 
limited resource in the region, mounting population pressure and the slow but steady 
manifestation of a changing climate in recent times has made water an even more 
pertinent issue. Steady population growth, coupled with changing hydroclimatic 
conditions in the western U.S., generates considerable concern over the ability of water 
supply to meet future water needs (USBR, 2012; CLCWSMP, 2007). This concern has 
turned attention to increasing water-use efficiency and water conservation in the region.  
An economic sector with great potential for increased water-use efficiency is 
agriculture (Wallace, 2000). While irrigation research typically focuses on improving 
day-to-day decisions of water-use, longer-term investments in new technology are 
essential for improvements in water-use efficiency and conservation over the long-term. 
However, the large, irreversible capital investment required coupled with slow and 
uncertain returns spanning many years, hamper adoption of these technologies (Hafi et 
al., 2006). For example, it has been established in the literature that more efficient 
irrigation technologies such as drip or center pivot irrigation can produce superior profit 
margins relative to traditional technologies (McKenry, 1996; Adusumilli and Almas, 
2007). Yet, conversations with farm advisors suggest “under-investment” in new 
irrigation technologies relative to investment levels proposed by positive expected net 
present values for these technologies (Carey and Zilberman, 2002).   
One explanation for this apparent under-investment is the uncertainty in future returns 
from water-saving investment.  This uncertainty is rooted in annual variations in 
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precipitation that make water supplies difficult to predict. While the region generally 
experiences cyclical trends in precipitation, climate scientists predict that as temperature 
increases through the century, it is prospective that more precipitation will occur as rain 
rather than snow, that the snow accumulation season will get shorter, and that more of the 
region’s snowpack will be lost through evaporation (BRAC, 2007). These predictions do 
not only forecast scarce water supplies in the future and more pronounced trade-offs 
among competing uses, but also uncertainty about the timing and quantity of precipitation 
received. It has been established in the literature that such uncertainty creates uncertainty 
about future returns from investments through production risks (Koundouri et al., 2009; 
Kato et al., 2009), and has the tendency to delay investments in conservation technology. 
This paper develops a dynamic technology adoption model to examine the impact of 
uncertainty considerations on the decision to invest in water-saving infrastructure, such as 
improved irrigation technology or canal lining to improve water-use efficiency and 
minimize water leakages and loss.  Adoption of the technology requires paying a sunk 
investment cost (I) to obtain new infrastructure, such as a center pivot irrigation system 
whose value (V) is dependent upon the monetization of water savings in the water lease 
market. The optimal time to adopt the technology maximizes the expected present value 
of returns from the sale/lease of water-saving resulting from investing in more efficient 
irrigation technology by the agent, to other water-users seeking to supplement their water 
supply.  Uncertainty creates speculation about future water prices, and subsequently 
about the profitability of water-saving infrastructure investments. 
There are two relevant sources of uncertainty influencing water-saving infrastructure 
investments. The first uncertainty concerns the timing and quantity of future water 
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supplies generated by changing weather conditions and increasing variability in 
precipitation patterns. Changing climatic conditions are projected to influence seasonal, 
year-to-year, and longer time-scale variability in precipitation timing and quantity.  Boer 
(2009) finds that while the increases are generally greater in the tropics, the standard 
deviation of average yearly precipitation increases across the board with increasing 
global temperatures
3
. This increase in variability is congruous with the prediction of more 
intense future precipitation events attributable to the ability of a warmer atmosphere to 
hold moisture (Räisänen, 2002; Stouffer and Wetherald, 2007; Meehl et al., 2007). Water 
supply uncertainty is thus a pertinent consideration for all, and more so for Utah which is 
expected to experience greater temperature increases than the global average (BRAC, 
2007).  
The second is technical uncertainty, also referred to as after-adoption efficiency 
(AAE) uncertainty, which is uncertainty pertaining to the performance of an adopted 
technology that lingers after adoption (Azevedo and Paxson, 2012). The realized water 
savings from center pivot technology adoption can vary from 10% to 35% depending on 
factors such as what system the center pivot would replace, soil type and water 
infiltration rates, wind drift, irrigation timing, evapotranspiration, and field gradient 
(slope). Thus, temporal and spatial variations in these factors may render the assumption 
that the efficiency of a center pivot irrigation system would equal the performance 
predicted by the manufacturer or irrigation extension officer, inappropriate for evaluating 
the investment decision. 
                                                            
3 Precipitation patterns are quite regional (some areas expected to be wetter, but some – like the American 
southwest – are anticipated to be much drier).  Also predicted precipitation changes have a huge amount of 
uncertainty, as compared to predicted air temperatures 
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This assertion is supported by Azevedo and Paxson (2012) who aver that 
manufacturing, renewable energy, agricultural, and mining sectors are exposed to high 
levels of technical uncertainty due to the dependence of efficiency after adoption, at least 
in part, on human and natural resource conditions which restrict full pre-adoption testing. 
It is noteworthy that this does not entail human- performance variation which may be 
resolved over time, as in the learning-by-doing literature; but is due to naturally occurring 
stochasticity which does not resolve by learning over time. 
The study extends previous research in three ways. First, it illustrates a way of 
incorporating water-price uncertainty based on readily available stream flow data. Water-
price uncertainty clearly matters for the optimality of water conservation investments.  
However, time series data needed to estimate this uncertainty rarely exists (Carey and 
Zilberman 2002). Second, this study investigates the influence of a market exit condition 
on the decision to invest in new technology. The decision to discontinue irrigated 
agriculture is a critical consideration as many irrigated landscapes are transitioning from 
agriculture to residential development. Third, the study allows for an explicit 
consideration of water supply uncertainty and uncertainty in technical efficiency jointly. 
A numerical solution procedure is used to allow for both sources of uncertainty 
simultaneously. 
To illustrate our theory’s applicability, we will apply the model to three watersheds in 
Utah. An average annual precipitation of 13 inches ranks Utah the second driest state in 
the country (Adams et al., 2010).  The state’s agricultural land is slowly being converted 
to urban use in response to population pressure in the state (Leydsman McGinty, 2009), 
as well as the relatively lower valued agricultural produce in Utah. About three hundred 
11 
 
thousand acres of the state’s agricultural land was converted to developed land between 
1982 and 2007 (Dempsey, 2010), with an additional 120,304 acres developed between 
2007 and 2012 (NASS, 2012). Agriculture, however, remains the greatest user of Utah’s 
developed water withdrawals as the region’s aridity makes its agriculture mainly 
irrigation-fed. Irrigation remains the largest use of fresh water in Utah (at about 83% of 
the water withdrawn from all sources in 2008) (UDWR, 2010; ORGC, 2012), underlying 
the potential importance of water-saving irrigation technology in the region. The Utah 
State Water plan lists, as one of its conservation recommendations, increased efficiency 
in agriculture with sprinklers or surge-flow, watertight canals and turnout structures. And 
yet, more than half of Utah’s 1.3 million irrigated acres are watered using surface 
methods such as flood, furrow, border, or basin irrigation (Barnhill et al., 2009). 
Applying our theoretical model to various Utah case studies, we will consider the 
influence of uncertainty on the decision to invest on irrigation investment behavior to 
answer three general questions; 1) What effect does the possibility of market exit have on 
investment behavior? 2) Do uncertainties in future water supplies and the efficiency of 
new water-saving technology, respectively; create similar incentives to delay adoption of 
new water-saving infrastructure investments? 3) How would reductions in, and 
interaction between the two types of uncertainty influence the adoption of water-saving 
infrastructure?   
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on uncertain 
investments in resource conservation.  Section 3 introduces the theoretical model as well 
as a characterization of the investment problem and the option of waiting to invest.  
Section 4 details the empirical case studies.  Section 5 concludes. 
12 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
Modeling approaches employed in the study of the adoption of conservation and 
agricultural technology in existing literature include multivariate regression analyses to 
decipher the factors most influential in adoption decisions (Marenya and Barret, 2007); 
Logit (Daberkow and McBride, 2003) and Probit (Koundouri, 2006) models which 
analyze the decision to adopt or not; Tobit models (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2001) 
which help measure likelihood and extent of adoption; duration analysis to capture the 
temporal dynamics of technology adoption and diffusion (De Souza Filho et al., 1999; 
Burton et al., 2003; D’Emden et al., 2006); and discounted net present value accounting 
(Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2008) which evaluates the economic profitability of 
investing in the adopted technology. Marques et al. (2005) employ a two-stage economic 
production model to investigate how the availability, price, and reliability of water affects 
economic performance, annual and long-run cropping patterns, and irrigation technology 
decision of a farm, while Cai and Rosengrant (2004) adopt a two-stage stochastic 
programming model to study how hydrological uncertainty impacts decisions about 
irrigation technology. 
The decision-centric models tell you who is likely to adopt based on characteristics, 
but provide no insight on the incentives for adoption. The discounted net present value 
applications evaluate the economic incentive to invest, but fail to accurately depict 
observed behavior. The gap between the number of conservation investments that yield 
positive net present values and the actual investments made is due in part to the fact that 
missing from the traditional analysis, is an option value which reflects the value of the 
13 
 
possibility or option to delay in order to obtain more information about the payoff from 
investing in the face of uncertainty. Option value (or Real Options) theory considers this 
value in evaluating investment decisions.   
 
2.1 Environmental and Natural Resource Applications of Real Options 
Environmental and resource economics often face problems which deal with the 
timing and making of decisions under varied contexts (Balikcioglu, 2008). They arise 
routinely in the management of renewable resources, such as in problems of optimal fish 
stock harvesting (Ludwig, 1980), forest rotation (Willassen, 1998; Alvarez, 2004; 
Forsyth, 2000; Insley, 2002) and invasive-species management (Sims et al., 2010; Sims 
and Finnoff, 2013). They are also present in the management of non-renewable resources 
with applications in mining (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985), conservation (Arrow and 
Fisher, 1974) and pollution abatement (Conrad, 1997; Pindyck, 2000a; Wirl, 2006). 
Properties common to these problems are the irreversibility of associated decisions, the 
dynamic nature of the problems and the inherent uncertainties associated with these 
decisions (Balikcioglu, 2008). 
Irreversibility arises from two sources. First, there are the sunk costs usually 
associated with the specialized nature of the capital equipment, control measures, or 
technology adoption (Pindyck, 2000b). A second source of irreversibility stems from the 
nature of the resource itself. As in the case of an old-growth forest where trees once 
felled require an effectively infinite number of years to grow back, decisions concerning 
non-renewable resources are generally irreversible. Irreversibility could also stem from 
the long-lasting effects of an investment decision. An example is the environmental and 
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health damages that may result from a decision to forgo or delay investment in pollution 
abatement.  
These problems are dynamic because decisions made in one period determine new 
starting conditions for decisions in subsequent periods. Uncertainty regarding these 
problems may stem from investment uncertainty where the future pay-offs (or damages) 
from an investment or decision is uncertain due to uncertain effects of the investment on 
the market, or uncertain occurrence of the event the investment was supposed to mitigate 
(Heal and Kristrom, 2002; Peterson, 2006; Pindyck, 2007). It may also stem from policy 
uncertainty, where decision-making agents are uncertain about the timing and magnitude 
of policy announcements and regulations which may totally change the nature of the 
decision-making problem (Fuss et al., 2008). 
Early attempts to incorporate uncertainty and irreversibility in environmental 
investment problems can be found in Kolstad (1992), who developed a three-period 
model to examine the effects of uncertainty on policy adoption where uncertainty 
persisting in the first two periods is resolved in the third period. Kolstad (1992) found 
that when policy is irreversible, it is better to wait for the resolution of uncertainty before 
policy adoption. Conrad (1992) finds that uncertainty leads to early adoption of 
abatement policy in the absence of irreversibility but ignores sunk costs in his model. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) supplement Conrad’s finding by showing that when 
irreversibility is considered, increasing uncertainty delays the emission reduction policy. 
Pindyck (2002) formalizes and generalizes these results by incorporating both policy and 
investment uncertainties as well as irreversibility into his model and shows that in all 
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cases, as uncertainty increases, the value to wait for future information increases and 
delays policy adoption.  
Saphores and Carr (2000) establish the importance of the choice of stochastic 
processes on model outcomes. Employing a similar framework employed by Pindyck in 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), but with a different assumption on the stochastic process of the 
stock pollutant, they investigated the effects of ecological uncertainty on policy adoption, 
and found that uncertainty has ambiguous effects on the timing of the policy adoption. At 
sufficiently high levels, increasing uncertainty leads to more conservative policy, i.e. a 
delay in and/or reduced extent of adoption. This result is attributable to the fact that 
expected social cost (damages) in the absence of pollution abatement increases with 
uncertainty in the Dixit and Pindyck model, while in most other real option models, 
expected social cost is not a function uncertainty (Balikcioglu, 2008). Since water 
infrastructure systems are large and long-lasting (about 50 years of useful life); the costs 
of technological adaptation could be high if water demand fails to evolve as predicted 
(Schleich and Hillenbrand, 2009). 
The literature generally concurs that when 1) a problem is characterized by 
uncertainty about future costs and benefits of the alternatives under consideration, 2) 
prospects exist for resolving the uncertainty with the passage of time, and 3) investment 
in at least one of the alternatives is irreversible, an extra value, an option value, should be 
attached to the reversible alternative(s) in the decision-making process (Fisher, 2001). In 
other words, an irreversible (investment) decision or action has a higher hurdle to clear in 
order to pass a benefit/cost test (Carey and Zilberman, 2002).  
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2.2 Water-saving Infrastructure Investments 
Variables identified as affecting farmers’ technology choice include economic factors 
such as commodity prices, costs of inputs, and the costs of the irrigation technology; 
environmental factors such as climate, topography and land quality; and institutional 
factors such as land-tenure and water rights arrangements. While results from different 
studies assign different weights to these factors, it is a common theme that low land 
quality, high crop and input prices, and low costs of switching technology correlate 
positively with the adoption of improved irrigation technologies (Scheierling, 2004). 
The indispensability of efficient agricultural water management in meeting future 
food needs is widely accepted (Heumesser et al., 2012). Known benefits of improved 
irrigation technologies include significant improvements in on-farm irrigation efficiencies 
and irrigation uniformity, as well as reductions in water delivery and withdrawal 
requirements, deep percolation and runoff. With improved technology, it is possible to 
attain output gains with no change in quantity of water applied. However, this 
improvement comes with the price of higher equipment costs (and, in the case of a switch 
to sprinklers, energy costs). Although research on irrigation technology adoption may be 
fairly nascent, it is grounded in the accepted development economics and industrial 
organization literature on general agricultural technology adoption (Caswell, 1991; 
Scheierling, 2004). 
Urbanization-induced increases in water demands and an appreciation of the value of 
in-stream flows, have increased competition for scarce water supplies in the Western 
United States (MacDonnel, 2009; Zellmer, 2009; Schaible and Aillery, 2012). As the 
principal and yet often lowest-priced water-use, irrigated agriculture has garnered 
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concerted attention and efforts to encourage agricultural water conservation (Huffaker 
and Whittlesey, 2000), with the objective of shifting some water to higher-valued uses 
and improving the economic efficiency of overall water allocation. The adoption of more 
efficient irrigation technologies is often touted as an approach with great potential for 
agricultural water conservation with minimal losses in farm yield and income 
(Scheierling, 2004). 
Proposed conservation measures target irrigated agriculture because: 1) irrigated 
agriculture accounts for the bulk of both total water withdrawals and consumptive water-
use globally (Johnson et al., 2001; Tiwari and Dinar, 2001), and this demand is expected 
to grow to meet food needs as populations continue to grow, and 2) irrigation water-use 
efficiency is generally low world-wide, with national averages generally below 50% of 
potential efficiency (Tiwari and Dinar, 2001). In fact, more than fifty percent of the water 
which enters irrigation distribution systems does not make it to the crops due to leakage 
and evaporation (Postel, 1995; Johnson et al., 2001). 
Researchers and policymakers typically focus on the provision of economic 
incentives, such as higher prices or subsidies, in precipitating investment in more 
efficient irrigation technologies (Weatherford, 1982; Caswell et al., 1990; Huffaker and 
Whittlesey, 2003). In real-world applications however, these policy tools may not be 
available, or practicable (Scheierling, 2004). For example, Huffaker and Whittlesey 
(2003) establish that higher applied water costs may be more efficient at achieving 
conservation goals than investment subsidies. However, this is largely not an available 
policy option under the prior appropriation system prevalent in the western United States.  
This necessitates the need for a better understanding of water-saving investment 
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decisions in the west, to design appropriate conservation policies which consider the 
west’s particular realities and water law. 
Ajami et al. (2008) testify to the significance of hydrological uncertainties in the 
sound management of water resources. Past and on-going research has seen advancement 
in assessment techniques for the different sources of uncertainty related to hydrological 
projections (Beven and Binley, 1992; Kuczera and Parent, 1998; Vrugt et al., 2003; 
Maier and Ascough, 2006; Ajami et al., 2007). However, there still remains room for 
more extensive exploration of the links between hydrological uncertainties and water 
resources management such as in (Huang and Loucks, 2000; Zhang et al., 2011). These 
linkages are necessary given the potential impacts of hydrological uncertainty on the 
ability of water policies to meet desired management and conservation goals. Ajami et al. 
(2008) aver that there is a need for proper understanding of the sources and impacts of 
uncertainty in order to attain reliability and sustainability goals in managing water 
resources. The same is true with regards to encouraging investment in water-saving 
technology.  
Contrary to the predictions of net present value (NPV) models, Carey and Zilberman 
(2002) affirm that farms wait until the return on an investment is significantly greater 
than the cost before adopting modern irrigation technologies. Adopting a stochastic 
dynamic approach to model farm irrigation investment under uncertainty, they find that 
farmers’ requirement that the expected benefits of investment outweigh costs by a large 
margin (hurdle rate) before investing in new technology may be explained by the 
consideration of uncertainty in their investment decisions. Thus, the conclusion that 
observed rates of investment in modern farm irrigation technology were suboptimal in 
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previous assessments was based on the use of traditional NPV models of investment, 
which ignore issues of uncertainty and irreversibility. Observed investment can only be 
considered optimal under the NPV framework if farmers have extremely high discount 
rates. However, factoring in the farmers’ consideration of the value of waiting to invest 
under uncertain conditions (option value ) seems to explain the farmers’ extremely high 
discount rates in evaluating irrigation investments (Carey and Zilberman, 2002).  
By waiting to invest, a farm can gather more information on the evolution of water 
prices before committing funds to irreversible investments. Thus, information is essential 
in decision-making under uncertainty. More information reduces perceived risk and 
precipitates investment. On the other hand, inadequate information increases perceived 
risk and delays investment in favor of gathering more information. 
Carey and Zilberman also find that, contrary to common belief, water markets can 
delay the adoption of irrigation technology. This is because the introduction of a water 
market may make it more profitable for farms with abundant (scarce) water supplies to 
adopt earlier (later) than they would otherwise due to economies (diseconomies) of scale. 
The presence of water markets increases opportunities for those with abundant water 
supplies to recoup investment costs through sold water savings and lowers pressure to 
invest for those with scarce supplies as they can buy water to supplement supply. 
Zilberman et al. (1995) find that drought events had substantial, positive impact on 
adoption rates of drip irrigation in California. Adoption rates remained low from 1982 to 
1986 despite proven cost effectiveness. However, the drought persistence from 1987 to 
1991 triggered widespread adoption by increasing returns sufficiently above investment 
costs. Thus, significant catastrophic events appear to provide a counter balance for 
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uncertainty and reduce the option value by increasing the cost of waiting, and increasing 
the value of (thus prompting) investment. 
Most recently, Bhaduri and Manna (2014) examine the impacts of water supply 
uncertainty and storage on efficient irrigation technology in a stochastic dynamic setting, 
and under a flexible water regime. They find that allowing for flexible water pricing does 
not guarantee higher technology adoption in all cases. They also demonstrate a 
complementary relationship between investments in storage capacity and efficient 
irrigation technology adoption. 
While we too focus on the impacts of water supply uncertainty on the adoption of 
efficient irrigation technology, our model presents differing features with regards to 
incorporating a second source of uncertainty: technical uncertainty into the real options 
investment model and commodity market exit conditions which act as an upper bound on 
the incentive to invest. Existing real options models in the literature generally assume ex-
ante knowledge of technology performance and ignore the possibility that agents may 
terminate production and, in turn, the use of technology. The introduction of technical 
efficiency uncertainty and market exit conditions introduces an added level of difficulty 
in the optimization of an investment decision, as it becomes more difficult to know what 
actual post-adoption revenues would be, and thus the optimal investment decision. 
Finally, our case studies which involve three different rivers (the Logan, Bear and 
Blacksmith Fork) in the Middle Bear-Logan Watershed provide differing water supply 
parameters allowing for interesting spatial comparative statics and illustrate by their 
differing investment considerations even within a single watershed, the importance of 
differing spatial realities on optimal investment decisions. 
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3: MODEL 
An agent is faced with the choice of determining whether and when to invest in 
water-saving technology given that the efficiency of the technology as well as the future 
price of conserved water is uncertain. The optimal time to invest maximizes his expected 
present value of future payoffs. For example, this investment may represent investment in 
irrigation-efficient technology or the lining of canals and ditches to mitigate water 
seepage losses. Motivated by farm irrigation investments, the model set-up will defer to 
the irrigation investment decision where compelled, but will maintain generalizability for 
canal lining investment evaluations. 
The agent is assumed to maximize an instantaneous profit function by choosing the 
amount of water to apply in production. The agent initially operates under a traditional 
irrigation technology regime or an unlined canal system where most, if not all, of the 
canal is unlined and susceptible to considerable seepage losses.  The agent has the option 
to invest in more efficient modern technology. Should the agent decide to make the 
investment in period t, he will incur an irreversible cost of adoption;       .4 The 
model thus essentially lays out a dual-level decision-making process where the agent first 
has to optimize an instantaneous choice of inputs for production, setting pre-investment 
benchmarks for productivity and profits. Then, given that he is choosing inputs to 
maximize profits, he also chooses the timing of investment. 
                                                            
4 The cost of investment may also be uncertain (Fuss et al, 2008; Fuss et al, 2009; Eryilmaz and Homans, 
2013; Feder et al, 1985).  Accounting for stochastic investment costs in this particular model, however, did 
not make a difference in the optimal investment decision and thus the assumption of non-stochastic costs is 
upheld. 
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The theoretical component of the model follows Carey and Zilberman (2002) very 
closely.  However, it generalizes this work by tracing water price uncertainty back to the 
underlying uncertainty in water supplies, incorporating a market exit condition, and 
considering a second source of uncertainty. While Carey and Zilberman find that water 
price uncertainty is a key driver in water conservation investments, they were forced to 
estimate this uncertainty based on a small number of observations.  Our approach allows 
water price uncertainty to be estimated based on a rich time series of stream flow data 
provided by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The model solution with the 
incorporation of the second source of uncertainty and market exit conditions require 
numerical analysis, and thus their treatment while extending Carey and Zilberman’s 
theoretical model, is more nested within the empirical section of this study.     
 
3.1 Water Supply and Price Uncertainty 
The agent produces a commodity whose price is given exogenously by  .  Following 
Carey and Zilberman (2002), the agent’s production is represented by a Von-Liebig 
production function such that; 
(1)                                     {
               
  
            
   
}       
where    is the amount of water employed in production, with i = 0 corresponding to 
production using pre-investment technology and i = T corresponding to production using 
the modern technology.
5
     is the agent’s optimal level of production and   
  is the 
                                                            
5 It is assumed that yield-increasing effects of the new technology on production are negligible (Letey, 
1991; Berck and Helfand, 1990; Carey and Zilberman, 2002), leaving the focus of gains from adoption to 
rest solely on water savings from increased water efficiency. Thus we assume that   
    
     so that 
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agent’s optimal water demand under technology i (what he would require for optimal 
production if unconstrained by water supply).     represents the actual amount of water 
demanded by the agent for use in production. In times of water abundance       
  , the 
agent is able to obtain no less than his optimal water demand for production 
optimization   
 , and produces at the optimal level   . In times of relative water shortage 
      
    however, the farmer is constrained by the amount of water available to him, 
and his production (       is proportional to the amount of applied water (    , B is a 
term representing the contribution of the optimal levels of all non-water inputs in 
production determined holding water constant  and    is a scalar that reflects the 
efficiency of technology i with      .   
In a linear response and plateau (or Von-Liebig) model, production responds to the 
addition of a limiting input until a different input becomes limiting. This reflects the fact 
that production inputs are not as readily substitutable as implied by smooth, concave 
functions. This model thus employs a Von-Liebig production function to show the non-
substitutability between an agent’s other production inputs and water. In our model, it is 
assumed that that agent has applied other production inputs at such a level that water is 
the limiting input in production (Letey, 1991). Thus, ceteris paribus, production will 
respond to increasing water availability until another production input, say land or canal 
size became limiting. It has been shown in the literature (Berck and Helfand, 1990) that 
by accounting for heterogeneity of input levels in production, Von-Liebig production 
functions can be reconciled with smooth, differentiable production functions via 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
we do not have a yield-increasing effect associated with adoption if both technologies operate at full 
potential.  Nutrient processing by agricultural crops could be an effect here in the case of the farmer and is 
an angle that may be explored in subsequent work. 
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aggregation and so this specification is employed with the knowledge that it is not 
mutually exclusive to smooth production functions in the aggregate. 
The total amount of water available for use by the agent is represented by; 
(2)                                    {
 ̅       ̅
            ̅ 
} ; 
where  ̅ is an exogenously determined scarcity threshold and    is the aggregate 
water supply at time t.  This aggregate water supply may reflect the flow of a river or 
canal or the level of a reservoir supplying water to the agent.  ̅  represents the amount of 
water that has to be in the canal for every water rights holder to be able to divert the full 
amount of water their water rights entitle them to under normal conditions.  
When aggregate water supply is high      ̅ , an agent may use (i.e. has at his 
disposal)  ̅ which represents how much water he is entitled to divert under ‘normal’ 
conditions based on the agent’s water rights or shares.  The model assumes shares have 
been acquired in the past (sunk costs) and that recurrent expenses associated with holding 
the share are negligible.   
When the aggregate water supply is low, the amount of water available to the agent is 
restricted to a proportion of the aggregate supply.  This proportion   may be a function of 
his geographical location, seniority of water right, production requirements, etc.  This 
conditional water supply reflects the reality in many parts of the western U.S. where 
water rights were allocated on historic conditions and often exceed available supply. 
The relationship between    and applied water (    is as follows; 
(3)                                     {
  
          
 
       
           
 } ; 
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Thus,         is the difference between water the agent has available for production 
and how much he actually employs in production. If positive (         , it represents 
the total amount of water left over after production and available for sale by the agent. If 
negative (         , it indicates how much water the agent buys to supplement his 
available water for production. Investment in efficient water technology helps tilt the 
difference of the two terms towards a surplus by reducing    . 
Current annual aggregate water supply (    is certain but future values are uncertain 
due to changes in weather.  This stochastic supply process is represented by a geometric 
Brownian motion, 
(4)                                                 
where    is the instantaneous drift rate of the supply process,    is the instantaneous 
variance rate, and     is the increment of a Wiener process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  
The Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) assumption is established in the literature as 
appropriate for describing the evolution of an uncertain/unpredictable process over time 
(Paddock et al., 1988; Marathe and Ryan, 2007), and specifically for describing the 
evolution of water supply (Bhaduri and Manal, 2014).  
A GBM assumption implies that the logarithm of the randomly evolving quantity 
(here, water supply) follows a Brownian motion (also called a Wiener process) with drift. 
A simplifying definition of a Brownian motion would be to see it as the limit of a random 
walk process, a process which assumes randomness in the evolution of a process such 
that the observation in one time step contains no information on what will happen in the 
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next time step. This ‘randomness’ and attendant unpredictability, suits it for describing 
uncertainty-laden processes such as water supply over time. 
The agent can smooth his water supply by buying, leasing, renting or selling water 
(buy/sell physical quantities of water, lease/rent water rights in the spot market). The 
water rights can be expressed as physical quantities for price comparison purposes. The 
agent can trade an acre-foot for use at time t at price     . However, a spot market in 
long-term water rights is assumed not to exist. This is because the existence of such a 
market would imply that expected future values of  ̅  could change as more rights are 
allocated in addition to existing ones in a given watershed. However, as it stands, there is 
no new allocation of new rights, only transfer and appropriation of already allocated 
rights.    
Periods of low aggregate water supply are assumed to correspond to periods of high 
water prices in the spot market.  For simplicity, we assume (inverse) demand for water on 
the spot market is isoelastic 
(5)      (
    
 
)
 
 
 
 
where φ is a positive constant and ε > 0 is the price elasticity of demand.  An 
isoelastic demand function depicts constant elasticity and is chosen here to demonstrate 
the relative (short run versus long run) inelasticity of water demand to water price 
(Olmstead and Stavins, 2009).  Following Ito’s Lemma, a result from the Ito Calculus 
solution of stochastic differential equations such as the Geometric Brownian motion, we 
find that the market price of a water right also follows a Geometric Brownian Motion. 
(6)    
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where    ( 
  
 
 
       
 
   
) and    ( 
  
 
). 
To the extent that changes in a farm’s water supply mirror changes in the aggregate 
supply,   and P will be negatively correlated as expressed in our isoelastic demand 
function. Due to the presence of a more developed water market in California, and its 
attendant  differences in competitiveness and transaction costs vis-a-vis the water markets 
in Utah, the model deviates from the (Carey and Zilberman, 2002) assumption that an 
agent’s investment decision is independent of aggregate water supply, and accounts for 
the influence of aggregate water supply on agent investment decisions via the posited 
isoelastic demand function, and established relationship between the stochastic processes 
for the evolution of water supply and price as above (equations 4 and 5).  
The agent’s decision to invest in modern irrigation technology depends on the 
tradeoff between the expected present value of the investment and the cost of switching 
technologies. The value of the investment at a given time is the expected increase in the 
profit flow with the adoption of modern technology.   
The agent’s optimal production level is assumed to be determined by a constrained 
optimization of his profit function subject to his initial water right allocation. This set-up 
leaves open the possibility of four different cases where aggregate water supply, coupled 
with policy and environmental constraints, may result in situations where the agent owns 
more shares than needed or less shares than needed for his desired level of production. 
The four possible cases arising out of water allocation policy and environmental (water 
supply) constraints are detailed in figure 1 in the appendix. 
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If the agent is not policy constrained, his normal water allocation implied by his water 
rights is sufficient to satisfy his optimal water demand:   
   ̅.   Case 4 considers an 
agent that is not constrained by policy considerations or environmental considerations 
(     
 ), the agent will employ   
  in production to produce at the optimal output level 
  . There is no question of choosing water input to maximize profit as he will always 
produce at the optimum level of output when that option is available to him. This case 
thus has a trivial solution. We therefore consider the case where       ̅ and thus 
     
   This occurs in cases 1, 2, and 3 in figure 1.  In these cases, the agent would 
then decide to supplement his water supply or not, by considering the availability and 
cost of doing so.  
When      
  (Cases 1, 2, and 3), the agent’s optimized profit function at time  ,  
derived by optimizing his instantaneous profit function, is 
(7)                                       
where    represents  the day-to-day fixed cost of operating the irrigation system under 
technology i. The agent incurs this cost whether he invests or not. However, the level of 
   may increase (decrease) upon adoption of the modern technology due to say higher 
pressurization costs (greater energy efficiency) with the new system. The change in the 
value of this profit function        as a result of investment (i.e.         
       ), is compared with the cost of investment I(t) to make the investment decision. 
Aggregate water supply determines both the profit to be derived from investment, and 
the penalty for non-investment. If aggregate supply is expected to be lower in the future, 
the investment is relatively more desirable as it indicates a greater demand and higher 
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future price for water savings.  However, if aggregate supply is expected to be higher in 
the future, investments in water-saving technology may appear inferior compared to other 
investments considered by the agent. Consequently, the future evolution of aggregate 
water supply is pivotal to the agent’s investment decision and the uncertainty surrounding 
this process needs to be adequately addressed to enable the agent to make the best 
investment decision. 
 
3.2 The Investment Decision 
The agent’s objective is to choose the timing of investment to maximize the expected 
discounted flow of profit. The agent’s decision of whether and when to invest depends on 
the trade-off between the expected present value of the investment, and the cost of 
switching technologies. The value of the investment at a given time, t, is the increase in 
profit flow as a result of technology adoption. 
(8)                                                                
Using equation (7) and simplifying, given that      
  (i.e. the agent would demand 
the amount of water needed to produce at his optimal level) and     
   the increase in 
profit flow is  
(9)                                                                            
where      
    
 , and        .    
  is the market value of water 
conserved as a result of technology adoption, and q is the change in the cost outlays for 
production.  Both technologies generate the same revenue when   
  is applied due to the 
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yield equivalence assumption.  Thus potential profit gains depend solely on the value of 
conserved water and differences in cost outlays.  
From (9), an agent’s investment decision depends on the expected present value of 
profit gains over all future time periods. Profit gains here is defined as the increase in 
profit as a result of investment, and is expressed by the difference between revenue from 
the sale of water savings (     and increase in operational costs (q) as a result of 
investment. 
(10)                                               ∫            ∫  
 
 
 
 
        
Since   is stochastic, it is discounted by the risk-adjusted interest rate,  . q, on the 
other hand, is deterministic and thus discounted by the risk-free interest rate r.  The 
expected present value can be written as, 
(11)                                                                   
   
 
 
 
 
,  
where       . Given that   is the risk adjusted interest rate, a drift rate larger 
than the risk adjusted interest rate (i.e.        would create a situation where it is 
always optimal to wait and there would be no determinable optimum in sight (i.e. wait 
indefinitely). The rate of return on holding the asset (i.e. waiting to invest) in this case 
would be greater than the rate of return the agent could earn by investing in the 
conservation technology, and so he would hold on to the asset and wait to invest.      
would imply that our convenience yield,         which measures the value of 
waiting to invest today (and earning the risk-adjusted interest rate (   on one’s money) 
versus investing today and earning the positive drift rate (   ) on water prices, would be 
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negative, making investment a non-issue. Thus, we assume       and thus     for a 
closed, non-trivial solution. 
In the traditional NPV investment model, the agent would invest if       , that is, 
if the expected present value of the investment is no less than the fixed cost of 
investment. Thus, in the traditional NPV model, the agent will choose to adopt water-
saving technology if the price of water is greater than, or equal to some threshold  ̃,  
where 
(12)                                                                  ̃  
 
  
(  
 
 
) .  
Thus, the agent is more likely to adopt water-saving technology as the water-savings 
associated with technology adoption,     increases. He is also less likely to adopt if the 
discount rate ( ), fixed cost of investment (I), or additional operational cost outlays (
 
 
) 
increase.  
 
3.3 Option Value with Water Supply Uncertainty 
To account for irreversibility, uncertainty, and the agent’s option to delay investment 
until a later date, we extend the above discussion to consider the investment’s option 
value. Recall that the agent’s profit function is defined as                
                 . To understand the motivation for the option value, consider the 
second and third terms,                  . These two terms account for the 
possibility of the agent buying water on the water market to supplement his water supply 
in the case of         . When the price of water is low, buying water to supplement 
agent’s water supply may make more economic sense than investing in water-saving 
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technology. However, by waiting to invest now the agent has the option to invest in new 
technology should water prices go up in future. The value of this option to delay 
investment is further reinforced by the specialized nature of irrigation investments which 
may constrain the value of scrapping the irrigation technology or its conversion to other 
uses should one seek to undo or reverse the investment post installation. 
Suppose F(P) is the value of the agent’s option to invest in modern water-saving 
technology defined explicitly below. Given the positive relationship between P and V as 
seen from (11), the expected value of investing, V(P), rises and falls as water price rises 
or falls. Over low enough price ranges, V(P) falls lower than the fixed cost of investment, 
    and the option to switch technologies is not a viable one. When water prices get 
sufficiently high, however, the option to invest in water-saving technology will become 
viable, and the agent will exercise his option to invest. The agent will trade off the 
potential benefits of waiting for more information to invest against the opportunity cost 
of waiting.  
While uncertainty never goes away (due to the geometric Brownian motion), waiting 
affords the agent more information about the uncertainty through increased observations 
of the movement of the relevant stochastic processes. In particular, waiting would afford 
the agent more observations of the movements of P and W, and the agent may then 
incorporate this information in deciding how best to deal with the uncertainty associated 
with the investment decision. 
The agent will choose to invest if water price reaches a critical threshold.  Dynamic 
optimization methods are employed to determine the threshold. Suppose  ̂ is the price of 
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water that triggers investment, then in the region     ̂ , in which the agent exercises his 
option to wait, the Bellman equation is; 
(13)                                                                     .  
This states that over the interval dt, the return on the investment opportunity         
must equal it’s expected rate of capital appreciation,          to ensure the agent 
exercises his option to wait (Carey and Zilberman, 2002). 
Using Ito’s Lemma to expand the right-hand side of equation (13), F( ) can be shown 
to satisfy the following differential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Carey and 
Zilberman, 2002): 
(14)                              
 
 
  
              
             
This states that over any infinitesimal time interval, the loss in the value of the 
investment due to time decay and gain in value as a result of the impact water supply 
evolution on water prices must offset each other such that the return is a return at the 
riskless rate    
Making the substitution       , we obtain 
(15) 
 
 
  
                              
subject to the boundary conditions; 
(16)                                                                   
(17)                                                        ̂     ̂     
(18)                                                     ̂      ̂   
Equation (16) states that when the price of water is zero, the option to invest is 
worthless. The value-matching condition (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) (17) states that the 
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value of the investment option should equal the expected present value less the fixed cost 
of investment at the threshold. The smooth-pasting condition (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
(18) states that the change in the value of the investment option should equal the change 
in the expected present value of the investment at the threshold. 
Equation (15) must be solved subject to boundary conditions (16)-(18) in order to 
find       Given that (15) is linear in F and its derivatives, the general solution (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994) for this second-order homogenous differential equation can be 
expressed as a linear combination of any two independent solutions. By trial and error, 
the function     is shown by substitution to satisfy equation (15) provided   is a root of 
the characteristic quadratic equation, 
(19)      
 
 
  
                      
 Thus, the general solution may be expressed as         
      
  .  To satisfy 
boundary condition (16),    must be zero. This is because zero to a negative power is 
undefined, and we know our quadratic equation in (15) has one positive, and one negative 
root. 
The positive co-efficient (
 
 
  
   of    in      depicts an upward facing parabola 
(Figure 2 in appendix) that approaches infinity as   approaches positive or negative 
infinity. Now,         and          Given   and   are both positive, this suggests 
the two roots of      are one to the right side of 1 (        and another to the left of 
zero (i.e. a negative root) because at       the function is still below the horizontal axis 
(negative) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Thus, the general solution for the value of the option must be of the form, 
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(20)                                                           
   
where      is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation  of the 
differential equation (15), and the constant   must be determined as part of the solution. 
To see why, substitute         
  ,            
     and              
     
    into (15) and simplify, to obtain the fundamental quadratic equation      
(21) 
 
 
  
                   
        
   satisfies the differential equation provided    is a root of     . Using 
the quadratic formula to solve equation (20), the two roots are; 
   
 
 
 
      
   
 
√[
      
   
 
 
 ]
 
   
   
   
and  
   
 
 
 
      
   
 
√[
      
   
 
 
 ]
 
   
   
   
Now          since the square of any real number is positive, thus the 
expression in the square brackets must be positive and    . The whole expression 
under the square root (         is therefore positive, and the two roots are distinct and 
real.  
Combining equations (12) and (20) with the boundary conditions (16-18), the 
investment threshold is 
(22)                                            
 ̂  
 
 (
  
    
) (
 
 
  ) 
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where 
  
    
 is known as the hurdle rate (Carey and Zilberman, 2002).  Defining 
 ̂  
 
 
   and  ̂( ̂)  
 ̂  
 
, the threshold condition can be rewritten as: 
(23)  ̂( ̂)  (
  
    
)  ̂ 
Because   > 1, the condition states that the expected revenue from the investment 
must be greater than the total investment cost at the threshold.  
Rearranging equation (22), the threshold price of investment is 
(24)  ̂  (
  
    
)
 
  
 ̂ 
For    ̂                                    invest, and for    ̂ the agent 
invests in the water-saving infrastructure.  Note that  ̂  (
  
    
)  ̃ , where  ̃ is the 
threshold price of the NPV model. Thus, when one accounts for uncertainty, 
irreversibility and the option to wait, a farmer or institutional agent such as a canal 
company or a municipality, would require a higher price than is stipulated by a NPV 
model, before it is willing to invest in water-saving technology. Uncertainty makes the 
agent more cautious about investment due to the presence of an option value to waiting in 
the face of an irreversible, uncertain investment decision. 
The disparity between the net present value and option value solutions, is the factor 
(
  
    
)  Thus its underlying factors (the variables that constitute   ), become useful in 
determining the response of the agent’s option value and therefore optimal investment 
decision, to changes in these parameters.  
Recall the fundamental quadratic equation     , represented by equation (20). 
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Taking the total derivative with respect to sigma, we get; 
(25)   
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
                                                                                                        
Now, 
(26)   
  
  
 
 
 
                                  
 Evaluated at   , 
  
  
   since                      
Also,  
  
  
                     
Since 
  
  
  and  
  
  
 are both greater than zero evaluated at       then 
  
  
 must be less 
than zero for equation (24) to hold. 
Thus,    decreases as    increases implying that the disparity factor (
  
    
) increases 
as   increases. Now,   is the volatility parameter. Hence, the greater the uncertainty, the 
greater the disparity between the real options and net present value solutions.  
Similarly, taking the total derivative of      with respect to   yields; 
(27)                           
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
              
Here,  
  
  
     which is less than zero evaluated at        Thus, given 
  
  
  , 
  
  
 
must be positive for equation  (26) to hold. 
  
  
   implies that 
  
    
 decreases with a 
greater  . Hence, the greater the convenience yield,         which measures the 
value of owning a good today versus owning the option to acquire the good in future, the 
smaller the option value of waiting. 
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Finally, taking the total derivative with respect to   yields: 
(28) 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
         
  
  
    which is greater than zero evaluated at     . Again, given 
  
  
    then 
  
  
 must be negative for equation (27) to hold. Thus, a larger   corresponds with a smaller 
     and a larger 
  
    
. Thus, a larger risk-adjusted interest rate leads to a greater (option) 
value to waiting. 
It is also worthy to note that    approaches 1 and    ̂  approaches infinity as 
  approaches infinity. Thus, the agent will never invest in the case of an infinitely large 
uncertainty. This is because while it increases the potential gains from investment, it also 
increases the value of waiting for more information ( ( ̂)   ( ̂)       due to the 
extremely high levels of uncertainty. On the other hand, as   approaches zero, there are 
two possible cases depending on the value of     If                 and 
   (
 
 
)    If        on the other hand,        and  
     Now, (
 
 
)     since 
         and       Thus, even in the absence of uncertainty, there may be an 
incentive for the agent to require a greater-than-net-present-value premium because 
waiting to invest means further discounting of the investment cost in terms of today’s 
dollars (Marglin, 1963; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This premium, where present, is 
further compounded by the introduction of uncertainty. 
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3.4 Incorporating the Shutdown Price 
The critical thresholds in the previous sections assume that water price will approach 
infinity given a sufficient amount of time. However, it is possible that water will 
eventually become so expensive that certain farmers will abandon production (shutdown) 
in favor of leasing their water rights since the amount they obtain from leasing all of the 
water rights would exceed any profits from production.   
We need not look far for examples of this. Hurt by the prolonged drought in 2013, 
farmers in Eddy county of New Mexico kept bill collectors at bay by selling their water 
to oil and gas developers
6
. In 2014, the drought persisted and transfers continued with the 
office of the state engineer reporting increased applications, and a significant backlog
7
. 
Frustrated by increasingly uncertain water allocations in the face of maintained payment 
of water infrastructure maintenance and water transfer costs, in 2010, two farmers in San 
Joaquin in California proposed to sell 2000 acre-feet of water annually at $5,850 per 
acre-foot to developers, netting revenue of about $11.7 million. Similar narratives can be 
found in Santa Fe
8
, and given that the current continuing drought in California has driven 
agricultural water prices to $3000 per acre-foot as against $60 in a normal year
9
 and is 
pricing out many farmers, this trend can be expected to have increasing and far-reaching 
occurrences. 
                                                            
6 http://www.abqjournal.com/216332/news/nm-farmers-selling-water-to-oil-and-gas-developers-2.html 
7 http://www.currentargus.com/carlsbad-news/ci_25022789/drought-prompts-farmers-sell-off-irrigation-
water-oil  
8 http://www.sfreporter.com/santafe/article-6807-death-by-a-thousand-cuts.html 
9 http://www.mercurynews.com/drought/ci_26181042/high-bidding-farmers-battle-water-auctions 
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  A total profit condition is used to determine an upper bound on P below which 
agents continue production instead of selling their water rights and quitting the industry.  
The total profit condition is satisfied if; 
(29)                                          
      (  
       )               
This condition requires that the total profit an agent derives from production should 
be greater or equal to the profit he stands to gain from selling his entire allocation of 
water. This condition is necessary to ensure continued agent participation in the market.  
This establishes an upper limit of   ̅        
  
  
 .
10
   
Including this upper bound on   eliminates an analytic solution for the problem. The 
previous section proceeds by assuming that the upper bound is so large it is 
inconsequential. With an upper bound on P, there is a positive probability that the agent 
will choose to terminate production and lease all of his water rights. Since it would no 
longer be in use, the water-saving technology would provide no value to the agent. This 
suggests a nonlinear relationship between water price and the value of water-saving 
investments from the agent’s perspective. We utilize a numerical solution technique that 
approximates the value function associated with a water-saving investment from the 
perspective of an agent who may no longer need the water-saving technology.   
 
 
 
                                                            
10 This upper bound on profit also ensures that the marginal cost of buying water must be less than or equal 
to the marginal profit to be derived by employing that water in production.  Similarly, the marginal revenue 
from selling all available water must be less than, or equal to the marginal profit (Carey and Zilberman, 
2002) ensuring agent participation in the market (or an interior equilibrium). 
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3.5 Investment under Water Supply and Technical Uncertainty 
Consider the case where in addition to uncertainty in the agent’s water supply 
(expressed in this model through its relation to water price) due to changing climatic 
conditions; there exists uncertainty in the agent’s post-adoption water requirements 
attributable to uncertainty in the efficiency of the new technology, known as technical 
uncertainty. 
The technical efficiency is denoted by            . The lower limit represents 
complete failure of systems to produce water savings relative to previous technology, and 
the upper limit, open bound to show that a hundred percent efficiency (      is not 
feasible. 
The agent knows the efficiency of the current technology    but    is unknown until 
the investment is made.  We assume that the uncertainty in modern technology efficiency 
is governed by a geometric Brownian motion with zero drift described by; 
(30)                  
The agent’s optimal water demand under the modern technology is given by 
  
     
  
      
 
where    is the agent’s optimal level of production.  Following Ito’s Lemma, the 
agent’s optimal water demand also follows a GBM 
(31)    
      
       
     
where      
       
We assume no trend in the technical uncertainty process here       and assume 
that abstracting from changes in technical efficiency due to learning by doing or human 
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error and given proper maintenance, the irrigation system shows no significant trend in 
performance. 
Thus, (30) reduces to; 
(32)            
and       
   in the evolution of optimal water demand in (31). 
The agent’s decision represents an optimal stopping problem where an agent is 
concerned with choosing the right time to undertake a particular activity, in this case 
investing in water-saving technology, based on sequentially observed random variables 
       in order to maximize his expected payoffs from undertaking that particular 
activity. The solution involves finding the value function and stopping curve that satisfies 
the agent’s Bellman equation for values of the state variables for which it is optimal to 
continue. 
Numerical techniques are employed in finding a solution to the problem, and the 
solution procedure is presented in Section 5.   
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4: A UTAH CASE STUDY 
4.1 Study Area 
The model developed in the previous section is applied to the Middle Bear-Logan 
Watershed in northern Utah. Over half of the land in the watershed is used as rangeland 
for grazing and about one-tenth is irrigated for crop cultivation and other agricultural 
practices. There are about 113 canal companies in the study region and over 251,550 
acres of privately owned farmland in the region. Diversions from the watershed, as well 
as releases from the Bear Lake facilitate the irrigation of over 485 km² of land by more 
than 70 irrigation companies in the watershed. To get a sense of the volume of water the 
canals convey, Last Chance canal, the principal diversion in the watershed, diverts 60,000 
acre feet of water annually. Receiving the highest amount of precipitation in the entire 
Bear River Basin, this watershed’s mean annual  precipitation ranges from 43 to 150 
centimeters, with most falling as snow in the winter months. This makes it a very crucial 
watershed in the State (BRWIS, 2011). 
The study area consists of three rivers in the watershed - the Logan, Little Bear and 
Blacksmith Fork Rivers. The Watershed does not include the main stem of the Bear 
River, and is completely made up of drainage areas for a number of major tributaries of 
the Bear River. The tributaries flow from the east southwards into the Cutler Reservoir 
and drain 230,000 hectares. Figure 4 provides a map of the watershed indicating the 
rivers of interest. 
The Logan River, draining the eastern section of the watershed, begins its journey in 
the high mountains of the Bear River Range in Idaho. From there, it amasses tributary 
waters from Beaver Creek, Temple Fork and Right Hand Fork; and traverses Logan 
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Canyon through the Wasatch National Forest. When it gets to the floor of the cache 
valley, it passes through the city of Logan and agricultural areas on its outskirts, 
ultimately joining the Blacksmith Fork in the Cutler Reservoir. The Logan River drains 
about 1,500 km² of land, when you include the Blacksmith Fork and adds the greatest 
volume of water to the Bear River in the entire Bear Basin.  
The Blacksmith Fork also commences up in the Bear River Range and drains the 
lands south of the Logan River. Traversing the Blacksmith Fork Canyon, it collects 
waters from Sheep Creek, Curtis Creek, Rock Creek, and Left Hand Fork.  
The Little Bear River drainage system caters to the southern end of the watershed. 
The South Fork Little Bear, which drains the mountains on the southernmost end of the 
watershed; and the East Fork, which collects water from a large area of forested land in 
the Bear River Range; constitute its two main sub-drainages. 
 
4.2 Estimating Water Supply Uncertainty 
Historical time series data obtained from United States Geological Services (USGS) 
records on annual stream flow levels (  ) from the Logan (41 years), Bear (69 years), 
and Blacksmith Fork (88 years ) rivers in northern Utah, are used to estimate the drift 
(  ) and volatility (  ) parameters for the stochastic water supply process.   
To test whether the data are consistent with the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) 
assumption, an augmented Dickey Fuller test is performed (Conrad, 1997; Forsyth, 2000; 
Insley, 2002; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, Sims and Finoff, 2013).  While GBM 
assumes aggregate water supply is log-normally distributed, logged water supply w = 
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ln(W) is normally distributed and follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) 
           with          as the drift and volatility parameters of the ABM 
respectively.  If w is consistent with arithmetic Brownian motion, Stratonovich calculus
11
 
ensures W must be consistent with GBM.  Testing that w is consistent with arithmetic 
Brownian motion requires running a restricted regression, 
(33)                                    
   
and unrestricted regression  
(34)                                            
  
in order to test the null hypothesis for an arithmetic Brownian motion: H0: β1 = β2 = 
0. The F-test results for the regression results are shown below in table 1.1.  We fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that w follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (H0: β1 = β2 = 
0) for the dataset for all three rivers (i.e.           and         are independent 
random variables, a characteristic of the Weiner process). Thus, we conclude that GBM is 
an appropriate assumption.  This conclusion is corroborated in the literature by Fisher and 
Santiago (1997) and Bhaduri and Manna (2014) who assume a GBM for the stochastic 
evolution of water supply based on the log-normal distribution of water flow.  
Performing the restricted and unrestricted regressions on the three data sets, the 
following F values were obtained. 
 
                                                            
11 See appendix for explanation of the use of the Stratonovich rather than Ito’s formulation in this case 
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River Calculated F value Critical F  
(at 1% significance)
12
 
Logan 5.59 8.42 
Bear  9.15 10.62 
Blacksmith Fork 8.87 10.26 
Table 1.1: Restricted and Unrestricted Regression F-test Results 
 
Given that stream flow levels appear consistent with GBM, we proceed to estimate 
the drift and water supply parameters of the stochastic water supply process from the 
mean and standard deviations of our time series data respectively.  These (      ) are 
then used to estimate the corresponding drift and volatility parameters for water price 
(     ) using the relationship established between the two processes in equation (5).  
Drift and volatility parameters are presented in Table 1.2 (and are explained in Section 
4.4 below), and plots of the data from the various rivers showing the drift and volatility 
are shown below in Figures 1.1(a-c). 
                                                            
12 5% or less is needed to claim statistical significance. Reported values are rounded to 2 decimal places. 
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Figure 1.1a: Stochastic processes for water supply and water price for Logan River.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1b: Stochastic processes for water supply and water price for Little Bear 
River. 
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Figure 1.1c: Stochastic processes for water supply and water price for Blacksmith 
Fork River. 
 
The graphs appear to confirm logged water supply and prices follow ABMs,  
corroborating the GBM narrative with an obvious downward (upward) trend for water 
supply (price), and a confirmation of the volatility around these trends.  
 
4.3 Estimating Technical Efficiency Uncertainty 
There is a dearth of data on actual on-farm irrigation efficiencies. To obtain a value 
for the volatility of the technical efficiency process, it is assumed that with 90% 
probability, the efficiency of the system will remain between 70% and 95% in the next 20 
years.  This assumption is based off the probability-based volatility estimation in Carey 
and Zilberman (2002); and informed by the average and high performance efficiencies 
for center pivot irrigation of 70% and 95% respectively (Rogers et al., 1997). 
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Given the GBM assumption, changes in       are normally distributed. Using a log 
transformation, and the 90% confidence interval for the normal distribution, we obtain 
(via the central limit theorem)  the 20-year variance to be 0.416 and obtain  by division, 
an annual variance of          and standard deviation of           
 
4.4 Selecting Parameter Values 
The model is general enough to be applied to a wide variety of water-saving 
infrastructure investments.  For illustration, we consider an investment in more efficient 
on-farm irrigation technology.  The parameter values selected in Table 4 are based on this 
type of investment and drawn from the established values in the literature. To illustrate 
the generality of the model, select results for an investment in the lining of canals or 
ditches to mitigate seepage losses are presented in the appendix. The interest rate is set at 
6 percent to reflect the interest rate used in evaluating similar investments in the literature 
(Michailidis and Mattas, 2007). A risk-adjusted interest rate of 12 percent is also chosen 
based on the literature (Carey and Zilberman, 2002). The convenience yield (which is the 
agent’s effective discount rate) is calculated as the difference between the risk-adjusted 
discount rate and the drift in the rate of water supply for each river dataset. The lease 
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price of water is determined from data from the Utah Water Rights exchange. The 
expected water savings, X*, is chosen as the mean of the highest and lowest water 
savings from irrigation investment in semi-arid areas in the western United States 
(Brown, 2008; Hill, 2000). The values for initial investment costs are obtained from Utah 
estimates for cost of center pivot irrigation by the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (NRCS, 2009). Finally, the 
commodity price used in determining the shutdown price is derived from using the price 
of alfalfa in the 2013 Utah Agricultural Statistics to compute the dollar value of alfalfa 
yield per acre-foot of farm acreage (UAS, 2013). 
 
Table 1.2: Common Parameters for Irrigation Investment 
Interest rate (r) 0.06 
Risk-adjusted discount factor (ρ) 0.12 
Water savings (  ) 2.25 AF 
Initial (one-time) Investment cost (I) $575 
Total Investment cost ( ̂    
 
 
) $805 
Commodity Price (    $193 
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Initial Water Supply (    Logan: 135166.60 
Bear: 90424.79 
Blacksmith-Fork: 82605.83   
Water Supply Drift (  ) Logan: -0.0177 
Bear: -0.0059 
Blacksmith-Fork: -0.0060  
Water Supply Volatility      Logan: 0.4686  
Bear: 0.3806 
Blacksmith-Fork: 0.4023  
Initial Water (Lease) Price (  ) $38/AF 
Water Price Drift      Logan: 0.2415 
Bear: 0.1480 
Blacksmith-Fork: 0.1642  
Water Price Volatility      Logan: 0.9189 
Bear: 0.7462 
Blacksmith-Fork: 0.7888   
Technical Efficiency Volatility     0.145 
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5 NUMERICAL SOLUTION 
Optimal stopping problems with one state variable are relatively easy to solve. They 
involve the solution of an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) and may even provide 
closed form solutions under certain conditions depending on the nature of the ODE. The 
solution of optimal stopping problems with two or more state variables differs from the 
one state variable case in that one has to solve a partial differential equation (PDE) rather 
than an ODE. Often, a closed form solution may not exist for the relevant PDE, 
mandating the use of numerical techniques in finding a solution to the problem.   
Brekke and Oksendal (1994) introduced the method of variational inequalities as a 
numerical technique capable of resolving this conundrum, and this method has been 
increasingly utilized in the real options literature, notable among which is Balikcioglu et 
al. (2011), Marten and Moore (2011), and Sims and Finnoff (2013). The method, as 
presented in Balikcioglu et al. (2011), is based on the collocation approach and 
complementarity representation of the optimal stopping problem. The collocation method 
seeks to select a 2-dimensional space of candidate solutions (polynomials of degree 2 in 
our case) and a number of points in the domain (called collocation points), and choose the 
solution (polynomial) satisfying the given differential equation at these points 
(Balikcioglu et al., 2011).  
The general methodology of the numerical solution method sets the problem up as 
follows:  
The solution to our optimal stopping problem with two state variables (Price (P) and 
Technical Efficiency (  )) is obtained by a numerical approximation of a value function, 
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     according to Brekke and Oksendal (1994), where   is a continuous 2-dimensional 
state process described by a diffusion of the form; 
(35)                                                               , 
where   is a 2x1 drift vector,   is a 2x2 diffusion matrix, and Z is a 2-dimensional 
vector of independent Wiener processes.   
An agent, faced with an optimal stopping problem, chooses between receiving a flow 
of payments      per unit time, and a one-time reward,     of stopping, after which no 
further rewards are given (Balikcioglu et al., 2011).The agent thus seeks to maximize his 
expected discounted flow of payments and his optimal policy involves choosing when to 
stop his value function; 
(36)           [∫  
            
             
 
 
] 
Brekke and Oksendal (1994) show that the optimal value function in this case,     , 
satisfies the set of complementarity conditions; 
(37)                   
where   is the infinitesimal state process generator, and 
(38)             
with one of these conditions holding with equality at each value of S.  
In our water-saving investment model, the state space is two dimensional        . 
Applying the numerical solution procedure as pioneered in Brekke and Oksendal (1994) 
and further applied in (Brekke and Oksendal, 1994; Judd, 1998, Miranda and Fackler, 
2002, and Balikcioglu et al., 2011) to the water-saving investment problem, we find the 
following pair of complementarity conditions  
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(39)       
      
  
      
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
         
   
    
 
(40)        
where the last term  in (39),          
   
    
goes to zero with uncorrelated P and   . 
Equation (39) holding with equality implies a delay in investment (i.e. agent exercises 
his option to delay investment to obtain better information for possible investment at a 
later date). When it holds with inequality, however, the investment is not viable (the 
expected return is less than the required return from investment) and therefore falls in the 
no-investment zone. (40) holding with equality however, implies the agent should invest. 
For our water-saving infrastructure investment model, the optimality conditions are 
evaluated numerically in MATLAB based on the study area in northern Utah. 
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6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Using the model set-up and baseline parameter values described above in Table 4, 
real options investment thresholds are solved for three scenarios: 
1) without stochastic efficiency and without farm shutdown price
13
 
2) without stochastic efficiency and with farm shutdown price 
3) with stochastic efficiency and with farm shutdown price 
Scenario 1 is directly comparable to Carey and Zilberman (2002) and will be more 
applicable in cases where the efficiency of the technology is well understood and the 
current price of water is low relative to the price that would trigger shutdown. Scenario 
two maintains the same characteristics as scenario 1, with the added characteristic that the 
current water price has the potential to hit the shutdown price in this scenario. In scenario 
3, efficiency uncertainty is added to scenario 2  To illustrate the influence of the option 
value, the real options thresholds (RO) will be compared to their corresponding benefit-
cost thresholds (NPV).  
 
6.1: Scenario 1 
The thresholds are solved for solely water supply uncertainty and no shutdown price.  
These results are will be compared with the model results from the added sources of 
uncertainty and market exit conditions, which are numerically solved for in the next 
section.  
 
 
                                                            
13 Cannot find real option threshold with stochastic efficiency and without shutdown price  
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Table 1.3: Irrigation Investment Thresholds under Scenario 1 
 Logan Bear Blacksmith-
Fork 
Threshold P (NPV) 21 54 49 
Threshold P (OV) 271 237 246 
Threshold W (NPV) 1,194,218 739,691 475,009 
Threshold W (OV) 3,234,756 349,406 207,692 
 
 
The results from the study (Table 1.3) indicate that water supply uncertainty delays 
investment in farm-scale irrigation investments. This can be seen from the disparity 
between the real options (OV) and benefit-cost (NPV) thresholds required for investment. 
The consideration of uncertainty in the real option investment evaluations lead to greater 
water prices required for investment. We also see that differences in volatility make a 
difference in the impact of uncertainty consideration on investment. The Bear River, 
which showed the lowest volatility in water price (and consequently, its derivative water 
supply process) as can be seen from comparing figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, as well as from the 
respective volatility parameters in table 4, requires the lowest price threshold for 
investment under the real options consideration.  
Thus, even within a particular geographical area, agents may face different 
uncertainty conditions depending upon their particular water source. It is interesting to 
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note, however, that under the benefit-cost criteria, irrigators along the Bear River would 
require the lowest price thresholds for investment. This makes intuitive sense. The Bear 
is the largest of the three albeit the most volatile and so considering quantity of water 
supply without considering the volatility factor would give a low estimate for the value of 
the water-saving infrastructure investment. Thus leaving out uncertainty considerations in 
evaluating investment decisions can produce significant distortions in investment 
analyses. 
Of interest, in considering these water supply thresholds, are estimations of how long 
it would take under current conditions for available water supplies to get to these critical 
thresholds. To this end, we employ Freeware (Excel Spreadsheet) by Marco Antonio 
Guimarães Dias
14
 which affords estimates for what it would take to attain the thresholds 
in question. 
 
 
Table 1.4: Hitting Time Simulations 
Irr        NPV  Y  r   OV  Y  r   D ff r  c  
L     N A 8 7 98 N A 
B  r   6 8     9  3  X NPV 
B  ck      
F rk 
     6    9    8 X NPV 
                                                            
14 Dias, Marco Antonio Guimarães. First Hitting Time and Expected Discount Factor. 
Available online at http://www.puc-rio.br/marco.ind/hittingt.html [2012, November 16] 
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We find on the average, that uncertainty in year-to-year water availability in northern 
Utah causes individuals to delay water conservation investments an average of at least 5X 
what would be suggested by discounted cash flow analysis for center pivot irrigation 
technology. 
The table shows simulated hitting times for the irrigation investment. It shows how 
long it would take for the critical price threshold to be hit under current conditions for 
both net present value and option value considerations. The Logan River’s price 
threshold for irrigation investment under the net present value consideration is lower than 
what the lease price of water is today, hence the N/A. It would take 5 times the time 
under the option value consideration for the lease price Bear River of the Bear River to 
reach the price threshold all other things remaining the same, and 7.6 times as the time 
for the Blacksmith Fork River, emphasizing the significant delay uncertainty 
considerations can cause. 
 
6.2: Scenarios 2 and 3 
The thresholds presented here reflect the optimal timing of investments in new 
technologies whose efficiency is uncertain, and where the shutdown water price is 
imminent.  In these instances, conclusions drawn from Carey and Zilberman (2002) may 
be misleading due to the omission of technical efficiency uncertainty and market exit 
condition from their investment evaluation.  Comparing the results of scenario 2 to 
scenario 1 provides insight into the effect of market exit. Comparing the results of 
scenario 3 to scenario 2 provides insight into the effect of uncertain efficiency 
improvements.  
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Figure 1.2 shows the approximated value of the investment option when a market 
shutdown price is incorporated in the investment decision. The x-axis shows the price, 
the y-axis shows the range of technical efficiency, and the z-axis shows the approximated 
value of investment. From the graph, it can be seen that the expected present value is 
negative for lower levels of price due to the sunk cost of investment, and increases with 
increasing price. It also shows that the investment then becomes less valuable as the price 
continue to increase and gets closer to the shut-down price. From the graph (read from 
left to right), the net present value falls below the zero line for low price values. It then 
increases as price increases, peaks then falls.  
This underscores the importance of the market shutdown condition. An assessment 
done without considering the option of the agent to leave the market will project an 
infinitely rising value of investment in response to price increase and this projection 
would have a gap from observed behavior which shows farmers selling their water at 
high enough prices. While Utah’s water allocation policies and limited water market may 
act as a bottleneck to the outright sale of saved water at the moment, there are still the 
options to lease, sell well water and in the worst case scenario, sell off farmland and 
ranchland. In support of this, McGinty (2009) showed that agricultural land is 
increasingly being sold due to rising costs of production, and the call for public comment 
for  the draft of a 50-year water strategy for the state (UWF, 2013) saw many calls for 
more favorable provisions for the transfer of saved water due to efficiency investments.  
It can also be seen from Figure 1.2(reading from right to left along the y- and z-axes, 
that the value of investment decreases with higher efficiency levels This is because the 
value of investment comes from water savings, and the water savings to be made from 
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converting a 75% efficient system to a 95% one, is lower than converting from a 40% 
flood system to a 95% center-pivot system. This also underlies the importance of 
technical uncertainty considerations in the decision to invest in more efficient water-
saving infrastructure. An advertised 55% gain in efficiency (40 to 95%) delivering only a 
25% actual efficiency gain, could make the difference between a profitable investment 
and a non-profitable one. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Impact of technical uncertainty on expected net present value of 
Investment. 
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Figure 1.3a: Comparison of scenarios 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3b: Comparison of scenarios 2 and 3 
 
 
62 
 
Figures 1.3a and 1.3b detail the impact of technical uncertainty and a market-exit 
condition on the agent’s decision to invest. Figure 1.3a is the deterministic technical 
efficiency case and highlights the effect of imposing the shutdown condition on the 
agent’s investment decision; whereas 1.3b shows the effect of a stochastic technical 
uncertainty. The unbroken lines detail the scenarios incorporating the shut-down price 
consideration, and the broken lines detail their no-shutdown counterparts. From the 
figure, it can be seen that the introduction of the shut-down price introduces a backward 
bending effect on both curves in the cases of both the net present value and option value 
considerations, imposing a bound on the ability of price increases to increase the 
profitability of investment. After a certain point, the value of investment no longer 
increases I response to price increases, and it rather becomes more profitable to market 
one’s water, rather than continue production.  
The backward bending we see in the top half of Figure 1.3a can be attributed to the 
reduction of the desirability of investment as water price approaches the shutdown price. 
In the lower half of the figure, we note that the cases with the shutdown condition (solid 
lines) lie above their no exit counterparts (broken lines). This is a result of the fact that 
the option to invest will be less valuable if the technology may someday be rendered 
worthless if the agent chooses to exit the market. 
Similar to Figure 1.2, the curves confirm the delaying effect of uncertainty 
consideration on the decision to invest. The curves for the real options scenarios 
(unbroken line) lie above their net present value counterparts in all cases, detailing a 
higher price threshold requirement for investment under the option value (uncertainty) 
consideration. This suggests that uncertainty in future water supplies and the efficiency of 
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new water-saving technology create similar incentives to delay adoption of new water-
saving infrastructure investments.  
In Figure 1.3b, the real options case is shown in black and red lines, and in both 
cases, lie above the benefit-cost lines in green and blue signifying greater price thresholds 
are required for investment in the option value consideration as opposed to the more 
traditional net present value evaluation. The higher investment thresholds and consequent 
fewer cases of investment compared to the benefit-cost evaluation is consistent with the 
findings of Carey and Zilberman (2002) and suggests that the discrepancy between the 
benefit-cost recommendations and observed investment in water-saving infrastructure 
may well be due to uncertainty considerations in the investment decisions. 
In addition to uncertainty about future supplies, uncertainty about the realized as 
opposed to advertised performance of water-saving technology factors into an agent’s 
decision to invest in said technology. This can be seen from comparing the two figures 
juxtaposed in Figure 1.3b. We note an increase in the investment threshold when 
stochastic efficiency is introduced into the model as noted by a higher price requirement 
for investment shown in the right hand diagram. To confirm the effect is attributable to 
efficiency uncertainty, we note that the figure maintains the lower benefit cost investment 
threshold in the left-hand diagram, while indicating a higher threshold for the real options 
case. This means that research and policy action targeted at reducing or managing 
technical efficiency has the potential to influence irrigation investment in the desired 
direction. This is important because while water supply uncertainty stems from inherently 
uncertain climate conditions, and is therefore likely to continue, efficiency uncertainty 
may be more easily managed, for instance, by more data-collection and research on the 
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post-adoption performance of conservation technology. A catalog of the various observed 
performances under various hydro-geophysical and climatic conditions may diminish the 
agent’s perceived uncertainty about the benefits of adoption, and help him make a more 
informed and more immediate investment.
15
 
The question of how reductions in both types of uncertainty would influence the 
adoption of water-saving infrastructure can best be investigated through sensitivity 
analysis. The added investment delays seen in the non-zero versus zero uncertainty cases, 
suggest that reduction in both sources of uncertainty would lead to greater investment. 
However, to determine which source of uncertainty has greater leverage in influencing 
investments, we conduct sensitivity analyses at 2%, 5% and 10% levels to investigate the 
impact of a 2%, 5% and 10% increase in the volatility parameters for water supply and 
technical efficiency have on the results of the model.
16
 The results suggest that changes in 
the volatility parameter for water supply have a greater impact on the decision to invest 
relative to volatility in technical efficiency. Thus, while uncertainty surrounding the 
performance of the efficient technology does have a significant impact on the decision to 
invest, concerns surrounding the future availability and predictability of water supplies 
are greater. This has major repercussions with water supply projected to see more 
seasonal and inter-annual variability with changing climatic conditions. 
Introducing the shutdown price in the analysis maintains higher investment threshold 
requirements in terms of the price of water under the real option value scenario. In 
                                                            
15 Rogers et al, 2005 find that deviations of installed system conditions from design operating conditions 
can cause system performance to vary as much as three times lower than in systems matching design 
operating conditions. 
16 See appendix for results of sensitivity analyses 
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addition, the introduction of a shutdown price makes the threshold curves backward-
bending. When it becomes possible to earn more by selling the farm’s water allocation 
rather than engaging in production, the agent exits the market. Thus, if the agent 
perceives that his water rights are going to be more valuable on the water market than any 
future production, he has no incentive to invest, but rather to wait and lease his water 
right. Since the main incentive for investment considered here is monetization of water 
savings or money ‘saved’ by not having to buy more water for production with increased 
water scarcity, the possibility of not investing should have a depressing effect on the level 
of investment.  
This result is perhaps more notable in the case of agricultural produce, and perhaps in 
the case of relative geographical mobility of food and people present in the United States 
which permits food importation from other states, as well as the possibility of migration 
to other states. In practice, agricultural produce is really not permitted, all other things 
being equal, to fully reflect the cost of production due to government desires to protect 
consumers from hunger, as well as producers from production risk, at the expense of state 
and federal subsidies. The United States Department of Agriculture and the Utah 
Department of Agriculture can only subsidize production so much before it becomes 
more economical to import agricultural produce. Further research into this issue could 
thus prove valuable for planning purposes. Considering the predicted regional water 
supply conditions, long-term planning could, for instance, make provision for gradually 
diversifying the state economy away from water-intensive production for a worst-case 
future water supply scenario, while encouraging investment in conservation technology 
in the short-term. 
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The backward bend in figures 5a and 5b highlights the fact that some water-
conservation technologies may not be efficient enough to trigger investment regardless of 
the price they could receive for the conserved water. When he has the option to leave a 
commodity market, higher water prices have two effects on the incentive to invest.  First, 
they increase the benefit of investment in each period.  Second, they decrease the 
expected time until the farm shuts down which decreases the expected time the 
technology will be in operation and decreases the expected net present value of the 
investment. In Figure 6b, the shutdown cases see no investment below technical 
efficiency about 0.55 for the benefit–cost, and 0.75 for the real options cases respectively. 
These all highlight the impact ignoring the technical efficiency uncertainty could have on 
optimal investment. 
Thus, when the agent considers the uncertainties in water price and technical 
efficiency, higher water price thresholds are required for investment. And this investment 
delay is further aggravated by introducing a shutdown price, answering the question, 
‘What effect does market entry and exit have on investment behavior.’ 
A point of interest to note would also be the relative absence of competition when it 
comes to agricultural production. Azevedo and Paxson (2012) find in a game-theoretic 
real options model, that technical uncertainty delayed investment in the new technology, 
but that it had a greater stalling effect on the follower than the leader who had the 
incentive to seek first mover advantage.  Thus, accounting for competition may be a 
valuable future exercise. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
There is increasing interest in the impact of hydrological and economic uncertainty on 
water infrastructure investment in the face of changing climatic conditions. The 
frequently observed under-investment in water-saving infrastructure despite positive net 
present value estimates is worrisome because delayed water infrastructure investments in 
the face of changing climatic conditions may result in a future water supply problems in 
the ‘best’ case, and damaged property and lost lives in the worst cases.  
The results from this study confirm the delaying impact of uncertainty on water-
efficiency investment behavior in our Utah case study. The empirically estimated 
threshold values of water supply and price to invest in water-saving suggest that 
uncertainty may very well explain the observed underinvestment in water-saving 
infrastructure investment in the region.  
The results also confirm the effects of uncertainty across rivers within the watershed. 
The Logan River, with the highest water supply volatility appropriately requires the 
highest and lowest water price and corresponding water supply thresholds, respectively as 
seen  in table 1.3.  
To answer our underlying research question, the study finds that uncertainty in future 
water supplies and the efficiency of new water-saving technology create similar 
incentives to delay adoption of new water-saving infrastructure investments.  
The introduction of the shutdown condition results in backward bending investment 
threshold curves, highlighting the fact that some water-conservation technologies may 
not be efficient enough to trigger investment regardless of the price they could receive for 
the conserved water. While increases in water price in response to increasing water 
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scarcity would make these technologies more profitable than they would be at lower 
prices, profits from production would have to be high enough to make a case for selling 
saved water under continued production, and selling all water and exiting the industry. 
The evaluation of farm irrigation investments has margins which could be explained 
by the consideration of uncertainty, as well as the inefficiency of the water markets in the 
watershed relative to that of neighboring regions. The water rights lease price of $38 is 
relatively low considering the prices for similar amounts of water in neighboring states. 
Also the prevailing prior appropriation water rights system stymies the benefits to be 
obtained from sold water savings and may also contribute to the investment inertia in the 
region. 
Finally, the sensitivity analyses for comparing the relative effects of the two sources 
of uncertainty reveal that the relationship between these uncertainties and their joint 
effect on investment in irrigation technology, is worth future study, and holds rich 
promise for targeted policy and research actions. 
These observations provide insight as to what measures may be taken to encourage 
water-saving infrastructure investments in the face of the associated inherent uncertainty 
across investment types and geographical areas. While policies that target perceived 
investment uncertainty may work best for irrigation investments, the fastest results with 
regards to canal lining investments may be subsidies to reduce present cost of these 
investments, as well as research and development to develop cheaper alternatives. 
Continuing research would extend the model to allow for continuous uncertainty in 
the future cost of investment that may arise from future technological innovations and 
policy, as well as sequential investment.  
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CHAPTER TWO: INCREMENTAL ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT IRRIGATION 
TECHNOLOGY: A REAL OPTIONS APPLICATION 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study employs an incremental real options approach to evaluating the decision to 
invest in efficient irrigation technology. It found that allowing for gradual investment can 
lead to up to 75% of investments occurring earlier than in the case of the same investment 
evaluation without incremental consideration. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As with any economic field of enquiry, the application of Real Option Theory to 
evaluating capital investment decisions in economics has inherent complexities and 
limitations that are typically dealt with by making simplifying assumptions to ensure 
tractability. One of these assumptions is in the setting up of problems such that the 
decision to extract, invest or develop is an all or nothing decision. With the all-or-nothing 
set-up, a decision to extract a resource meant choosing between leaving the resource 
wholly intact or a complete extraction of the resource. Likewise, a decision to invest in 
energy-efficient technology meant a complete overhaul of existing technology; and a 
decision to develop an area with a resource such as an old growth forest meant that the 
entire forest would be lost in the development process. 
However, decisions are not so black and white in real life applications. We regularly 
observe sequential decision-making with regards to the eventual scale and scheduling of 
capital investments (Mezey and Conrad, 2010).  Gupta and Rosenhead (1968) proffer a 
motivation for this more gradual decision-making. They assert that one way investors 
guard against the danger of regretting large investments, particularly in the face of 
appreciable uncertainty about future conditions, is ensuring that their early (and 
irreversible) steps in the investment sequence keep as many of the ‘good’ options open as 
possible. Thus, the observed more sequential investment decision-making may be 
explained by investors choosing the timing and scale of their investments in order to 
minimize their potential of investor regret; and offers them more courses of (potentially 
more optimal) action relative to the all-or-nothing scenario where their only recourse to 
avoiding regret would be delaying the whole investment.  
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For example, consider the case of a farmer choosing to adopt a new agricultural 
technology. As Ma and Shi (2015) affirm, agricultural technology is often adopted 
sequentially, with farmers first adopting a new technology on part of their lands and 
make later adjustments to their use of the new technology based on their experience of 
the initial partial adoption. A farmer, seeking to invest in terracing to mitigate erosion and 
soil losses might decide to terrace the steepest slope on his acreage first should he be 
unable (due to budget or other constraints) or unwilling (due to cost-effectiveness) to do 
his entire land area at a time. This decision makes economic sense because the steepest 
section has the most losses and so has the greatest benefit potential. In the terminology of 
production theory, marginal benefit of terracing an added acre is greater in the steepest 
sections and would be more likely to measure up to the marginal cost of investment if we 
allowed for a breakdown of the cost of investments to permit partial and incremental 
investment. The formulation of such a farmer’s investment decision as an all or nothing 
decision, however, might see him not investing at all because the requirement of full 
investment and attendant higher resource commitment is more difficult to justify.   
The incremental investment decision approach advanced by this study provides a 
clearer picture of the value of flexibility by decomposing the full investment from 
Chapter 1 into a series of partial investments. By presenting the opportunity for a partial 
initial investment with potential incremental adjustments in future, this approach offers 
the opportunity to take advantage of new information at each incremental stage.  In the 
face of unfavorable unfolding of events which increase the cost and/or decrease the value 
of completing the investment, an incremental approach allows one to cut one’s losses by 
temporarily or permanently halting future investments. Under favorable conditions, an 
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incremental approach still preserves the option to undertake additional investments that 
become economically viable under the new conditions. 
Thus, assuming an ‘all or nothing’ stance in evaluating investment decisions is more 
likely to lead to suboptimal investment decisions under uncertain future conditions 
because it increases the possibility of perceived over-investment (Woodward et al., 2014) 
by catering to worst case future scenarios (and thus best case investment return 
scenarios), ignoring the more probable tempered middle ground scenarios. An agent, 
having made the decision to invest to avoid a worst case scenario, will perceive his 
investment as over-investment if the future evolution of the variables he considered, fall 
short of the unlikely worst case scenario. This relates to the Bernanke (1983) bad news 
principle which asserts that the willingness to invest in the current period depends only 
on the severity of bad news that may arrive given a current return. And that it does not 
matter at all how good the potential for future good news regarding the investment may 
be (Maoz, 2004). 
This effect is attributable to the effect of irreversibility on potential for investor 
regret. Since an investor’s response to bad news (i.e. partially or fully disinvesting) is 
constrained after an irreversible investment has been made, he ascribes a disproportionate 
weight to the possibility of bad news, and this suppresses his perception of the value of 
the validation post-investment good news may bring. This weight increases the greater 
the resource commitment and uncertainty associated with an investment since these 
determine the size of potential loss and thus regret, and probability of this loss, 
respectively. It may also be amplified in the case of a pessimistic investor, and vice versa. 
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The value of the real options approach is in its inherent flexibility which allows 
decision-making to be adaptable to a wide range of future scenarios. Thus, by doing away 
with the all-or-nothing assumption inherent in traditional real options models, we 
capitalize on the flexibility benefits of using the real options approach in evaluating 
investment decisions. By allowing the agent to incrementally invest, we temper this 
distorted perception since smaller scales of investment lessen the possibility and scale of 
potential overinvestment. 
Employing the incremental formulation thus enables us to capture both flexibility 
with respect to the timing of investment – (relaxing the now or never assumption) from 
the traditional real options approach, and flexibility with respect to the scale of 
investment from the incremental or impulse control formulation gained by relaxing the all 
or nothing assumption in the traditional model. This is illustrated in the following 
diagram. 
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Figure 2.1: Assessing the temporal and scale flexibility of technology adoption 
investments 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the possible combinations of investment flexibility and models 
employed in capturing them, to situate the models in this chapter and in chapter one. 
Discounted cash flow methods with fixed costs of investment (A) are used for 
investments with limited flexibility with regards to timing and scale. This investment 
class is the most restrictive and formulates the investment decision as an all-or-nothing 
investment which must be undertaken now or never. The next category (B), relaxes this 
to allow for incremental investments, but maintains the now or never requirement (i.e. it 
does not consider the option value). It does this by setting up the investment as 
consecutive segments with costs varying from one segment to the next.  
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(C) maintains the all-or-nothing formulation, but allows for timing flexibility beyond 
now or never by considering the value of the option of waiting to invest. And (D), 
represents the most flexible of these models by allowing for both flexibility in the timing 
(now or never) and scale (all or nothing) assumptions.  
There are three cases where the more flexible incremental real options investment 
approach proposed in chapter 2 stands to be more appropriate compared to net present 
value and non-incremental option value formulation, and captures information otherwise 
missed. These are; 
1) Liquidity- where the agent does not have sufficient funds upfront for the full 
investment 
2) Litigation- where public opposition to a part of the project would stall a full 
investment, as in the case of protests against canal lining 
3) Non-constant marginal productivity - where incremental investment allows the 
agent to optimize timing and scale of investment to maximize return from his 
investment dollars.  
While the first two are pertinent, this chapter focuses primarily on the third to 
examine the impact of uncertainty on agent investment scale and schedule. 
It is hypothesized that in general, and particularly in the case of investments involving 
big picture goals such as regional water conservation, the added flexibility presented by 
the incremental investment formulation would increase the probability of positive 
outcomes (i.e. more incidence of investment) relative to the all-or-nothing formulation. It 
is hypothesized that this greater incidence of gradual scaled investment has the potential 
to be large enough to offset the investment margin losses due to scaling. This has 
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significant implications for investments such as energy or water conservation (irrigation) 
or pollution abatement where individual investments while evaluated for profitability to 
individual agents making the investment decisions, also work in tandem towards bigger 
picture outcomes such as sustainability of agriculture in a semi-arid environment given 
uncertain evolution of hydroclimatic conditions.    
There are two reasons providing backing for this incremental investment story with 
regards to irrigation investment.  First, variation in soil conditions (e.g., soil composition, 
nutrient content, drainage) lead to variation in the marginal productivity of irrigation 
technology.  Current economic and climatic conditions may make water-saving 
technology upgrades feasible on only a portion of a farm. Second, in requiring greater 
pecuniary commitment, a farm-wide technology upgrade is likely to require the kind of 
return associated with a worst-case future water supply and price scenario. The 
substantial investment costs; the discounted, uncertainty-adjusted benefits of investing 
fully in water-saving technology may only surpass cost requirements if future water 
prices attain significantly high values – the kind associated with extreme future water 
scarcity (drought). Given the low probability of this event, positive returns would be out 
of reach in most cases preventing investment. Thus, in trying to get agents to be protected 
against the worst-case scenario via the nature of the all or nothing model set up, they may 
elect to acquire zero protection given the uncertainty associated with said worst-case 
scenario, preferring to defer investment to a later date where more information about 
future water supply and water prices are available. 
Applying an incremental investment approach to the decision to invest in water-
saving infrastructure such as efficient irrigation technology becomes critical when water 
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supply and water price are highly volatile.  Since uncertainty has the effect of spreading 
the tails of a normal distribution, it increases the likelihood of both very good news 
(greater water scarcity and elevated value of saved water) and very bad news (less 
scarcity and lower value of saved water) affecting the value of the investment. The 
Bernanke bad news principle suggests that the possibility of greater water availability 
(lower valued of conserved water) than expected has a disproportionate drag on the 
agent’s willingness to invest.  
This chapter thus extends the previous chapter to consider the effect of allowing for 
impulse-control (where the agent may incrementally upgrade technology, investing where 
he can make the greatest efficiency-gains first, with possible future expansion) on an 
agent’s decision to invest in water-saving infrastructure in the face of hydrologic 
uncertainty in the Wasatch Range Metropolitan Area (WRMA). 
Lifting the constraint of total or zero investment will temper some of the impact that 
irreversibility of the irrigation investment has on the agents’ decision to invest in the face 
of uncertainty. By allowing for gradual scaled investments, it allows the agent to scale his 
loss potential in increments, mitigating the potential for investor regret since he can stop 
at any point before total investment is attained. Specifically, it is hypothesized based on 
existing literature that agents will have greater incentive to invest in more units of 
technology in the face of greater uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Schwartz and 
Trigeorsis, 2004).  
However, this will be counteracted by a corresponding increase in the opportunity 
cost of investment in consecutive marginal units by requiring each marginal unit to meet 
profitability requirements by itself rather than under the total investment umbrella, 
92 
 
leading to a reduction in optimal investment levels. It is also expected that while 
independent agents who do invest may invest in less technology units, more agents will 
invest as compared to the all or nothing scenario and the net effect of this will depend on 
the relative magnitude of the extensive (number of agents investing) and intensive 
(number of acres with upgrade technology). 
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2 BACKGROUND 
The incremental real options approach to evaluating capital investments has been 
amply applied in the strategic management literature (Krychowski and Quelin, 2010; 
Leslie and Michaels, 1997). Here, Real Option theory is treated as a rhetorical tool which 
helps organizations structure their investment decisions in the context of high uncertainty. 
An application by Leslie and Michael (1997) posits an incremental investment strategy as 
a management best case practice, confirming the merit of sequencing investments into 
phases in order to benefit from upside risk, while eliminating the cost of downside risk. 
The incremental real options approach has also been applied in the engineering 
literature, as a strategic decision-making tool (Ramirez, 2002; Miller and Park, 2002). It 
capitalizes on the arguably greatest benefit of the real options approach by encouraging 
investment decision-making which preserves the flexibility of choice, as well as future 
modification of investment in response to economic circumstances (McGrath et al., 2004, 
Miller and Park (2002). 
Other fields where this incremental approach has been amply applied include the 
capacity choice and asset replacement literature. Zambujal-Oliviera and Duque (2011) 
analyze operational asset replacement strategy in a real options framework, and confirm 
that different types of uncertainties produce non-monotonic effects on optimal capital 
replacement level.  
Dangl (1999) investigates simultaneous choice of optimal capacity choice and 
optimal investment timing under irreversible investment costs and uncertain future 
demand. He asserts that while a once and for all decision (capacity choice is not all or 
nothing, but cannot be revised in future once chosen) leads to higher optimal installed 
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capacity, it also causes investment delay and makes investment so sensitive to uncertainty 
that even small amounts of uncertainty lead to a wait and see conclusion for large ranges 
of demand.  
Incremental real options can also be used to manage risk. Guma (2008) in a real estate 
development application asserts that developers can better manage risk associated with a 
weak market and gain the potential to benefit in a strong one, by considering investments 
that afford the capability to react appropriately to uncertain future events. The study 
considers the value of the option of vertical real estate expansion in dense urban centers, 
and determines that incorporating the real options framework enhances the potential of 
matching investor preferences to development projects. 
Extending this application, Boyer et al. (2004), Kong and Kwok (2006), and Smith 
and Trigeorsis (2004) confirm the advantages of a joint dynamic real option and strategic 
competition (games) analysis, revealing the considerable impact of imposing the 
indivisibility assumption on real options investment analyses.  
In economics, this study joins the sparse but steadily evolving literature dedicated to 
real options applications which consider not only whether (and when) to invest (optimal 
stopping and timing), but also how much to invest (optimal capacity). Pindyck (1988) 
applies this to the choice of firm capacity, focusing particularly on marginal investment 
decision. He posits that a firm’s capacity choice is optimal when the value of the 
marginal unit of capacity is just equal to the total marginal cost of that unit. In true real 
options fashion, this total cost includes not only purchase and installation costs, but also 
the opportunity cost of exercising the option to buy the unit. 
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Pindyck (1988) suggests two steps to an optimal capacity analysis. The first involves 
a determination of the value of a marginal unit of capacity given a starting capacity. This 
value must account for the fact that should demand unexpectedly fall; the new unit of 
capacity may be unutilized. Next, one must determine the value of the option to invest 
(which will depend, in part, on the value determined in step one), together with the 
decision rule for exercising the option. This decision rule, in essence, would solve the 
optimal capacity problem. 
Uncertainty has substantial influence in the optimal capacity problem, as with optimal 
stopping and timing problems. Since a marginal unit of capacity need not be utilized, it is 
worth more when demand fluctuates stochastically. This appears to create an incentive 
for the firm to hold more capacity in the face of uncertain future demand (Pindyck, 
1988). However, uncertainty also increases the opportunity cost of exercising the option 
to invest in a marginal unit. As future uncertainty increases, the value of the marginal unit 
increases, but the opportunity cost of investing increases even more which produces the 
net effect of a reduction in the firm’s optimal capacity choice. The opportunity cost here 
is the so-called user cost of capital in the literature which captures investment reluctance 
borne out of the anticipation of the irreversibility constraint holding in future, (Abel and 
Eberly, 1996; Bertola, 1988; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Dixit, 1989; Pindyck, 1988). To 
wit - while uncertainty increases the potential value of increased capacity, it also 
increases the potential of unused capital stock in future (overinvestment) and thus a drag 
on optimal capital capacity.
17
 Thus ignoring such costs could lead to over-investment. 
                                                            
17 This result requires that marginal revenue product be a decreasing function of capital stock, as noted by 
Pindyck (1993) and Abel and Eberly (1997). 
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This creates the need to correctly compute and account for the opportunity cost in optimal 
capacity decisions, and provides motivation for this study.  While chapter one considers 
how the joint impact of uncertainty and irreversibility delays investment relative to the 
net present value case, this study goes a step further to show how the all or nothing 
formulation of the investment decision contributes to this delay and how allowing for 
gradual piecewise investments may help better optimize the timing and level/intensity of 
investment. 
Real options with impulse control has also been applied, in the natural resource 
economics literature, to the management of invasive species where the presence of the 
complexity of multiple interacting species and uncertainty in the population dynamics 
mandates control strategies above the single-species control models.  
 Kotani et al., (2009) apply it in examining the effect of species catchability on 
optimal invasive species management strategy, and conclude that given the sensitivity of 
species catchability to current stock size, the optimal control sequence could drastically 
change in response to changes in stock size as successive units of control is applied. 
Adopting an all or nothing approach in such an evaluation would thus erroneously lead to 
no control being applied, where   management strategies which maintain some positive 
economically efficient levels of the invasive species would be optimal. The identification 
of this optimal strategy is however only possible in an incremental investment 
framework.  
Conrad and Yang (2009) identify the threshold gypsy moth concentrations that would 
minimize the discounted sum of damage and control costs associated with managing the 
invasive moths. They do this by incorporating the associated damage and control costs 
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into a complex biological model describing the evolution of gypsy moth populations and 
find that the minimization of the sum of discounted damage and spraying costs does not 
result in a smooth convex function relating damage costs to gypsy moth concentrations. 
The damage function is instead, discontinuous in relation to gypsy moth concentrations 
and has the graphical form of a series of line segments with multiple, non-unique, local 
minima. This would be a treacherous optimization problem for a local solver and 
inaccurately captured by the imposition of a smooth function. In relation to the focus of 
this chapter, the maximization of the difference between expected costs and benefits of 
investment in the real options framework given the evolution of water supply and water 
price may not result in a smooth, convex threshold curve which is imposed by an all or 
nothing model assumption, and such an assumption would yield spurious results.   
Applying real options theory, Saphores (2000) formulates an optimal stopping model 
for the application of control measures to a pest population whose concentration varies 
randomly. The expected marginal cost of reentry for a farmer is analyzed by introducing 
a delay between successive pesticide applications. Applying this to the pesticide-control 
of a foliar apple pest and solving numerically for threshold levels, Saphores (2000), finds 
that threshold pest density needed to trigger pesticide control varied significantly with the 
uncertainty surrounding pest density. He thus established that incorporating the 
uncertainty in pest spread evolutions may help better manage the pesticide application to 
soils and crops by using the threshold pest densities as a guide to optimize timing and 
scale via an incremental pest control strategy.  
In their study of aquatic invasive species, Leung et al. (2002) demonstrate the 
importance of uncertainty in determining optimal prevention expenditures needed to 
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attain economically efficient invasion risk levels. Saphores and Shogren (2005) 
contribute an essential extension to this in their application of a real options framework to 
account for both uncertainty and managerial flexibility in the traditional dynamic model 
of non-native invasive species management. In their model, a resource manager is faced 
with an investment decision to eliminate 90% of an invasive species at a fixed cost. 
Given the population dynamics of the species which was uncertain with an exponential 
growth expectation, the solution to the model proved to be a trigger population level 
which, when reached, will prompt the resource manager to exert control on the invasive 
species population. 
Marten and Moore (2011), following the arguments in Saphores and Shogren (2005), 
develop a more generalized real options framework to incorporate more complex and 
realistic management strategies such as a hybrid biological and chemical control strategy. 
Albeit with increases in complexity, their generalization of the model makes it possible to 
solve for the optimal timing and flow of the control measures rather than restricting the 
solution to a fixed level of control as was done in Saphores and Shogren (2005). Marten 
and Moore (2011) found under early detection and control, biological control agents were 
sufficient to contain the invasive species populations within acceptable limits. However, 
a delay of control which allowed invasive species populations to explode mandated a 
more costly optimal (simultaneous chemical and biological) control strategy. 
This chapter will adapt an approach based on Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and applied in 
Marten and Moore (2011) to extend the model of water-saving investment under 
economic and hydrologic uncertainty in chapter one. We will analyze the investment 
strategies for improving water-use efficiency when the inherent all or nothing restriction 
99 
 
in the decision to invest in the chapter one is lifted. We depict a model general enough to 
be applied to a range of water-saving technology investments such as canal lining 
investments but will focus on irrigation investments for simplicity.   
We begin with a modification of our stochastic dynamic investment model from 
chapter one, to allow for multiple possibilities of different investment magnitudes and 
sequential timings. The modified model is then used to examine how relaxing the all-or-
never investment assumption impacts the incidence and magnitude of investment in 
water-saving infrastructure in Utah. Using empirical observations to calibrate the model, 
we will then compare the results to both results from chapter one and observed 
investments on water-saving technology, to see which one more accurately explains 
observed behavior, and how policy can be modified, if need be, to reflect partial 
investment possibilities and capitalize on that for the attainment of conservation policy 
objectives.   
Juxtaposing the model results with that of chapter one, we consider the relative 
effects of water supply variability on irrigation investments in areas with greater 
variability in on-field characteristics which would be more likely to benefit from the 
incremental investment consideration, and discuss the ramifications of the differences in 
outcomes of the two models for water conservation and adaptation to changes in 
agricultural water availability and predictability in the western United States. This 
contributes to the body of knowledge on how the incremental approach to adopting 
water-saving infrastructural improvements impacts the intensity (magnitude) and extent 
(incidence) of adoption in the case of investments which may be broken down into units 
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with differing contributions to productivity and thus value of investment, and the big 
picture implications of these impacts. 
 
Key Words: Incremental Real Options, Site-specific Irrigation 
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3 MODEL 
This chapter examines an agent’s decision to invest in water-saving technology in a 
more general context, by formulating the agent’s problem as making adjustments to his 
existing technology stock.  
In chapter one, technological change is treated as a discrete change in a parameter 
from    to   . Here, technological change is treated as a stock to which additions can be 
made, and is handled by the introduction of a new variable       , that denotes the 
agent’s current level of investment, represented by acres of farmland converted to the 
new technology. Thus, while the all or nothing investment in chapter one has investment 
move from an entire field under old technology to the entire field under new technology, 
increasing overall farm irrigation efficiency from    to   , the incremental investment 
makes stepwise changes to capital stock (   with each consecutive addition to     
contributing its marginal change in water efficiency depending on characteristics of that 
unit which impact its irrigation efficiency (water-saving) potential.  
For comparison purposes, the model in chapter one may analogously be interpreted as 
an agent with a starting capital stock    who makes a single investment to increase his 
capital stock from    to   . Since the agent’s problem was formulated as an all or 
nothing question, he required a critical water price level that would make the whole    to 
   investment maximize his expected present value of farm profits under the option 
value consideration. Under the incremental story, he now has the ability to optimally 
choose    and has the option to make additional investments in the future that increase 
his capital stock to           This additional flexibility presents the agent with the 
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option to cut out the additions to capital stock that make the least contributions to the 
total benefit derived from investment resulting in a lower price required to make the 
initial investment. In a way, the lower critical water price required for investment may be 
seen as the agent’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid investing in the least productive 
units of his capital stock given current water prices. Being able to delay these least 
productive units has value because full investment under uncertainty requires that 
investment yield a larger expected return to compensate for the lesser productive units of 
investment. This higher expected rate of return caters to the less likely worst case future 
water supply scenarios (i.e. the higher the water price threshold, the greater the scarcity 
conditions that would be required to hit that price). While uncertainty increases the 
occurrence probability of these dire scenarios, the majority of the distribution of our 
underlying stochastic process remains in the middle ground. The partial investment 
option enables the agent to minimize his potential for investment remorse given the 
irreversible nature of the investment. 
The agent currently has a profit flow which is a function of his existing technology 
and variable input (water) applied. He can choose to alter this profit flow by making 
changes to his existing technology stock through a series of irreversible investments. 
We break down the agent’s investment in improved water-saving technology to allow 
for a graduated technology overhaul. These investment graduations can be viewed as 
distinct individual projects, and can conceptually be lined up, in order of their marginal 
productivity, as consecutive units of investment from the unit with the greatest marginal 
product to that with the lowest. This breakdown is appropriate when the production 
function shows diminishing returns to scale suggesting that individual units of investment 
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do not contribute equally to the increased total product and profit considered in a full 
investment evaluation. For instance, the evaluation of an irrigation investment covering 
100 acres of land with an estimated profit of $100,000 would suggest an average profit of 
$1000 per acre. It is however possible, given diminishing returns to scale, that $75,000 
out of this total profit is contributed by fifty out of the 100 acres of farmland, with the 
remaining 50 contribute increasingly smaller margins to the total profit. 
A practical way this may manifest itself is with field level variation in geo-
hydrological conditions such as slope, soil type, etc.  Kumar et al. 2008 confirms that 
irrigation system performance with regards to field level water savings varies both 
across- and on-field based on the geo-hydrological environment comprising factors such 
as slope and soil type; crop type; and the field-specific agro-climate. Thus field level 
variations may contribute significantly to the potential effect of improved irrigation 
efficiency on farm-level water savings within field. In this case, the greater the variability 
in water savings across the field, the greater the bias resulting from the one-time 
investment model presented in chapter 1. 
For their treatment of sequential and incremental investments, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) consider first, the case of multi-stage investments where the time to completion is 
the major motivator of the sequential investment story. Based on the fact that many 
projects, especially large ones, take substantial time to complete and thus can be put on 
hold at any stage and be discontinued or continued at a later date; investment projects are 
denoted as having many stages where each dollar spent gives the firm the right, but not 
the obligation to go ahead and invest the next dollar. The underlying characteristic here is 
the ability to hold or quit the project in response to evolving economic conditions which 
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may affect cost of and/or returns on investment. The investment decision then comprises 
choosing a conditional investment path (conditional on hitting certain determined 
investment thresholds for the firm at each point on the path) to optimize investment 
timing and cost/return.  
With the sequential investment story, the project does not generate cash flows until 
completed. An example here may be a large hydroelectric dam project which may be put 
on hold for investment funds to be invested elsewhere in the face of persistent drought 
which reduces electricity potential of the underlying river, or be halted if a country found 
a cheaper alternative source of electricity while the project was ongoing. While the 
flexibility allows money spent on the project (costs) to be reined in, since the dam 
produces no electricity and thus yields no cash flow until it is complete making cash flow 
from even a 75% complete project exactly zero. 
They then considered the capacity choice treatment of incremental investments where 
the decision-maker alters his capital stock by undertaking a number of projects, and 
retiring or adding projects as unfavorable or favorable conditions develop. 
For example, in our above mentioned farm investment scenario, the gains from partial 
investment (in the first and most productive 50 acres of farmland) comprise hedging 
against increase in the cost of initial investment, and having the option to hold, scrap or 
abandon the project should unfavorable conditions develop. However, water savings do 
occur and thus the farmer gets returns (cash flow) from his investment even with a partial 
investment. Thus the incremental investment story may be said to be a special case of a 
multi-stage or sequential investment story where one does not have to make the full 
105 
 
investment to start reaping the benefits of investment and a partial investment still yields 
some cash flow. 
The appeal of the possibility of partial incremental investments here is the flexibility 
it affords the agent to avoid investor remorse by investing under the worst case future 
water supply scenario the all or nothing investment story panders to; or to make a partial 
investment in the acres of farmland with the greatest potential for water savings, and 
potentially either invest in the remaining acreage or sell it off as future conditions evolve. 
As chapter one showed, the option to exit the market is a valuable one and under the 
incremental story, the agent would have the option to keep his most valuable acres, and 
divulge the rest in sales
18
. Thus the availability of option to exit adds another nuance 
which may further stack things up against the all-or-nothing formulation. Also, there may 
be grants, subsidies, and other forms of financial assistance the farmer may have access 
to which may not cover investment in his total acreage. Under this model, he would have 
the option to make a partial investment, and then later reinvest some profits to cover the 
remaining acreage
19
. 
Given the uncertain future supply and price of water, we find a profitability threshold 
that justifies investment for each conceptually distinct investment project. McClintock 
(2009) asserts that the option value of investment becomes increasingly important with 
larger investment. And it is posited that the usual option-value effect of delaying 
                                                            
18 With a lesser efficient system, the amount of water he would need to supplement production in scarcity 
conditions would be even higher eroding profitability margins of arm production and increasing the 
probability that exiting the market would be more beneficial than continued production.” 
19 In a canal lining investment analog, the investor could minimize canal seepage losses by making gradual 
partial investments in the case where legal dispute over the project (as seen in the recent case of the Logan 
Canal Restoration project) invokes a stay/hold on total investment). This is a valuable consideration given 
the potential of legal process for lengthy deliberations. 
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investment will be tempered by the option to make a partial (smaller) investment, leading 
to greater incidence of investment, but varying extents of investment.  
While analysis in this study considers a single agent, this has implications for larger 
scale analysis and application. A state, in a bid to meet its water conservation goals, may 
through extension services assist farmers with plans involving gradual incremental 
improvements to their irrigation systems. This approach would have the merit of catering 
to farmers’ overinvestment aversion, as well as putting investment dollars (whether from 
farmer or government incentive coffers) towards water conservation goals every step 
along the way. For instance, it may be profitable for only 10% of the farming population 
to make 100% irrigation investments under the all or nothing formulation, but profitable 
for at least 60% of farmers to upgrade at least 50% of their total acreage under the 
incremental investment formulation. 
Consecutive units of capital with their consecutively lower marginal products will 
require higher and higher profitability thresholds for investment. The consecutive 
thresholds are chosen to maximize potential water savings and thus profits from 
investment, and by timing the investments when the consecutive thresholds are hit, the 
potential for ‘overinvestment’ and its attendant investment remorse is minimized, 
limiting any drag it may have on investment.  
This contrasts with the set-up in the non-incremental story in chapter one where each 
acre of farmland is implicitly assumed to contribute equally to the total value derived 
from investment in more efficient irrigation technology. We can then establish an 
investment threshold curve by plotting different agent’s technology stock levels against 
water price threshold values required to invest up to those levels. The threshold curve, 
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which relates the agents level of irrigation technology to water price (see figure 2.1), then 
illustrates how each additional unit of investment requires its own progressively higher 
required threshold for investment, and is upward sloping as a result of the decreasing 
returns to scale assumption.  
As capital stock increases, the acres of farmland remaining to be invested in have 
increasingly lower potential for water savings and so would require increasingly higher 
prices to make their investment worthwhile. No investment is made for water price levels 
below the threshold curve, and our agent will invest in water-saving infrastructure up to 
the last acre of irrigated farmland where the value of additional water savings for that unit 
meets the threshold curve
20
.  
We now consider an agent’s incremental technology stock expansion based on 
Pindyck (1988), Bertola (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The agent has the option 
to invest in water-saving technology for his farm. The agent’s technology stock,      
refers to acres of farmland converted to the new technology. The new technology 
adoption has been broken down into units of investment such that the agent incrementally 
invests in additional acres of farmland, and each irreversible incremental investment 
costs   per acre.  
Since the agent first converts the most productive acres of farmland before 
considering the remaining farmland, the uptake of the new technology can be thought of 
as a series of investments ordered from most productive to least productive. A farmer 
                                                            
20
 The definition of investment in U as farm acreage has an inherent right bound where the investment 
level is bound by agent’s total acres of farmland. There is thus the potential in future research here for 
exploring this bound, for instance, by permitting purchase of additional farmland in response to increased 
profits given how important the exit barrier proved to chapter 1 model results. 
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who grows alfalfa and other crops for instance, might find it profitable to invest in the 
acres for alfalfa production, but not for the others. It is also assumed that the nature of the 
technology and market is such that scrap value is negligible in the agent’s decision due to 
the specialized nature of the technology which makes it costly to reverse even if not 
technically irreversible, with any potential scrap value a small fraction of initial capital 
cost (Conrad and Kotani, 2005). Also, a more competitive market for the agricultural 
commodity will tend to decrease the incentive to disinvest or scrap the irrigation 
technology (Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
21
.  
The relationship between technology stock and the agent’s profit is manifest through 
the impact of agent’s increase in water efficiency on his total demand for (applied) 
water     22. For instance, a farmer who is currently using 200 acre -feet of water on his 
property upon upgrading his irrigation system on a portion of that property, will need less 
applied water all other things constant.  We maintain the same yield neutral assumption 
in chapter one such that the investment payoff is independent of productivity gains
23
. As 
technological efficiency increases with incremental investments (increasing U), 
     increases (i.e.   >0). Thus, the marginal revenue product of each unit of investment 
is given by      where       is the water savings from investment (        and   is 
the same water price process in chapter one evolving stochastically according to; 
                                                            
21 In a competitive agricultural market where farmers are price takers, if the going rate of alfalfa makes 
farming under a given water scenario profitable for one farmer, it will all other things being equal be 
profitable for others like him, and so they will all stay rather than scrap, and conversely, they would all be 
scrapping all other things being equal and so there would be limited incentive to sell or buy another’s scrap. 
22 Water demand is implicitly a function of total acreage. This relationship between acreage and water 
demand is not an issue for the specific problem you are addressing and can therefore be subsumed in the 
function for X. 
23 Productivity gains may prove to be a major incentive for irrigation investment among farmers in certain 
regions of the country and with certain commodities. The implications of this, as well as potential for future 
research, is discussed in the conclusions.  
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1)                   
where    ( 
  
 
 
       
 
   
) and    ( 
  
 
) 
Simplistically, one could boil down the difference between chapter 1 and chapter 2 by 
a fixed water savings level in chapter one         
    while in chapter 2 it is 
dependent on our choice variable   and (designated by        ). While water savings on 
each plot of land are exogenously determined in principle, by choosing the magnitude of 
the impulse (level of irrigation technology), one chooses one’s level of marginal water 
savings. 
We assume diminishing returns to scale such that marginal revenue product          
is decreasing in                . This means that marginal water savings      , falls 
with successive additions to the stock of efficient irrigation technology (i.e. additions to 
water savings in response to successive units of investment, while positive (       ), 
get increasingly smaller). This may be attributable to physical diminishing returns due to 
characteristics of the technology or farm. 
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2.1 Agent’s Problem 
Figure 2.2: One-time full investment versus incremental investment path. 
 
 
 Given the initial capital stock   , the initial water price   , and     ⁄ , the agent 
chooses the timing and magnitude of a series of investments to maximize the expected 
discounted stream of agricultural profits  
2)                                    
net of the cost of irreversible additions to the capital stock (dU/dt≥0 for all t ) where 
the marginal revenue product of irrigation capital is [      ] 
 . The optimal timing 
and magnitude of a series of investments can also be conceptualized as an optimal but 
discontinuous time path for the capital stock.  Figure 1 illustrates the difference in this 
optimal time path for the one-time investment and incremental investment cases. The 
solution for the optimal time path of the capital stock for the incremental investment 
time time 
U U 
One-time investment Incremental investment 
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problem is found through stochastic dynamic programming with value (Bellman) 
function given by 
3)               {∫        
     
  
 
 {                    }} 
where   is the discount rate and    is the time the current marginal investment is 
made.  The inclusion of           in the value function recognizes that the farmer 
retains the option to make additional investments in the irrigation capital in the future, 
accounting for the possibility of multiple-period investments.  Equation (3) aggregates 
return during the pre-investment time period, and the farmer evaluates (3) for each 
possible incremental investment made. 
To examine the agent’s piecewise investment decision-making, we consider the time 
interval     Given the continuous nature of agent decision-making, and the fact that    is 
an arbitrary construct, we consider the limit as    approaches zero. Suppose the agent 
invests in water-saving technology, moving his technology stock from   to    at the end 
of the interval     Water price is assumed to shift over this interval from   to   
    While the agent does not know the exact value of     he knows its probability 
distribution, and is thus able to calculate the expected value of the increase in technology 
stock as; 
4)                 {                     } 
Thus, the agent estimates the value of his increase in capital stock as the present value 
of all future cash-flows associated with the capital stock increase less its cost.  This 
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includes the immediate profit, if the investment is made           ,24 plus the expected 
capital gain from making the investment -              . Change in profit 
(           ) is zero while the agent is still holding the option (waiting to invest) and 
positive when he invests due to the increase in water savings from his increased 
efficiency valued at current water price. This is akin to dividends from investment. 
Capital gain depends on the instantaneous change in the value of the investment 
opportunity and is tied to the stochastic process specified for P. Thus any increase 
(decrease) accruing to the value of investment due to an increase (decrease) in P above 
current P is a capital gain (loss). 
The agent will choose    to maximize      {                     }, with 
the irreversibility property of the investment requiring that     .  If            
        in the initial period, the initial value of the value function         will be the 
resulting maximum and no investment will be made until say P increases by enough to 
turn the inequality around. The concavity property assumed for the production function 
ensures that the Bellman function obtained is also concave in , and this makes it 
possible to employ the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of calculus, in characterizing the 
maximization of the expression in (4). Differentiating (4) with respect to     we obtain 
5)      { {     
        }   } 
As    tends to zero, the expression in (5) tends to     
         
Now, if      
        the expression to be maximized as expressed in (4) decreases 
with respect to    within the range       In this case, the agent will find it optimal to 
                                                            
24 We can ignore the effect of discounting over the interval as it shall be of the order      due to Ito’s 
lemma. 
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make no alterations to his current technology stock and maintain    . In fact, he may 
find it optimal to decrease U if that were possible. If, however,      
        in the 
initial period, the agent will find it optimal to invest in (     ) technology in order to 
set his new technology stock    at the level defined by the condition (i.e. make an 
increment to his capital stock up to a level equating value marginal product from 
investing, and marginal cost of investment); 
6)      
        which specifies our threshold curve. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Investment Threshold Curve under Incremental Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
] 
Immediate Investment 
 
] 
     
       
Barrier Control 
 
     , no investment 
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The figure above (Figure 2.3) illustrates the choice problem faced by the agent under 
incremental investment. As P evolves stochastically, the point       moves up or down 
the threshold curve. Whenever it rises above the threshold curve, the agent increases his 
capital stock by just enough to move it horizontally back to the threshold curve. The 
upward slope of the threshold curve here (positive relationship between U and P) 
illustrates the preceding discussion, that consecutively higher price thresholds would be 
required for investment in lesser productive units 
To develop the optimal policy argument, we start with the region to the right of the 
threshold curve where it is optimal to take no action (wait). We substitute      (i.e. 
            in (3) to obtain the initial value         This substitution gives us, 
                                      
and expresses as in chapter one, the sum of profit accruals over the interval (    
    (first term on right-hand side) and the continuation value beyond      (second term 
on right-hand side). 
Applying Ito’s lemma to the right hand side, we obtain 
                [           
 
 
  
           ]                 
       
where       captures all terms which go to zero faster than     Thus, 
                              [           
 
 
  
           ]    
                  [                          
 
 
  
           ]    
This implies that        satisfies the differential equation  
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7) 
 
 
  
                                          
If after investing in the nth ‘unit’ of irrigation technology, the evolution of water price 
fails to rise to approach the value of the marginal efficiency of the (n+1)th unit  of 
irrigation technology and get the agent back to the curve, investment stops until it does. 
This means that from an initial point above the curve, the agent invests to move the point 
horizontally to the curve. Thereafter, his level of irrigation investment remains constant 
while   is low enough to keep him on the curve, or responds continuously to small 
increments in   at the curve. Since any upward move of   at the barrier (threshold 
curve), leads to a corresponding rightward move of  , the time path of   at such 
locations is not differentiable.
25
 This means that the time derivative       is infinite and 
thus the impulse (barrier) control policy comprises rather than a finite rate (flow) of 
investment through time, occasional bursts of investment as the threshold curve is hit. It 
also eliminates derivatives of the value function with respect to   from (7), and allows us 
to treat U, as a parameter (rather than a variable) which shifts the whole functional 
relationship. The absence of derivatives with respect to U permits us to treat it as an 
ordinary differential equation relating V to P, and regard U as a parameter that shifts the 
whole functional relationship (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While it is true that farmers 
typically sign contracts that stabilize their water prices, the market for lease water prices 
does vary. Thus, the cost (benefit) of leasing (renting water to supplement any shortfalls 
in supply can vary more readily. This model hold his initial water allocation as 
exogenous and only considers the impact of water price evolution to his water savings. 
                                                            
25 One property of Brownian motions is that the time path of a Brownian process is, with a probability one, 
nowhere differentiable. Thus, the time path of   is not differentiable. 
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Since equation (7) is analogous to equation (15) in chapter one, the general solution 
of the ordinary differential equation in (7) is then analogously given by; 
8)              
         
   
     
   
   
      the betas are the positive and negative roots of the fundamental quadratic 
equation, and the B’s are ‘constants’ to be determined.26 
Thus, the fundamental quadratic equation is derived as   
 
 
  
           
      and the ‘wait’ region includes the limit as water price goes to zero. As a result, 
we must leave out the negative power of the price variable in the solution, in order to 
keep        finite. To this end,        which is the negative root from the fundamental 
quadratic equation, is set to zero, and substituting    for      the general solution 
becomes 
9)              
   
     
 
  
The first term on the right-hand side in equation (9), is the value of the agent’s 
optimal future technology investment, and the second term tells us the present value of 
the agent’s future profits should he maintain his initial technology stock forever.      is 
then determined by making use of the curve            which serves as the other 
boundary of the “wait” or inaction region.  
                                                            
26 The constants of integration are functions of U.  This specification of the constants as functions of the 
capital stock does not suffer from the issues highlighted in Balikcioglu et al (2011) due to the nature of the 
capital stock here. Specifically, since the value function is not differentiable in U above the threshold curve, 
U can be treated as a parameter that shifts the functional relationship and not as a second stochastic variable 
that would necessitate a second set of partial derivatives. 
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The solution procedure to our impulse control investment problem, follows the same 
technique as the analytical (single source of uncertainty) section in chapter one; with 
adaptations made to approximate the curve in figure 1. This is done by taking discrete 
approximations of U and solving for the optimal threshold at each discretely 
approximated level of U.  Subsequently, these derived critical thresholds are linked 
through interpolation to produce the critical threshold curve. 
With every marginal unit of investment the agent makes, he gives up the option value 
(of waiting) to invest in that unit. Intuitively, since option value captures the value of 
waiting, this can be thought of as the agent starting with the maximum option value and 
having each incremental investment erode the option value a little. This illuminates the 
motivation and benefit of this approach. The option value being calculated for every 
marginal unit enables the agent to at each step evaluate whether benefit of waiting for 
more information about the investment in that particular unit is worth the opportunity 
cost of not making that particular unit of additional investment at that step. With non-
constant marginal productivity, some units of investment may never be profitable to 
make no matter how long one waits and when these are lumped together with the other 
units, they drag down the value of investing in the all-or-nothing decision framework.  
For our water-saving infrastructure investment model, the optimality conditions are 
evaluated in MATLAB based on the study area in northern Utah. 
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4 CASE STUDY 
We maintain the study area from chapter one, for comparison purposes. The study 
area thus consists of three rivers - the Logan, Bear and Blacksmith Fork Rivers. We 
maintain the derived parameter values for water price, and the drift and volatility 
parameters for their respective water price processes.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Common parameters for Irrigation Investment 
Interest rate (r) 0.06 
Risk-adjusted discount factor (ρ) 0.3 
Water savings (  ) 2.25 AF 
Initial (one-time) Investment cost (I) $575 
Cost of unit upgrade (   $805 
Commodity Price (    $193 
Initial Water Supply (    Logan: 135166.60 
Bear: 90424.79 
Blacksmith-Fork: 82605.83   
Water Supply Drift (  ) Logan: -0.0177 
Bear: -0.0059 
Blacksmith-Fork: -0.0060  
Water Supply Volatility      Logan: 0.4686  
Bear: 0.3806 
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Blacksmith-Fork: 0.4023  
Initial Water Price (  ) $38/AF 
Water Price Drift      Logan: 0.2415 
Bear: 0.1480 
Blacksmith-Fork: 0.1642  
Water Price Volatility      Logan: (0.9189) 
Bear: (0.7462) 
Blacksmith-Fork: (0.7888)   
Technical Efficiency Volatility     0.145 
 
The analytical results from section 5.1 in chapter one, showed the following threshold 
values for water price and water savings under the all or nothing investment formulation 
across rivers; 
 
 
Table 2.2: Analytical Results for Irrigation Investment from Chapter One 
 Logan Bear Blacksmith-Fork 
Threshold P (NPV) 20.93 54.38222 48.58622 
Threshold P (OV) 149.17 134.43 140.00 
Threshold P* (OV)  168.39 152.28 158.59 
Threshold W (NPV) 135166.6036** 75356.72 72391.84 
Threshold W (OV) 66680.55 47356.28 42442.37 
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*This is the threshold from chapter one adjusted for on-field differences 
** returns starting value (depicting immediate investment) since threshold has already 
been hit. 
 
 
P*(OV) is calculated to show the effect of forcing an average water savings which 
caters to the best case scenario on a field with substantial on-field variability of water 
savings potential. Thus, P*(OV) traces the price thresholds under the all-or-nothing 
scenario that would correspond to a constant marginal productivity of subsequent units of 
investment implicitly assumed by lumping all the units of investment together. It 
normalizes the results from chapter one to serve as a baseline for comparison. 
These results indicated the disparity between the real options (OV) and benefit-cost 
(NPV) thresholds required for investment. The consideration of uncertainty in the real 
option investment evaluations lead to greater water prices required for investment. We 
also see that differences in volatility make a difference in the impact of uncertainty 
consideration on investment. The Bear River, which showed the lowest volatility in water 
price (and consequently, its derivative water supply process), requires the lowest price 
threshold for investment under the real options consideration.  
We then set the rationale/motivation and parameters for the incremental investment 
scenario. 
As described in the Introduction section, base conditions at the field level contribute 
significantly to the potential effect of improved irrigation efficiency on farm-level water 
savings. Irrigation system performance with regards to field level water savings varies 
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both across- and on-field based on the geo-hydrological environment comprising factors 
such as slope and soil type; crop type; and the field-specific agro-climate (Kumar et al., 
2008). 
This has spurred research into and development of techniques and technology to 
tackle the on-field variability of technology performance. This has engendered site-
specific farm management using tools such Variable Rate Irrigation (VRI). VRI allows 
irrigators to tailor water application on their fields based on soil data maps, yield data, 
topography maps, and other user-defined information.  
Studies on VRI applications tend to focus on yield improvement. For instance, King 
et al. (2002) in an application divided a 2.9 ha (7.1 ac) field into eighteen arbitrary 
irrigation management zones under one quadrant of a 4-span 191 m (628 ft) long center 
pivot irrigation system. They found that under variable rate application based on on-field 
spatial variation in soil texture gross receipts were $165/ha ($67/ac) greater under the site 
specific management scenario.  
As a result of the yield focus, studies on the water conservation benefits of site-
specific sprinkler irrigation for crop production are rather limited, and studies on its cost-
effectiveness scarce. With increasing water scarcity and rising interest in environmental 
flows of water, initial studies focusing on water-saving potential suggest considerable 
potential.  For instance; simulation studies comparing conventional and site-specific 
irrigation have reported gains of up to 26% water savings for well-watered crop 
production (Evans and King, 2012). 
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Given such variation, it is possible to see how lumping together investments which on 
average produce 26% water savings will incorrectly characterize the decision to adopt 
water conservation technology. 
Our numerical example here will revisit the investment decision from chapter 1 by 
disaggregating the investment based on heterogeneity in productivity and water savings 
across the field.   
The field size considered under the all-or-nothing formulation in chapter one, 
corresponds roughly to four times the area needed (160 acres) for the installation of a 
standard sized (125 acre) center pivot (O’Brien et al., 1997). Thus, we divide the whole 
field into four units (               with varying water savings potential (  
  
  
    
    
    based on field characteristics. The total water savings across the 4 
fields is set up to average 2.25 AF, which is the water savings consideration (    for the 
all or nothing scenario in chapter one:    
  
    
    
    
 
 
     .  
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Figure 2.3: Variations in water savings from 125 acre center pivot systems installed 
on a 640 acre field  
 
  
         
        
  
     37    
    66  
 
 
Thus, the difference between the most productive and least productive portions of his 
field is 26% based on Evans and King (2012), with a graded progression (  
  0%, 
  
  5%,   
  10%, and   
  26%) as shown in Figure 2.3. 
To compare the all-or-nothing to the incremental investment case, we maintain the 
same level of investment and refer to Figure 2.3. The agent is however now able to break 
up his investment and make an initial partial investment. The agent first invests in the 
section of his field that is most conducive for the technology (corresponding to water 
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savings  
  
       and incrementally invests as and when the water price rises to hit his 
thresholds for the sections with lower marginal irrigation efficiency productivity (  
  
   37     
              
    66 )  
To demonstrate the impact of differing marginal efficiency productivity of the various 
sections, we ran a simulation of the total investment scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Impact of Varying Potential Water Savings on Investment Threshold 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the ‘dragging’ effect of less productive units of investment is 
seen in the progressively higher price thresholds successive units require for investment 
and is derived by varying the potential water savings for the real options with 
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deterministic efficiency and no shutdown from figure 1.3a in chapter one. These 
threshold curves are negatively sloping here due to the labeling of the axes, but show the 
relationship between price thresholds and water savings potential impacted by 
diminishing marginal returns. For any given level of efficiency on the x-axis, increasingly 
higher price thresholds are needed for investment for increasingly lower marginal water 
savings potential. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: All-or-nothing versus Incremental Thresholds 
 
126 
 
Breaking down the total investment into sections and re-running the simulation, 
Figure 2.5 is obtained. The figure shows the impulse control timing for investment in the 
consecutive ‘units’ of irrigation investment with                each unit 
representing a quarter of the total investment. Using data from the Blacksmith Fork 
River, we see from Figure 2.5 that investment occurs before the all or nothing price 
threshold is hit, three out of four times.  
The all-or-nothing threshold is represented by the black line, while we see the step-
wise graduation of the incremental investments in blue. It demonstrates that the critical 
price for U=   (0.25) is less than the critical price from chapter one ($158.59) and the 
critical price for U=   is above the $158.59 all-or-nothing threshold in chapter one. In 
chapter one, the water savings in U=   is required of all four portions of the field for 
investment leading to a price threshold higher than required for incremental investment in 
all but the least productive section of the field,     
Thus, the burden of proof of investment profitability is reduced under the incremental 
investment scenario, and has great potential to improve investment incidence as opposed 
to all or nothing formulations. 
To put this in perspective with regards to the length of time it would take to exercise 
barrier control at the various investment levels, we trace the number of years it would 
take for the price process to hit the various trigger points on the threshold curve. Doing 
this for the three rivers, we find the following: 
 
 
127 
 
Table 2.3: Inter-River Variability and Time to Barrier Control 
 Logan Bear Blacksmith 
Fork 
Water Supply 
Drift (  ) 
-0.0177 
  
-0.0059 -0.0060  
Water Supply 
Volatility      
0.4686  
  
0.3806 0.4023  
Barrier 1($) 
number of years 
149.18 
~37 
134.43 
~107 
140.00 
~108 
Barrier 2($) 
number of years 
157.03 
~38 
14.50 
~111 
147.37 
~113 
Barrier 3($) 
number of years 
165.75 
~40 
149.37 
~116 
155.56 
~117 
Barrier 4($) 
number of years 
201.59 
~46 
181.66 
~133 
189.19 
~134 
 
 
 
The number of years required to hit threshold points, while not markedly distinct 
here, do show the difference the incremental consideration makes. The times to hit the 
adjusted chapter one thresholds are 40 years, 118 years, and 119 years respectively. By 
these times, the thresholds for investment would have been hit for investment in the third 
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segment (highlighted in yellow in table 3) of the agent’s acreage whether he is dependent 
on the Logan, Blacksmith Fork or Bear River observation point. Thus across all three 
rivers, our agent would invest in about three quarters of his total acreage under the 
incremental investment story before hitting the corresponding all-or-nothing thresholds.  
From table 2, the data from the Logan River shows the highest drift and volatility 
rates among the three rivers, as well as the highest starting value for its water supply 
process. Here, it also sees the earliest investments. Having the highest drift rate signifies 
that the general downward trend in the evolution of water supply is highest in the Logan 
River and that it is also the most volatile of the three water supply processes. Having the 
highest volatility (uncertainty) would suggest that the option value would be highest for 
the Logan River and that it would have the highest price thresholds. This is true as we can 
see from table 3 that the price thresholds for the Logan river is consistently higher than 
that for the Bear and Blacksmith fork in all instances. And yet, we see that the Logan 
River consistently hits its higher thresholds before the other two rivers in all cases.  
This offers an interesting peek at the interplay of trend and deviations around a trend 
where stochastic processes are involved; and has implications for adaptation and 
resilience of existing systems to changing conditions which are uncertain. While 
increased volatility gives value to waiting, it also increases the margins of profits 
(opportunity costs) of investing (or not) and coupled with the higher drift rate signifying a 
higher rate of decline in water supplies, this appears to produce a joint effect of 
precipitating investment relative to the other rivers.  
With its high drift and volatility rates two random samples from simulations of the 
stochastic water supply and price processes for the Logan River could present starkly 
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different pictures of the need and urgency for water conservation investments. This is an 
important hurdle to be cleared whether at the individual investor level, or in allocating 
municipal, state or federal funds.  
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5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
While true that an all or nothing, or one-time investment assumption simplifies the 
analytical model under examination, makes the problem easier to solve, and provides 
insight about the technology adoption problem, this formulation restricts potential future 
revisions (abandon or pause project) which may become desirable in response to changes 
in the economic or environmental state which affect the value of investment over time 
(Balikcioglu, 2008). 
The results from this study confirm the assertion by Gupta and Rosenhead (1968), 
averring that investors guard against the danger of regretting large investments in the face 
of appreciable uncertainty about future conditions, and strive to keep as many of their 
‘good’ options open as possible, where the good options are the decision to not invest in 
more marginal areas.  
While an irrigator’s only defense against regret is to delay investing in the all-or-
nothing investment scenario, the irrigator can employ both investment timing and scaling 
to help guard against investor-regret in an impulse control framework. 
In the face of increased pressure for increased efficiency of agricultural water, it is 
becoming increasingly important for irrigators to obtain quantitative information on 
actual post-installation irrigation system performance rather than sticking to 
manufacturers’ claims regarding water savings. Chapter one shows the importance of this 
through the technical efficiency uncertainty story. Here, the importance of regional data 
on hydro-geological factors that influence not just across field, but on-field variability of 
irrigation system performance is established. 
131 
 
This study also points to the need for improved economic information regarding 
water-use and conservation informed by data and technical considerations from bio-
physical sciences, as well as technical studies. Using hydro-geological data to measure 
the marginal efficiency contribution of subsequent units of conservation technology, 
including irrigation and canal lining, this study found a significant difference in 
investment behavior which incorporated on-field hydro-geological variability into 
evaluating the economic decision to invest in irrigation technology. This study has shown 
that use of such data has value and may mean the difference between a 75% (three out of 
four times relative to all-or-nothing formulation) and 0% investment.  
This is an area for future study which I intend to collaborate with colleagues from 
hydrology, irrigation engineering, ecology etc. to explore. One extension would be 
coupling an extension of this study of an agent to water conservation across a region say 
the Wasatch Range Metropolitan Area incorporating soil and topographical maps to 
determine what extending the incremental investment story to the region would dictate as 
optimal intensity and extent of irrigation investment across areas with variable 
hydrogeological characteristics across the region. 
Additionally, this model may be incorporated with climate projection models to more 
accurately account for projected changes in hydroclimatic conditions, and how they 
would affect agricultural activity and investments in the state of Utah and beyond.  
This chapter illuminates the gap between levels of investment in irrigation and other 
conservation technology suggested by net present value evaluations of these investments, 
and observed investment behavior. As changing hydroclimatic and socioeconomic 
conditions continue to inject increased variability into decisions once perceived as black 
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or white, it is important for policy and planning purposes that studies such as this are 
conducted in order to provide  insight into how observed gaps between investment levels 
suggested by traditional models such as discounted cash flow models and observed 
investment can be explained and thus influenced by new and/or supplementary theories 
of economic decision-making.  
With regards to intensity versus extent of investment, a comparison of results from 
the all-or-nothing and incremental set-ups suggests that the relative effect of water supply 
uncertainty on investment in areas with differing on-field variability is a pertinent 
consideration concerning water conservation goals and planning. State planners, for 
instance, would do well to know account for this variability in drawing up water plans 
and for policy implementation. A slow uptake of prescribed technology may, instead of a 
perceived problem to be tackled with policy and public funds, be the effective working of 
the system to ensure only units of investment which at least match their incremental 
investment costs are made.  It is thus necessary to jointly consider water supply 
variability (uncertainty), sunk costs (irreversibility) and on-field variability (marginal 
productivity) as factors determining adaptation investments in response to changing 
hydroclimatic conditions in the western United States.   
On-field variability also has important ramifications in the face of limitations to the 
monetization (sale) of water savings in the west due to the predominant prior 
appropriation water rights system and related laws. With more efficient water markets 
(improved individual right to sell water savings, and canal company share prices which 
are to more readily respond to changing market conditions), the water price would more 
readily respond to changes in the evolution of the water supply process allowing for 
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potentially more optimal water allocation. An agent will invest based on the equation of 
‘marginal benefit’ and ‘cost,’ meaning that the cost of your next unit of investment would 
have to be less than what you would pay to buy the water it saves you on the market.  
Smith and North (2009) argue that it is not possible to make a blanket “rule of thumb” 
statement about profitability of center pivot investments, suggesting that evaluations are 
made with “with” or “without” investment scenario modeling on a case by case basis 
instead. Our findings support this. While more convenient and most times more cost-
effective to effect blanket policy prescriptions, increasingly uncertain conditions may 
advocate this more case-by-case approach which incorporates a more detailed account of 
variability in investments across agents, across regions, and in the case of this model – 
within a single field and it is important to bear these in mind in optimizing policy and 
planning goals at all levels of governance. 
Like in chapter one, this assessment perhaps handicaps itself for profitability by 
holding constant the most important agronomic consideration for farmers in adopting 
efficient irrigation technology, which is systematic improvements in crop yield 
attributable to the adoption of center pivot technology. This comes to bear on the 
incremental investment story in particular because field variability does tend to inform 
choice of crops and so one potent motivation for gradual partial investments would be to 
invest in the sections which hold your highest valued, water-sensitive crops first. This 
would also take some of burden of proof of investment profitability off how much you 
could directly convert your water savings for, since increased production and increased 
crop prices in response to changes in water supplies would contribute to the value of 
investment.  
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However, this singling out of the water savings is pertinent. In the context of 
increasing water scarcity, it becomes more relevant to consider potential decreases in 
water-use than increases in output   (Frija et al., 2009).  
Holding productivity constant to consider the water savings effect only has the 
following benefits: 
1) With increasing scarcity, the value of sold water savings will potentially become 
increasingly important revenue to farmers even if not as physical cash received 
from sales, as cash they may have had to expend to supplement their own water 
supply for continued production in the absence of technology adoption. Thus, 
investing in efficient irrigation investment would gain increased value as a way 
for farmers to mitigate production risk due to increasingly scarce and uncertain 
water supplies. 
2) With an increasing interest in the environment as a ‘beneficial use,’ it provides 
some quantitative guidelines as to what a farmer may have to be paid to prohibit 
conversion of saved water for expanded production, to promote in-stream flows. 
3) Given that the water rights system in Utah generally does not encourage sale of 
water, it hints at the potential this may have in encouraging water conservation. 
Given that the evaluations in these studies were done using seasonal agricultural 
water lease prices, it is just the tip of the iceberg as to what a well-functioning 
water market where prices respond more readily to increasing water scarcity and 
unpredictability may accomplish. 
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Real options theory is, certainly, not the sole method available for understanding 
optimal investing under uncertainty. Alternative modeling frameworks for economic 
decision-making under uncertainty will only continue to grow in importance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A BI-LEVEL HYDROECONOMIC MODEL OF WATER-
USE AND MANAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES: A UTAH CASE 
STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study employs spatial dynamic optimization and bi-level programming 
techniques to analyze water-use behavior in the Cache Valley of Utah. Using a case-study 
Logan Northwest Field canal system, it explores the impact spatial location of 
heterogeneous actors has on decision-making hierarchy and outcomes. It also analyzes in 
particular, 1) the efficiency contribution of an omniscient water master to overall water-
use efficiency of actors in the canal system, 2) the impact of varying composition of the 
system’s actors and their needs (agricultural to residential users ratio) on the decisions 
and directives of the omniscient water master. 
 
Key Words: Bi-level Programming, Water Management, Spatial Dynamic Optimization 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The management and use of water in urban areas is a complex and dynamic 
issue. Water managers must juggle the goals of regulating water demand, with securing 
and improving access to good quality water for their jurisdiction areas. As demographic 
and hydroclimatic changes force a shift in the focus of water management from supply 
expansion to improving management of existing water supply systems (Harou et al., 
2010), a holistic understanding of existing systems has become a pertinent need. While 
past economic studies have produced useful results and emphases, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that restrictions such as the assumption of a rational representative 
agent, the assumption that aggregate behavior is based on the summation of individual 
decisions by clones of this representative agent, and the disregard for the inherent 
complexity and synergy in human-engineered water systems must be done away with.  
Changing precipitation patterns, population growth, urban development and evolving 
agricultural water demand in response to hydroclimatic conditions are all factors that 
impact how, when, and where people use water. Effective and efficient adaptation to the 
evolution of these factors requires enhancements in water-use and management decisions 
through improved monitoring and prediction of the hydro-climate as well as 
improvements in how information is used within water-use and management decision 
processes. To do this, a comprehensive understanding of the current system of water-use 
and management decision‐making and interactions is needed. This study thus develops a 
spatial-dynamic model of water-use and management to illuminate of the current water-
use and management system in Utah. 
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Water movement on spatial and temporal scales play crucial roles in creating areas of 
abundance and scarcity across time and space, which then determines the sufficiency or 
otherwise of existing water resources to meet the needs of current and future populations. 
For instance, spatial differences with regards to topography can introduce interesting 
dynamics into the interactions between an upstream agricultural user and downstream 
residential user with regards to both water quantity and quality. Further, as chapter two 
confirms, hydro-geophysical differences across spaces can significantly impact optimal 
water management choices and accounting for spatial differences can improve the 
outcomes of behavioral adaptations such as the adoption of more efficient irrigation 
technology.  
Indeed, a major general limitation of existing economic studies of water, is the 
concentration on demand-supply relationships with little, if any, regard to the natural and 
conveyance (built) systems within which these relationships are nested. The placement of 
agents and biophysical influences does matter.  A farmer located both downstream and 
downhill on a river system suffers disproportionately from both flood and scarcity. And 
effluents from a polluting factory located upstream have greater water system 
consequences than those from a factory located at the river’s mouth. 
This consideration is a major contribution of this chapter. Due to the nature of our 
conveyance system where the omniscient water master determines flows for all canal 
users, it is possible to model water management in the canal system using bi-level 
formulation, allowing us to study how this top-down incorporation of residential and 
agricultural objectives affect both individual and system outcomes. And while the spatial 
aspects are not as pronounced as they could be due to the scale of the case study and how 
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quickly water runs through this particular system, space does matter in terms of defining 
the user constituents that a water manager must accommodate. 
This chapter thus analyzes the water allocation and benefit trade-off decisions of an 
omniscient water master who seeks to coordinate the interests of heterogeneous users 
under his jurisdiction while prioritizing his own. We study spatial dynamic optimal 
decision-making with regards to water-use and management using a case study of the 
Logan Northwest Field canal system in the Cache valley of Utah. We develop a model 
comprising four different types of actors (water master, storm-water manager, 
agricultural user, residential user) each acting to achieve their defined desired objectives 
with regards to water in the canal system considering the constraints imposed upon them 
by physical attributes of the system, as well as the actions of other actors. 
The case-study canal system is modeled as a bi-level problem with the water master 
at the topmost level, and the other users at the sublevel. The analysis of the actions and 
interaction of these agents is done using spatial dynamic optimization and bi-level 
programming techniques, to explore how the spatial location of the different actors in the 
system affects decision-making hierarchy and outcomes. 
With the bi-level formulation, the optimal choices of the various actors at the 
sublevel, determined using dynamic optimization techniques, serve as inputs in the water 
master’s problem. Likewise, the solution to the water master’s problem feeds into the 
sublevel decisions through the water directives and allocation he makes after he 
determines his optimal course of action. The water master – other users hierarchy here 
thus reflects a relationship between autonomous and potentially conflicting decision-
makers relatable to the leader-follower scenario in Stackelberg games.  
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In the Stackelberg (1934) game, the leader acts first, with the follower moving to 
optimally react to the leader's move. The leader, aware beforehand that the follower 
observes his actions before making their move, anticipates and incorporates the 
follower’s optimal response behavior in optimizing his own Thus the follower’s 
optimization problem (here, the sub-level problem of the agricultural and residential 
users) is nested within the leader’s problem, which corresponds to the upper level 
optimization problem in a general bi-level program and the water masters problem in this 
model. 
In this vein, the solution (optimal behavioral rule/strategy) may be likened to a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Bruckner and Scheffer, 2011) so that it expresses the 
strategy that best caters to the objectives of each user in the model, given the behavioral 
motivations and rules of all other users in the canal system. Each user operates under the 
scenario where he cannot improve his outcome be changing only his behavior all other 
things constant (i.e. a Nash equilibrium). 
The results are then explored through counterfactual scenario analyses for insights on 
1) the impact of individual decisions and actions on available water supplies, 2) the 
impact these decisions may have on institutional management (i.e., canal companies, 
state and federal agencies) of water resources, and 3) discrepancies between results from 
this model and a non-hierarchical one where the objectives of all users are jointly 
optimized/determined. 
In the body of economic literature most related, this study aligns most as a dynamic 
optimization model incorporating spatial heterogeneity. In particular, it analyzes dynamic 
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optimal water allocation and use in a canal system with spatially heterogeneous agents 
with varying objectives. 
This study contributes to this literature in two ways: it examines a novel case where 
spatial location dictates a decision-making hierarchy.  The canal manager at the top of the 
canal decision-making hierarchy makes decisions given the water-use of all individuals 
along the canal.  The use of bi-level programming affords this contribution and it is the 
first combination of these two techniques that we are aware of. Another contribution is 
the incorporation of heterogeneous agents. Spatially dynamic optimization models in 
economics typically assume identical decision makers at each point in the grid, and this 
study comprises three different user types in the canal system. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1: Water Research in Economics 
Traditionally, economics espouses an approach based on the reductionist principle of 
physics in studying aggregate behavior. According to this principle, the aggregate can be 
understood simply by considering its individual components. The reductionist framework 
suggests that “the dynamics of a (linear) model can be decomposed into its constituent 
parts through the representative agent framework” (Bianchi et al., 2008). 
As a result, general equilibrium models are built on the foundational assumption of a 
rational, omniscient representative agent with optimization goals. While the 
representative agent theory has support in a complete market scenario (Constantinides, 
1982; Guvenen, 2011), most markets are far from that and water markets are no 
exception. True, aggregation theorems are usually presented as defense for the 
representative agent approach, with some evidence showing aggregation producing 
similar results for representative and heterogeneous agent scenarios in even incomplete 
markets (Krussell and Smith, 1998; Rios-Rul, 1996). However, aggregating 
heterogeneous agents into a representative agent can produce preferences that do not 
reflect those of the model underlying the aggregation (Hansen, 1985; Romero, 1988; 
Browning, Hansen and Heckman, 1999) and heterogeneous agent models can explain 
aggregate evidence a single representative agent model grapples with.  
Indeed, this weakness has been recognized in the literature and the representative 
agent model assumption where water economics is concerned has been relaxed using 
tools such as game theory and agent-based modeling.  
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In addition to the proliferation of representative agent assumptions in existing water 
economics research, there is a distinct paucity of attention given to the natural and built 
systems which govern the transportation and delivery of the water under study.  
Thus while existing studies on water-use and management cover such topics as the 
economics of water-use in agriculture (Carlson et al., 1993; Zilberman, 2008); the 
economics of water management in agriculture (Molden et al., 2007; Bournaris et al., 
2014); the economic value of water in irrigation/agriculture (Sunding et al., 2002; Ward 
and Michelsen, 2002; Rigby et al., 2010); the economic impacts of restricting water 
supply (Berrittella et al., 2006; Berrittella et al., 2007); the use of pricing policies 
(Gaudin, 2006; Olmstead et al., 2007) and water markets in regulating water demand and 
promoting conservation (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009); water supply security and the 
willingness to pay to avoid drought (Hensher et al., 2006); among others.  
These studies are done with no consideration of how the conveyance systems and 
order of water-use and management decisions, actions and interactions affect individual, 
as well as system-wide water outcomes. And yet, the systems and conditions governing 
the transport of water can be incredibly important in water quantity and quality 
management. A storm-water management decision by one upstream and uphill agent can 
mean financial destitution for a downstream and downhill farmer depending on the 
drainage and conveyance systems present. 
Finally, existing studies in water economics reveal a knowledge gap with regards to 
the motivations behind observed water-use and management behavior. There is ample 
information of which factors influence greater water-use and irrigation technology 
adoption, but there is a dearth of information on why those factors have said influence. In 
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Hoekstra and Chapagain’s (2007) study of the water footprint of nations considering 
water-use as a function of consumption patterns, they find the major direct determinants 
of a country’s water footprint to be gross national income; pattern of consumption (e.g. 
high versus low meat consumption); climate (growth conditions); and agricultural 
practices (water-use efficiency). Household meat consumption and similar behaviors, for 
instance, is not readily accounted for in traditional economic water-use models. 
Knowledge of these underlying motivations is invaluable in policy-making. Knowing 
why people use water the way they do is crucial in determining how to incentivize them 
to modify their water-use behavior. 
Bockstael et al. (1987) establish the sensitivity of measurements of recreation benefits 
obtained from models of recreational behavior to people’s perception of their decision 
problems. Goodman and Howe (1997) investigate the determinants of ditch company 
share prices in the South Platte river basin and find that while characteristics of the ditch 
company shares and price fluctuations appear to explain share prices well, there were 
considerable inter-city differences which remained unexplained and mayhap be explained 
by variances in geographical factors, risk preferences and consumer expectations about 
the future. 
This hints subtly at the synergy and complexity in water-use this study seeks to 
address at a hydroeconomic system scale and also suggests the importance of not just 
how much water and at what price people use water, but why (purpose/motivation), when 
(timing) and where (spatial explicitness) when it comes to water-use and management 
decisions. 
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2.2 Multi-Agent Models 
Game theory provides an excellent tool for explaining behavioral outcomes and 
makes a compelling case for detailed study of heterogeneous rather than representative 
economic agent interactions. Bogardi and Szidarovszky (1976) demonstrate the merit of 
the game-theoretic approach in analyzing protection of water ecosystems, irrigation 
system management (Rosen and Sexton, 1993), water quality management, and joint 
management of water systems for multiple objectives such as storm-water management, 
recreation, biodiversity, water supply, etc. They find varying motivations for cooperation, 
and numerical justification for joint optimization. Thus while all actors in a water system 
may benefit from co-operation, disproportionate distribution of this benefit often leads to 
non-cooperation and therefore sub-optimal outcomes for all.  
Dinar and Howitt (1997), Raquel et al. (2007) and Wei et al. (2010) corroborate this 
in their application of game theory to water conflict and co-operation among 
heterogeneous agents. They find that those who would benefit the least (or lose the most) 
pushed back against co-operation and engendered the non-cooperative sub-optimality 
embodied in the prisoner’s dilemma. Game theory has also been applied to the allotment 
of joint water project costs (Giglio and Wrightington, 1972; Suzuki and Nakayana, 1976; 
Young et al., 1980; Straffin et al., 1981; Dinar and Howitt, 1997);   and transboundary 
water management and cooperation (Bardhan, 1993; Becker and Easter, 1995; Adams et 
al., 1996; Fisvold and Casswell, 2000, Fernandez, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers, 2008; 
Fernandez, 2009) with identical conclusions. 
Game theory, in allowing for heterogeneous actors, permits analysis of behavior that 
does not assume everyone is equally committed towards a joint goal. This allows detailed 
151 
 
study of cooperation and non-cooperation among players and how such behavior impacts 
players’ welfare both individually and jointly.  
Cooperative game theory is better than a traditional market model where agents only 
interact through price when it comes to models involving a relatively small number of 
players who can make decisions together and individually (Dinar, Ratner and Yaron, 
1992). However, it requires agents to be suitably well-informed and this is not always 
feasible.  
(Madani, 2010) employs a series of non-cooperative games to investigate the 
applicability of game theory to water resource management and conflict resolution.  The 
results from the study demonstrate the inherent dynamism in water resource problems 
and the need to consider the evolution path of linked/dependent decisions in the study of 
such problems.  
The predicted outcomes from such game theory analyses, however, often differ from 
results from traditional economic optimization approaches which assume all parties are 
willing to work towards attaining the best outcome for the system (Madani, 2010). 
System management with regards to water resource management often involves conflicts. 
Stakeholders, who might be able to reach mutually beneficial situations through co-
operation, often exhibit (non-cooperative) behavior which produces mutually unfavorable 
results. The model in this chapter considers an omniscient water master in a non-
cooperative game set-up comparable to the Stackelberg leadership model where a better 
informed leader acts first taking the followers motivations and possible reactions into 
account to optimize welfare. This is a suitable set up for water management in many 
canal systems in Utah and beyond, as well as in many decision-making scenarios with 
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different levels of decision-making power. There may be some observed ‘cooperation’ 
between lower level decision makers, but this is usually in one way or another dictated by 
the priorities of the higher-level decision maker(s). For instance, water masters may give 
directives to protect downstream agricultural users in the interest of minimizing the 
impact of drought on agriculture in the region and subsequently the economy as a whole.  
A number of modeling approaches have developed in response to the clarion call for 
models better able to capture the complexity, heterogeneity and synergies inherent in 
coupled human-natural systems such as the water system, and also able to accommodate 
suboptimal choices resulting from the interaction of economic agents with their 
environment and each other. 
One such model touted by many as the standard, is the agent-based modeling 
approach (ABM). ABM may be defined as “a computerized simulation of a number of 
decision-makers (agents) and institutions which interact through prescribed rules” 
(Farmer and Foley, 2009; An, 2012). These agents are usually set in a dynamic 
environment, and interact with the environment, which includes other agents. Agents are 
usually given the ability to evolve in their perceptions and behaviors, in response to the 
behavior of other agents and the evolution of the environment. In social science 
applications, ABMs typically deduce assumptions from observed conditions in society 
and nature, and based off these assumptions and simulation, produces data for analysis 
(An, 2012), successfully marrying the traditional inductive and deductive approaches in 
scientific research (Axelrod, 1997).  
Agent-based modeling applications in water economics allow researchers to account 
for the complexity and synergistic relationships in the studied water systems, as well as 
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the heterogeneity of agents. (Troost and Berger, 2014; Berger and Troost, 2014; and 
Berger, 2001) capitalize on this strength to explicitly capture agent interactions across 
social and spatial dimensions, as well as capturing response and adaptation of water-users 
to changes in hydroclimatic and socioeconomic conditions. 
In economics, ABM is especially employed in ecological economics whose domain 
comprises interconnected social and environmental systems. Agent-based models can be 
used to explore feedbacks and adaptations integral to these systems as it permits 
representation of autonomous, dynamic and heterogeneous entities and has the capacity 
to handle interactions among these entities. The interactions between agents and their 
environments then produce macro-scale results employable as data in the quantitative 
analysis of complex systems (Heckbert et al., 2010).  
ABM applications in ecological economics are seen in the area of natural resource 
management where it has seen applications to invasive species management (Atallah et 
al., 2013), water resource management (Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl, 2007), and energy 
investment decisions (Wittman, 2008). Applications are also seen in studies of land-use 
change (Parker et al., 2003), urban systems modeling, changes in consumer attitudes, 
innovation and diffusion of technology and management practices (Berger and Troost, 
2012), and psychological aspects to human decision-making and behavior change. 
Developing research using ABM in ecological economics seeks not just to expand its 
applications, but also build its capacity for testing specific hypotheses about agent 
decision-making, through the calibration and validation of models (Heckbert et al., 2010). 
ABMs can determine and analyze the decisions of parties to water resource conflicts and 
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delineate how interacting agents who make decisions based on self-interest rather than 
system-wide interest impact a system’s evolution. 
While the ABM approach may very well be the ideal approach in many natural 
resource applications, the data intensity and time requirements of developing, populating 
and parameterizing Agent-Based models can be considerable. Thus, there is the need to 
continue developing other approaches and models which may more readily and generally 
be employed in the economic analysis of complex water systems. 
This study presents one such option, by taking into consideration and marrying spatial 
dynamic optimization techniques from economics, and bi-level programming techniques 
imported from mathematical programming. Spatial dynamic optimization allows for 
incorporation of spatial heterogeneity of agents with respect to hydro-geophysical 
characteristics and economic characteristics such as agent objectives, costs and benefits. 
The bi-level formulation allows incorporation of the institutional hierarchy in water 
decision-making where policies and regulations from irrigation managers, municipalities, 
cities, states and federal institutions exert an influence a step or two above the other 
agents in the system.  
The following sections examine these two techniques, as well as the merits of 
coupling them.  
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2.3  Spatial Dynamic Optimization 
The use of optimization methods is widespread in economics - from the analysis of 
one-time choices using static optimization methods, to optimal decision-making over 
time using dynamic optimization methods. Further, we see the extension of these 
dynamic optimization models to account for uncertain variables (stochastic dynamic 
optimization) and spatial variation (spatial dynamic optimization). 
In the resource economics literature, spatial dynamic optimization has seen 
widespread application, with applications examining the dynamics of spillover effects of 
individual resource use (Irwin and Bockstael, 2002), designation of use-no use areas like 
in the case of wildlife reserves (Polasky et al., 2008; Benitez et al., 2006) highlighting 
questions about the difference between individual resource use and optimal resource use 
over the whole spatial grid, and the dynamics and spillover effects of managing adverse 
biological (invasive species, infectious disease, etc.) and physical (wildfire, erosion, etc.) 
events (Atallah et al., 2013; Conrad and Rondeau, 2014). 
The economics of spatial dynamic optimization as it pertains to natural resources 
differ significantly from separate considerations of spatial and dynamic problems in 
resource economics. The joint consideration of the space and time components often 
introduces new challenges birthed from the interaction of hydro-geo-physical, bio-
ecological and economic systems across spatio-temporal space. Prevalent examples of 
such problems include invasive species management, wildfire control and infectious 
disease spread, which all have the unifying influence of underlying biophysical 
dispersion or diffusion processes (Smith et al., 2009).  From an optimization standpoint, 
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we now have to consider not just when and how much of an optimal control to apply, but 
also where to apply this control to optimize impact of said control. 
Separately, the spatial and dynamic aspects of resource use have received ample 
address in existing literature. Most economic investigations considering the optimal 
policies regarding extraction, development and conservation of resources such as timber 
(Faustmann, 1995; Conrad, 2000), minerals (Hoteling, 1931), and fishery (Crutchfield 
and Zellner, 1962; Schaeffer, 1987) thoroughly treat the dynamic aspects of these 
problems. 
On the spatial side, Von Thunen’s exploration of the spatial impacts of autonomous 
economic decision-making has spurred spatially focused research on how patterns of 
production and consumption, urban structure and emergence of cities vary across 
geographical space (Fujita et al., 1999) and how variables such as availability of 
environmental amenities affect spatial development patterns in urban and rural settings 
(Wu, 2006; Wu and Plantinga, 2003; Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Wu, 2001). 
The extent of spatial consideration in spatial models in economics varies. We have 
spatially explicit models which describe a discrete or continuous non-uniform 
geographical space and spatially-implicit models which, in lieu of geographical space, 
integrate assumptions about the spatial composition of biological interactions without 
using geographical space. Due to spatial analyses being centered on an economic 
resource or activity, spatial analyses was traditionally done along concentric circles of 
influence. Currently, grid systems populated with cellular automata interacting with 
neighboring cells are more used, with neighborhoods defined based on expert knowledge 
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as fine as specific GIS data, to established empirical economic relationships (Verburg et 
al., 2002). 
Joint considerations of spatio-temporal aspects of resource use in economics vary in 
complexity. At one end are fully integrated models of spatial-dynamic processes such as 
a spatial bioeconomic optimization model of (migratory) fish populations (Smith et al., 
2009, Marten and Moore, 2010), invasive species management (Sims and Finoff, 2013, 
Aadland et al., 2013), and control of wildfire (Spring and Kennedy, 2005; Thompson and 
Calkin, 2011). At the other end, we find optimal resource allocation models with 
considerations of spatial heterogeneity for example the one-time optimal choice of nature 
conservation reserve sites based on habitat productivity (Polasky et al., 2001; Ando et al., 
1998) and its related reserve site selection problems which examine optimal choice of 
conservation activities for optimal design of protected area networks (Williams et al., 
2005; Tischendorf et al., 2000; Margules et al., 1982, Diamond, 1975) and models which 
incorporate spatial heterogeneity with dynamics but no spatial-dynamic processes - such 
as dynamic optimization of spatially heterogeneous agricultural runoff (Goetz and 
Zilberman, 2000) and stock pollutants (Xabadia et al., 2006). 
 
2.4: Bi-Level Programming 
Optimization problems which have some or all of their variables constrained to be an 
optimal solution of other optimization problems are known as multi-level optimization 
problems. Commonly found in applications with decision-making hierarchies, these 
problems have their feasible set which satisfies all constraints and optimality conditions 
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implicitly determined by a series of nested optimization problems which may all be on a 
single lower level (bi-level problems) or on multiple levels.  
These nested problems are represented by mathematical programs parameterized by 
the non-constrained variables. Thus, when solving the problems at level a, variables at all 
other levels are held as fixed parameters.  
Multi-level formulations of decision-making models are suitable for situations which 
present a hierarchical structure and generally have the following characteristics (Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl, 1981): 
a) Two or more decision-making agents with independent, sometimes conflicting 
goals at the same, or different levels of the decision-making ladder 
b) Each agent is limited in the model variables they have direct control over. 
c) The decision-making process is undertaken in a sequential manner for each pair of 
adjacent levels of the decision tree thus – the agent at the higher level first 
announces his plan of action or policy, and this is taken as exogenous input by the 
agent(s) at lower levels in deciding their own optimal plan of action or policy.  
d) The agent at the highest level, whose optimization is the master problem, then 
chooses a course of action to optimize its objective function, incorporating 
information from how the lower level agent(s) reacted to his announcement in c) 
above. 
e) The agent solving the master problem knows the objective function and 
constraints of the lower-level problem(s) with certainty.  
When such a multi-level decision-making hierarchy comprises two decision-making 
levels which may be represented as pure mathematical programs (i.e. not dependent on or 
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constrained by other programs), the arising problems are known as bi-level programming 
problems (Vicente and Calamai, 2004; Dempe et al., 2006) and (Bard 1998).  
Bi-level programming techniques present a way to model decentralized hierarchical 
decision-making comprising a ‘leader’s’ objective (master problem) at the first level, and 
the follower’s objective (sub problem) at the second level (Matroud and Sadeghi, 2013). 
 Colson et al. (2007) provides a general overview of bi-level programming 
applications, which reveals its most common application to transportation analysis, 
particularly traffic flow problems (Dowling and Skabardonis, 2008; Akgungor and 
Bullen, 2007; Akcelik, 2003; Daganzo, 1994) and network design ( Farvaresh and 
Sepheri, 2013; Ban et al., 2012; Farvaresh and Sepheri, 2011; Ban et al., 2006). 
It has also been applied to the transportation and marketing of natural gas, with 
particular emphasis on the default payments for late or interrupted delivery (Kalashnikov  
et al., 2010; Kalashnikov and Peres-Valdes, 2010; Kalashnikov and Rios-Mercado, 2006; 
Midthun et al., 2009; Dempe et al., 2006; Kalashnikov et al., 2006; Dempe et al., 2005) 
Closer to home, bi-level programming has been applied to water resource allocation 
with existing studies emphasizing the multiplicity of objectives. Xu et al. (2013), for 
instance, considers water allocation among irrigation, industrial, residential and 
ecological benefits in a Chinese river basin. Fang et al. (2013) and Xu and Wei (2012) 
also apply bi-level programming to water allocation and distribution across users. Lv et 
al. (2010) introduces Fuzzy bi-level programming for water allocation problems which 
allows for consideration of different users and scenarios. This study will add to this fairly 
nascent body of literature, with the added contribution of spatial considerations and how 
it might affect water decision-making, as well as how an omniscient water master’s 
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interventions may help or derail overall welfare. Bi-level problems differ from traditional 
optimization problems in their containment of a nested optimization task within the 
constraints of another. The outer optimization problem is referred as the upper level task 
and the inner optimization problem is referred as the lower level task. The solution of bi-
level optimization problems can have considerable difficulty. This is due to the nested 
structure of the overall problem which requires that any solution to the upper level 
problem may be feasible only if it is an optimal solution to the lower level problem.  
Our model can be represented as a two-level optimization model where the water 
master’s optimization problem is the master problem, and the sub-problems are the 
optimization problems of the residential users, agricultural users, and storm-water 
management whose optimal decisions are dependent on their objectives and limitations; 
with the water master having the highest level of influence.  
The model set-up is described below, followed by the mathematical programing set-
up, solution, and discussion. 
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3 BI-LEVEL MODEL  
The goal is to build a model of water-use in a spatial human-hydrologic system and 
identify optimal water usage in the system using bi-level programming techniques 
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981).  Although we focus on a case study of the Logan 
Northwest Canal in this model, it maintains a generic enough structure that can be 
broadly applied to other (canal) systems. 
 
Human Hydrologic System 
The human hydrologic system considers a primary canal (Crockett Canal) which is 
fed by a river (Logan River) and services a number of secondary canals which in turn 
service a variety of end-use agents.  The model considers 4 different categories of 
decision-making agents each with different motivations, values, and objectives:  
 
1. Water Master (one for each canal (k) with a total of K canals): 
Chooses  
1. the amount of water diverted from the Logan River   
  
2. the degree to which residential water-use is restricted – rationing calls 
 ̅ 
     
 
to minimize 
1. maintenance costs 
2. residential service costs 
3. agricultural service costs 
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subject to  
1. downstream flow requirements  
2. the flow capacity in the canal (proxied by size of head-gates) 
 
2. Agricultural Users (total of M agricultural users each indexed by m): 
Choose water withdrawals     
     
 to maximize profits from agricultural production 
subject to 
1. Agricultural production (this proxies crop type and other non-water 
inputs) 
2. Pumping costs and irrigation capacity constraints  (proxies irrigation 
technology) 
 
3. Residential Users (total of N residential user each indexed by n): 
Choose water withdrawals to maximize household utility which is a function of 
1. Water withdrawals 
2. Canal flows for aesthetic motivations: think people who enjoy water 
running by their property.  (These values can be scaled up and down if an 
individual does not have much value for canal flows) 
subject to 
1. The flow in the canal   
  
2. The level of rationing call  ̅ 
     
 currently imposed by water master 
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An important difference between the residential and agricultural users is that 
residential users recognize that their withdrawals decrease the flow in the canal whereas 
agricultural users treat canal flow as exogenous to their water withdrawal decision.  In 
other words, agricultural water-users act as if increasing their water-use decisions will 
have no impact on the current flow in the canal.  This reflects the reality in certain areas 
where residential use restrictions are imposed to supply water to agricultural users.   
 
4. Logan City Storm-water Management: 
This agent chooses the percentage of storm-water diverted to the canal to minimize 
cost of storm-water disposal. Some decisions will be influenced by the decision of other 
agents.  An obvious example is the diversion and rationing call decision made by the 
water master.  Residential users must also predict how likely they are to have their usage 
limited by the water master.  Because of these interactions between agents, the solution to 
the model will be characterized by a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in which each 
agent makes a decision based on the best response of all other agents.  In other words, 
each agent understands the water-use decisions of all other agents and expects each agent 
to make rational water-use decisions.  Initially we will start with a simple model with six 
agents – one water master (K=1), two residential users (N=2), two agricultural users 
(M=2), and one storm-water manager.  We will also initially focus on only water 
quantity.   
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Space and time 
Time is set in discrete daily increments and indexed by         where T is the 
length of the irrigation season.  The human-hydrologic system (NWFIC stakeholders) is 
divided into a grid with rows indexed by         and columns indexed by        .  
Each cell on the grid is represented by the pair      .  As shown in figure 2, each cell 
      is assigned to one of three categories: 
1. Conveyance: These cells move water across the grid.  No water-use decisions are 
made on these cells.  There are two different components to the conveyance 
system 
i. Crockett Canal – links Logan River to field canals 
ii. Northwest canal – one of many field canals connected to Crockett 
These two components are managed jointly in our model ( i.e., diversions from the 
Logan River to Crockett Canal are chosen based on planned diversions by all FIC’s 
operating along Crockett). 
2. Diversion: These cells represent junctions between different conveyance 
components. 
3. Use: These cells represent land parcels where the diverted water is used.     
The Logan River, which supplies water to the Crockett Canal, is dynamically 
modeled off the grid. 
Cells that fall in the conveyance and diversion categories constitute the hydrologic 
system that delivers water to the end user.  The hydrologic system is represented by a 
water quantity state variable   
  measured in cubic feet per day and represents the amount 
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of water that flowed through canal         at time t.  The actual movement of water 
through the system is governed by a QUAL2K model representation of the system.  The 
residence time in the canal system is about 6 hours.  Water-users are assumed to make 
water-use decision on a less frequent time step (12-24 hours).  As a result, each agent’s 
decision problem is largely static since current water-use decision will have little or no 
impact on canal flows when the next decision is made.  An implication of this is that no 
water-users have any incentive to conserve water at this spatial scale.  Any water left in 
the canal for conservation purposes will have flowed out of the canal by the time the 
agent makes a subsequent decision.  The incentive to conserve may increase as the spatial 
consideration of decision makers increase (and the residence time of water in the system 
increase) but will still be limited by the presence/absence of storage in the system.   
The model for the perceived water system represents an agent’s simplified perception 
of the more complex hydro system.  This model is created using difference equations and 
simple proportional flow from one canal in the hydro system to another.  The quantity of 
water in the Logan River at the Crockett Canal diversion is a function of the amount of 
snowpack and              
   is a disturbance term with mean   and standard deviation 
  that captures natural fluctuations (weather, climate, and hydrologic processes) and 
variation in anthropogenic diversions upstream of the Crockett Canal diversion.
27
  
Specifically, the snowpack declines over the course of the season according to  
                     
 (1) 
                                                            
27 By treating other canal company diversions as n error term assumes no coordination among canal 
company operators.  This could be relaxed with a modeling effort than encompasses the larger spatial 
extent. 
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which implies         
    where   is the rate the snowpack melts and    is the 
snowpack (in cubic feet of water equivalent) at the beginning of the season in the Logan 
River watershed.  The amount of water upstream of the Crockett Canal diversion is 
  
                       
 (2) 
while the amount of water in the Logan River below the Crockett Canal diversion 
becomes 
  
    
  ∑   
  
     
   ̅        
 (iii) 
where   captures the proportion of the melted snowpack that makes its way to the 
Crockett Canal diversion,   
  is the rate of withdrawal from the Logan by canal company 
k with K total canal companies along the Crockett Canal, and  ̅ represents any 
downstream flow requirements that may be implicitly or explicitly tied to Logan River 
flows.   
The quantity of water at the bottom of canal k at time t is a function of the flow into 
that canal (set by the k
th
 water master), the withdrawals by the N+M shareholders along 
the canal, and the delivery requirement for the canal  ̅ :   
  
    
   
 ⏟
      
  ∑     
      
     ∑     
      
        ̅
 ⏟
        
           
   
 (iv) 
where     
     
 is the quantity withdrawn by residential user n,     
     
 is the quantity 
withdrawn by agricultural user m and   
     
 is the storm-water return flow.  Inflow is 
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proportional to the flow in the Logan River with   
   ̅    where   
   ̅  where 
canal k’s head-gate is fully open.   
 
Human Decision-Making 
At the spatial scale considered in this model, no agent has an incentive to conserve 
canal water assuming no instream storage.  Each agent is faced with a static optimization 
problem since there is no future cost of current actions.  At this spatial scale, relative 
location within the canal system plays a less refined role in decision-making.  Agents 
have to consider the decision of other agents when making a current decision but spatial 
location matters only in that agent’s only consider decisions of other agent’s using the 
same canal – being upstream or downstream doesn’t matter. 
The static nature of the agent’s decision problem is due to the fact that the time step 
for decision-making is longer than the residence time in the canal that the person is 
drawing from.  With a larger coordinating body with a larger spatial jurisdiction, 
effective residence times would be larger but it’s not clear that the time-step for decision-
making would stay the same size since larger coordinating bodies often engage in longer-
term planning.  But if you did have an effective residence time longer than 24 hours, and 
a decision that was made daily, then agents recognize their relative location to others.   
Human decision-making is undertaken by four different types of agents.  These 
agents make daily decisions about the amount of water to withdraw/divert in the system.  
However, each agent type has different motivations, values, and objectives.  Water 
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decisions on cell       in period   are given by   
     
   for withdrawal and   
     
   for 
storm-water return flow.   
 
Residential User Decision Problem 
Multiple agents will fall in the residential water-use category and will be indexed by 
the cell which they own or are charged with managing.  For these agents, water quantity 
provides value from its withdrawal and usage or in situ.  The use/withdrawal of the water 
quantity state variable on cell       in period   by residential user n is given by     
     
.  
Values from in situ use might represent riparian benefits from having water in the river, 
canal, or ditch.  A residential user’s preference for these two ecosystem services are 
captured by the utility function  (    
     
   
   )       represents relative 
preferences for water withdrawal.  For exposition assume a log-linear utility function 
making the agent n’s problem 
   
    
      (    
     
   
   )         
     
          
     
 (v.1) 
subject to 
  
    
   
   ∑     
      
     ∑     
      
           
 (v.2) 
    
     
  ̅ 
     
          
 (v.3) 
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where  ̂   
     
,  ̂   
     
, and  ̂  represent the best responses by the residential users, 
agricultural users, and storm-water managers in the canal system.  The residential water-
user’s problem is similar to the common pool resource problem.  The Lagrangian 
function associated with this agent is  {       
     
        [ ̂ 
   
   ∑  ̂   
      
    
∑  ̂   
      
     ̂ ]}      
     
[ ̅ 
     
     
     
] (vi) 
with first-order condition 
{
 
 ̂   
      
   
  
   ̂   
     }      
     
        
 (vii) 
where  ̂   
     
 is the best response by agent n.    
 ̂   
     
 {
   
                         
  
 ̅ 
     
 
 ̅ 
     
                  
  
 ̅ 
     
 
 
      
 (viii) 
If the water rationing constraint is not binding, the water master incurs no service 
damages from this agent (    
     
  ) and  
 ̂   
     
    
   ̅ 
     
 
If the water rationing constraint is binding ( ̅ 
     
  ̂   
     
), the water master’s service 
damages from this agent are given by 
    
     
( ̅   
     
)  {
 
 ̅   
     
 
   
  
 } 
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Storm-water Manager Decision Problem 
The second type of agent is the city storm-water manager.  To simplify notation, we 
will assume all storm-water inflow takes place at one point in the canal system (i.e., we 
rule out multiple intake points).  This agent must minimize the cost of disposing of storm-
water by selecting the percentage of storm-water that flows to the canal   .  The total 
amount of storm-water that a city manager must dispose of is     .  The city manager’s 
cost function is given by  (  
 )                   where  (  
 ) is the marginal 
cost of dumping storm-water in the canal and   is the cost of disposing of storm-water 
under the next best alternative (e.g., retaining ponds).  The marginal cost of disposing of 
storm-water in the canal is higher when the canal flow is near capacity: 
  
   
   .  For 
simplicity assume  (  
 )     
    The city manager chooses storm-water inflow to 
minimize costs 
     {   
                   }       
 (ix) 
The first-order condition for this problem is  
   
             
 (x) 
This implies that the city manager’s problem is a bang-bang solution.  When   
  
 
 
, 
the marginal cost of dumping storm-water in the canal is higher than the alternative 
approach and the manager chooses     .  When   
  
 
 
, it is relatively cheap to dump 
the storm-water in the canal and the manager chooses      and the inflow is equal to 
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the total amount of storm-water.  This leads to a critical threshold for canal flow 
 
 
 below 
which the city manager begins to dump storm-water in the canal and the best response 
from the storm-water manager is given by 
 ̂  {
              
  
 
 
                    
  
 
 
      (xi) 
    
Agricultural Water-user Decision Problem  
The third type of agent is agricultural water-users.  Multiple agents will fall in this 
category and will be indexed by the cell which they own.  These agents use water to 
irrigate agricultural fields which produce a valuable agricultural commodity which can be 
sold for price p when harvested.  The water master will not restrict the amount of water 
agricultural users may withdraw and as such they do not consider how their individual 
withdrawal impacts the flow remaining in the canal (problem not solved subject to the 
equation of motion for   
 ).   Agricultural users choose withdrawals to maximize 
instantaneous profit 
   
    
       
     
 {  (    
     
)   (  
 )    
     
}      
 (xii) 
subject to commodity specific production function  (    
     
)       
      
  marginal 
cost of production  (  
 )  
 
  
 , and     
     
   
     
 where   
     
 is a capacity constraint 
from the farmer’s irrigation technology.  Since canal flow will change over time the 
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farmer’s withdrawal may be periodically constrained by the irrigation technology.  The 
Kuhn-Tucker condition for this myopic problem is 
       
        
 
 
  
           
 (xiii) 
[       
        
 
 
  
 ] (  
     
     
     
)         
 (xiv) 
The best response for the agricultural user can be described by 
 ̂   
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 (xv) 
If canal flow exceeds 
 
     
        
,  the farmer will choose to operate at full capacity 
and when the canal flow is lower than this threshold, the farmer will operate at less than 
full capacity.  Service losses to the agricultural user are equal to the loss in profits from 
operating at less than full capacity: 
    
     
     
     
(  
     
)      
     
( ̂   
     
)      (xvi) 
 
Water Master Decision Problem 
The water master makes two primary decisions: 1) when to open and close the head-
gate and 2) how much residential shareholder usage should be limited during times of 
water shortage – rationing calls  ̅ 
     
.  The decision to initially open the head-gate at the 
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beginning of the season is determined outside the model.  When the flow in the Logan 
River is high and the head-gate is open, the water master risks flooding areas adjacent to 
the canal.  These high flows in the canal also exacerbate maintenance costs.      
The water master chooses what percentage of water in the Logan River should be 
diverted to the canal   
  in order to minimize maintenance costs and the losses to canal 
users (service damages).  This decision must ensure that various demands are met.  First, 
the canal company operator must ensure that a sufficient amount of water remains in the 
canal to satisfy the demands of downstream users of the primary canal.  These demands 
are assumed to remain constant and given by  ̅ .  Second, the canal company operator 
must also ensure that the diversion also meets the water demands of downstream users of 
the canal   
     
 and the return flow demands   
     
.   
Maintenance costs are a quadratic function of the flow in the canal 
    
   
    
Service damages only arise when canal users’ demands are limited by the water 
master.  The residential service damage on cell       is     
     
( ̅ 
     
) and represents the 
individuals shadow value for instream canal flows.  The agricultural service damage on 
cell (i,j) is     
     
 and represents lost profits from not operating at maximum irrigating 
capacity.  The water master problem is: 
   
  
  ̅ 
         
   
    ∑     
      
    ∑     
      
        
 (xvii) 
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subject to the best response of all residential  ̂   
     
, agricultural  ̂   
     
 and storm-water 
 ̂ 
     
 users and supply constraints  
  
    
   
   ∑  ̂   
      
    ∑  ̂   
      
     ̂ 
     
  ̅     
 (xviii) 
  
                       
 (xix) 
  
    
  ∑   
  
     
   ̅        
 (xx) 
When the head-gates are fully open,   
   ̅ .  If this flow meets downstream flow 
requirement demands and the demands of residential and agricultural users, the water 
master may lower the flow   
   ̅  to minimize maintenance costs.  If the fully open 
head-gate flow does not meet all demand, the water master may restrict the usage of 
residential water-users by choosing a lower level of  ̅ 
     
 on all residential cells.  This 
rationing call allows downstream flow and agricultural requirements to be met but also 
incurs residential service damages.  Based on their respective decision problems, the 
water master is able to form a “best guess” for how each agent will act and the service 
damage that will arise from a given canal flow:  
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4 BI-LEVEL MODEL SOLUTION 
The bi-level program looks at optimal water management in a single canal (K=1) and 
is modeled after the Logan Northwest Field Irrigation Company (NWFIC, see Figures 5.1 
and 5.2).  For simplicity we will drop the k notation from the model description. The bi-
level programming approach presumes a master problem and sub-problem whose optimal 
decisions are dependent covertly or overtly on input from each other.  
This study formulates a bi-level spatial dynamic optimization problem to derive 
optimal water-use behavior for a canal company manager (water master); and presents an 
initial mathematical solution and analysis. The first level of our bi-level problem denotes 
a strategically acting omniscient water master comparable to a Stackelberg leader, while 
the second level comprises residential and agricultural users analogous to the Stackelberg 
follower(s).  
Our omniscient water master considered in this model is the water master of the 
Logan North West Irrigation company. The area under his jurisdiction is situated on the 
west side of Logan city, running south and north along 400 west and 200 west, with an 
irrigated acreage of 1062.07 acres. This canal system is located in Utah water right area 
25, with a period of use from April 1 to October 31. 
The large shareholders in this canal system are located on the northern end of the 
system and are agricultural users whom the water master tries to save from crop failure 
with his water directives in time of scarcity. The residential users generally use the water 
for lawn irrigation with minimal, if any culinary use. This can be relaxed, especially 
when incorporating water quality considerations to account for both culinary and outdoor 
users. 
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The mathematical model is defined as follows by equations xvii-xx; 
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    ∑     
      
       
 (xvii) 
such that 
  
    
   
   ∑  ̂   
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 (xx) 
Thus, the optimal choices of residential and agricultural users are incorporated into 
the water masters problem through his choice of     
     
and     
     
 in his objective function, 
and in his constraint in xviii ( ̂   
     
  ̂   
     
 . In turn, when the water master sets   
  at his 
optimal choice, this influences the constraints of residential users through their 
constraints in equation (v.2). Since we assume protection of agricultural users and 
myopic decision-making, the agricultural user is not directly constrained in this fashion. 
However, the water masters choice affects both users through the term   
  in both their 
objective functions. 
To solve the bi-level optimization problem, the objective functions at the second 
decision-making level are substituted with the KKT (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) optimality 
conditions of the residential and agricultural user problems ( ̂   
     
  ̂   
     
  , resulting in a 
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) depicted above (xvii-xx). 
178 
 
This MPEC is then solved in MATLAB using a direct mixed integer quadratic 
programming approach as promulgated by YALMIP.  
The direct mixed integer quadratic program has some of its decision variables 
constrained to be integer values at the optimal solution.  The discrete nature of integers 
allows us to model decision variables that take yes or no values, and to capture similar 
bang-bang solutions as observed in the KKT optimality conditions we derived. However, 
this possibility comes at a price as integers introduce non-convexity into the optimization 
problems, and thus make it more difficult to solve. Both computer memory demand and 
time to convergence can increase exponentially with the introduction of integer variables. 
Our outer problem is a quadratic programming problem in the variables   
        
     
 and 
    
     
.  
   
  
  ̅ 
     
   
    
 
 
  
        
    
 
subject to    
    
   
         
     
  ̂   ̅
  
where the variables           constrained to be the optimal solutions of our lower 
level optimization (quadratic programming) problems. 
That is,   = ̂   
     
= arg min             
     
 ,  
and   = ̂   
     
= arg min      
  
 
  
 
 
       
subject to     
     
   
     
 where   
     
 is a capacity constraint from the farmer’s 
irrigation technology. 
The solution is derived numerically using the following parameters and variables. 
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values 
Variable/Parameter Definition 
S0= 160.3 
 
Initial snowpack level (SWE) in mm 
(annual snowfall in Logan) 
gamma=0.5 Water master's cost parameter 
mu=1.41;  
 
rate of snowpack melt (per day) during 
peak summer 
  
rho= 0.38 
 
portion of S which goes to canal 
epsilonkt = sdpvar(n) 
 
rate of water withdrawal by canal 
company k  
alpha = 0.6 utility preference for consumptive use 
n=4 number of decision variables 
m=3 number of constraints 
St= 0.8*S0-d*mu %snow pack equation during peak 
operating season 
Lut=rho*500*St amount of water upstream crockett 
canal diversion 
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The numerical results are obtained using the YALMIP toolbox in MATLAB. The 
solver in YALMIP is based on a simple branching strategy which performs branching on 
the complementary slackness conditions. This is an application of the branch and bound 
strategy promulgated by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl. The KKT conditions of the sub-
problem are stated and then integer programming is employed in accommodating the 
complementary slackness conditions. The branch and bound scheme searches a defined 
state space for a list of candidate solutions (branches), and then tests these solutions 
branch by branch against the bounds of the optimal solution to find the best-performing 
solution. 
Table 3.2 below presents the results obtained by solving for optimal agricultural 
water demand, residential water demand and optimal permissible storm-water flow using 
the bi-level formulation in the numerical model, juxtaposed against the same variables 
optimized with the KKT-conditions without considering the hierarchy of decision-
making. 
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Table 3.2: Bi-level versus Non-hierarchical “Everyman for Himself” scenario 
Variable/Met
hod 
 ̂   
          ̂   
     
res  ̂   
     
Ag  ̂   
     
Ag  ̂ 
     
 
Bi-level 5000 10000 10000 20000 200 
Non-
Hierarchical 
11,786 235713 4801 9601 539 
 
 
 
These results are estimated averages during the peak summer season from June 1-
August 31. The superscripts show the user’s location on the grid while the subscripts 
show the type of user they are, and the time marker.  
Initial results show that the water master will always choose   
  to divert the full 
allowable diversion the upper bound imposed by his maintenance costs and water right 
allow. While his maintenance and operation costs exert a downward pull, this downward 
pull, he is also required to ‘use it or lose it’ and so takes that into consideration. Initial 
results also suggest some improved overall system outcomes in the hierarchical model 
relative to individual optimization. This is attributable to the downstream agricultural 
users having a higher value for water in this system set up. In a case where the residential 
users had a high enough value for water, the benevolence of the water master towards 
agricultural users could produce worse system outcomes for all involved. 
182 
 
In particular, the omniscient water master is able to optimize outcomes for all users 
within his system, and also for the purposes of meeting downstream requirements. He 
elects to divert exactly the amount of water required to fulfill the needs of his agricultural 
and residential users, and tolerates the least amount of storm-water in a bid to minimize 
his costs.  
He is able to provide an acceptable and desirable level of benefit for his residential 
users, while taking advantage of water they may have otherwise dumped in the quest to 
keep their water rights to protect the downstream agricultural users from crop failure. In 
the absence of the water master, the upstream residential users, as a result of their 
location and/or seniority of water rights, tend to withdraw more water as seen in the every 
man for himself scenario. This result is appropriate and observed in the locale as some 
residential water-users flood their neighboring lots to preserve their water rights.  
When the level of water drops further so that the value of water increases for both 
users, both agricultural and residential users have their use limited, and the water master 
schedules the timing and allowance in favor of the agricultural users as much as possible 
taking the needs of the residential users into consideration. 
The downstream agricultural users obtain less water in the nonhierarchical instance, 
leaving them open to crop failure, increased costs when compelled to lease water from 
upstream users to meet their needs, etc. The benevolence of the water master is not 
altogether altruistic. The Agricultural users comprise his largest shareholders with some 
holding thousands of shares and so he does have motivation to keep them satisfied. 
Secondly, given the importance of agriculture to Utah’s economy, the actions of a 
benevolent water master who protects the agricultural users, preserves statewide 
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economic interest and keeps out state agencies which may be as informed as a water 
master would be, from stepping in to protect Agricultural users and the economy and 
potentially creating less favorable system outcomes due to their information deficiency. 
Where storm-water is concerned, the water master in the current model set-up 
recognizes the storm-water return flow in the equation of motion for   
 .  So when the 
canal flow falls below z/w the WM recognizes more water will enter the system.  The 
benefits of the storm-water inflow are incorporated in w.  While he does not currently 
receive much financial benefit from storm-water flows, they do have the potential to help 
meet downstream flow requirements during reduced canal flow input from the Logan 
River.  
This state of limited financial benefit from storm-water allowance has two ready 
motivations for relaxation in subsequent post-degree study. Firstly, increasing 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation of storm-water management with 
regards to water quality creates a potential leverage for water masters of irrigation 
companies to charge the municipalities for their storm-water allowance. Secondly, as 
more precipitation falls as rain (a change that current systems are not appropriately 
equipped to handle), the fee(s) charged could be used to invest in storm-water storage 
and/or treatment infrastructure so that the water may be used within the canal system, or 
later released to meet downstream requirements. 
In sum, initial results from the model suggest that an omniscient conveyance system 
manager does tend to improve overall system outcomes in particular when it comes to 
system benefits or costs which may not be readily considered by all agents (storm-water 
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management, prioritizing agricultural users, downstream user and in-stream 
requirements, etc.) 
The imports of these benefits shift in response to increased water scarcity. For 
instance, the value of storm-water flows for meeting downstream requirements increase 
in times of low canal input from the Logan river where there may be storm-water inflow 
from rain, etc. 
However, further parameterization is needed to strengthen the conclusiveness of those 
results as they tend to be highly sensitive to constraint values, particularly bounds on the 
water master’s choice variable,   
 . Also, further research is needed to improve 
parameterization and model robustness, and this will be the focus of future work. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The model confirms its merit for consideration of a water infrastructure-dictated 
hierarchical decision-making model with heterogeneous users. The model set up and bi-
level formulation allow thorough examination of how the differences in water-users and a 
decision-making hierarchy determined by natural and built components of conveyance 
systems affect water allocation. 
In particular, it shows how differing agent objectives as well as topographical 
structure of existing conveyance systems impact water diversions within a canal system. 
It shows that the incorporation of a hierarchical structure with an omniscient water 
master, allows system inefficiencies (e.g. dumping due to use it or lose it requirement) to 
be exploited for improved system-wide benefit, and allows water to be moved towards 
higher valued use.  
It also shows the benefit of information in achieving overall system benefit even in a 
non-cooperative setting. The water master is able to use the information he has on the 
other users in the model, to meet downstream water requirements in an efficient manner. 
Should it be left up to myopic individual users, there is the potential to fall short of this 
consideration and risk stringent regulation. The information benefit is also seen in the 
agricultural user protection as noted above. 
Subsequent research efforts will seek to improve computational performance by fine-
tuning system parameters; improving the variable constraints and optimality bounds 
taking advantage of similar studies in the literature, as well as come primary data 
collection from interviews with canal manager in other systems, and reducing symmetries 
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in the model. Lessons from the model will also be adapted towards extensions to more 
complicated relationships between water decision makers in a canal system.  
There is also room for expansion to explicitly incorporate uncertainty and ecosystem 
benefits and payment systems in the model, and to consider multiple levels of decision-
making to investigate the immediate and trickle down effects of state and federal 
regulations or directives on water decision-making at the canal and individual levels. 
Limitations of the model include difficulty setting bounds and weights for the 
different objectives in the model. One reason traditional programming favors the 
representative agent approach is the increased computational difficulty when 
heterogeneity of agent characteristics and objectives are introduced. There are potential 
trade-offs in speed and sometimes exactitude when seeking to satisfy multiple constraints 
within a solution space for global and local optimality. However, this calls for increased 
research efforts to improve the solution process rather than avoidance as the 
heterogeneity and hierarchical structure have proven themselves relevant in this and 
related studies. 
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GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As water continues to grow increasingly scarce and less predictable, it is more 
imperative than ever to better understand the motivations and considerations of water 
decision-makers in choosing how and when to use and invest in water. 
This dissertation, contributes to the body of knowledge on how farm agents, canal 
users and water masters interact with each other, as well as with the environment.  
In chapter one, it is established that uncertainty in future water supplies and the 
efficiency of new water-saving technology create similar incentives to delay adoption of 
new water-saving infrastructure investments. It is also affirmed that some water-
conservation technologies may not be efficient enough to trigger investment regardless of 
the price they could receive for the conserved water. While increases in water price in 
response to increasing water scarcity would make these technologies more profitable than 
they would be at lower prices, profits from production would have to be high enough to 
make a case for selling saved water under continued production, and selling all water and 
exiting the industry. 
These observations provide insight as to what measures may be taken to encourage 
water-saving infrastructure investments in the face of the associated inherent uncertainty 
across investment types and geographical areas.  
In chapter two, it is discovered that on-field variability of irrigation system 
performance can have significant impact on the economic incentive to invest in irrigation 
technology. The study found a significant difference in investment behavior which 
incorporated on-field hydro-geological variability into evaluating the economic decision 
to invest in irrigation technology. This study has shown that use of such data has value 
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and may mean the difference between a 75% (three out of four times relative to all-or-
nothing formulation) and 0% investment.  
These two chapters illuminate the disparity between levels of investment in irrigation 
and other conservation technology suggested by net present value evaluations of these 
investments, and observed investment behavior. It is worth noting, that the investment 
thresholds obtained in these models are illustrative, rather than prescriptive, of the effect 
of uncertainty on irrigation investments.  Given actual survey data on when individuals 
purchased water conservation technology, it is possible to parameterize these models to 
look at how changes in the model parameters lead to deviations from actual behavior.  
Here, we are only loosely trying to match actual behavior given the data available. The 
models are thus consistent with individual behavior, but may not be representative of 
average behavior. 
As changing hydroclimatic and socioeconomic conditions continue to inject increased 
variability into decisions once perceived as black or white, it is important for policy and 
planning purposes that studies such as this are conducted in order to provide insight into 
how observed gaps between investment levels suggested by traditional models such as 
discounted cash flow models and observed investment can be explained and thus 
influenced by new and/or supplementary theories of economic decision-making.  
With regards to intensity versus extent of investment, a comparison of results from 
the all-or-nothing and incremental set-ups suggests that the relative effect of water supply 
uncertainty on investment in areas with differing on-field variability is a pertinent 
consideration concerning water conservation goals and planning. State planners, for 
instance, would do well to acknowledge this variability in drawing up water plans and for 
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policy implementation. A slow uptake of prescribed technology may (instead of a 
perceived problem to be tackled with policy and public funds) be the effective working of 
the system to ensure only units of investment which whose benefits offset their 
incremental investment costs are made.  It is thus necessary to jointly consider water 
supply variability (uncertainty), sunk costs (irreversibility) and on-field variability 
(marginal productivity) as factors determining adaptation investments in response to 
changing hydroclimatic conditions in the western United States.   
Chapter three considered a water infrastructure-dictated hierarchical decision-making 
model with heterogeneous users. It examines how differences in water-users and a 
decision-making hierarchy determined by natural and built components of conveyance 
systems affect water allocation. 
In particular, it shows how differing agent objectives as well as topographical 
structure of existing conveyance systems impact water diversions within a canal system. 
It shows that the incorporation of a hierarchical structure with an omniscient water 
master, allows system inefficiencies (e.g. dumping due to use it or lose it requirement) to 
be exploited for improved system-wide benefit, and allows water to be moved towards 
higher valued use.  
It also shows the benefit of information in achieving overall system benefit even in a 
non-cooperative setting. The water master is able to use the information he has on the 
other users in the model, to meet downstream water requirements in an efficient manner. 
Should it be left up to myopic individual users, there is the potential to fall short of this 
consideration and risk stringent regulation. The information benefit is also seen in the 
agricultural user protection as noted above. 
203 
 
Subsequent research efforts will seek to improve computational performance by fine-
tuning system parameters; improving the variable constraints and optimality bounds 
taking advantage of similar studies in the literature, as well as come primary data 
collection from interviews with canal manager in other systems, and reducing symmetries 
in the model. Lessons from the model will also be adapted towards extensions to more 
complicated relationships between water decision makers in a canal system.  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER ONE MATERIAL 
Canal lining investment results 
The main distinction between an irrigation investment and a canal lining investment 
in our model comes from differences in water prices, costs, and water savings.  Because 
water saved by canal lining is often sold rather than leased, the stochastic price process is 
assumed to convey sale prices rather than lease prices. The prices for water rights are 
obtained from the Utah water rights exchange
28
 and the cost estimates from the project 
evaluation documents of the Logan canal reconstruction project (NRCS, 2011). 
Analogous results for the investment model without uncertainty are presented in tables 
1.5 and 1.6 below for reference. 
 
 
Table A.1: Common parameters for Canal Lining Investment 
Interest rate (r) 0.06 
Risk-adjusted discount factor (ρ) 0.12 
Water savings (  ) 40AF 
Initial (one-time) Investment cost (I) $575 
Total Investment cost ( ̂    
 
 
) $135,036 
Initial Water Price (  ) $1500/AF 
 
 
                                                            
28 Waterrightexchange.com/old/ 
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Table A.2: Canal Lining Investment Thresholds 
 
Logan Bear  
Blacksmith-
Fork 
Threshold P (NPV) 3510.936 9122.432 8150.173 
Threshold P (OV) 45463.38 39698.77 41270.49 
Threshold W (NPV) 87601.25 54259.64 34844.03 
Threshold W (OV) 23728.4 25630.5 15235.17 
 
 
Stratonovich versus Ito’s Calculus 
The study begins with the standard initial assumption of a Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM) evolution for the stochastic processes of Water Supply and subsequently 
water price. Initial unit-root tests performed to investigate the validity of this assumption 
initially appear to corroborate the assumption. However, using the derived variance and 
drift parameters to predict the future evolution of the two stochastic processes suggested 
the processes may not be correctly solved under the Ito formulation. 
Clarke and Reed (1989) establish the inappropriateness of the Ito’s calculus approach 
to solving for the drift and variance parameters of a GBM in the description of stochastic 
processes based on size (density) dependent growth rather than the age-dependent growth 
inherently assumed in an Ito calculus application. They aver that while age-dependent 
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growth may be appropriate for the growth of husbanded biological agents such as herds 
of livestock and intensively cultivated tree stands where environmental factors play no 
limiting role, it may be less appropriate for assets of a more wild nature such as 
unintended forest stands, or natural populations of fish and wildlife. 
They posit that in the case of such ‘wild’ agents, growth is more likely to be 
determined by the size/density of the agent in relation to environmental factors such as 
the availability of food, soil nutrients, etc. rather than by the age structure of the 
biological agent population. Given the import of environmental factors on water supply, 
water supply is more likely to follow density-dependent growth, where density in this 
case would be factors like water demand (and thus factors that affect water demand such 
as population growth) and environmental factors such as changing hydroclimatic 
conditions. 
In the case of a density-dependent growth, a Stratonovich calculus approach is more 
appropriate for solving for the drift and variance parameters in the stochastic evolution of 
the resource or biological agent. While estimates from Stratonovich and Ito’s calculus are 
equivalent from an operational point of view, with both providing maximum likelihood 
estimations of parameters, the distinction becomes important for analytic purposes, 
specifically with respect to the uncertainty (variance) parameter, which is pivotal in this 
study. Thus, we employ the Stratonovich calculus approach in our model. 
Reed and Clarke (1990) establish that to correctly determine the effects of price 
uncertainty, it is necessary to establish whether the Ito or Stratonovich form of the GBM 
best described the price of the commodity in question. This question is not easy to resolve 
but is essential in this study. 
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Physical and biological models are typically modeled in terms of an input (driving) 
white noise process, by a stochastic differential equation of the form; 
                                         
 (1) 
This formulation has two main advantages. The first is its amenability to 
mathematical analysis. Solving (1) results in a diffusion process with infinitesimal drift 
        and infinitesimal variance        . The second merit is that while the inherent 
white noise assumption represents a mathematical abstraction, it is a good approximation 
of a variety of noise or other background and environmental random input processes that 
occur naturally in physical and biological contexts (Karlin and Taylor). 
The solution of (1) is in terms of a stochastic integral∫              . Two 
prominent versions of this stochastic integral exist – Ito’s integral and Stratonovich 
integral. Ito’s calculus is an analogue for stochastic processes of the ordinary calculus of 
Leibnitz and Newton and the Ito’s integral plays the role in stochastic calculus that the 
fundamental theorem of calculus plays in ordinary calculus. 
The concept and manipulations of the Stratonovich integral are reduced to 
calculations of related Ito’s processes, and the Stratonovich integral differs from the Ito’s 
integral by a corrective term. In particular, the solution from the Stratonovich calculus 
has the same variance, but a drift co-efficient of            in contrast to    
       
 
 
   for Ito’s calculus. 
Thus, the Stratonovich formulation is used in the paper, to account for this corrective 
term.  
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Figure A.1: Agent water conditions dependent on water allocation policy and 
environmental constraints 
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Figure A.2: Illustration of β>1 condition for positive root of Q(β)
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Figure A.3: Maps of the Middle Bear-Logan watershed indicating the rivers of 
interest (Source: Bear River Watershed Information System, BRWIS, 2011) 
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Sensitivity Analyses Results 
Figure A.4a: 2% sensitivity analysis for water supply (above) and technical (below) 
uncertainty  
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Figure A.4b: 5% sensitivity analysis for water supply (above) and technical (below) 
uncertainty  
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Figure A.4c: 10% sensitivity analysis for water supply (above) and technical (below) 
uncertainty  
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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER THREE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Figure 5.1: Logan Northwest Field Canal 
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Figure 5.2: Stylized Model of Logan North-West Canal System. 
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